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Abstract  
The introduction of highly reliable sensors and remote condition monitoring 
equipment will change the form and functionality of maintenance and 
engineering systems within many infrastructure sectors. Process, transport 
and infrastructure companies are increasingly looking to intelligent 
infrastructure to increase reliability and decrease costs in the future, but 
such systems will present many new (and some old) human factor 
challenges. As the first substantial piece of human factors work examining  
future railway intelligent infrastructure, this thesis has an overall goal to 
establish a human factors knowledge base regarding intelligent 
infrastructure systems, as used in tomorrow¶V UDLOZD\ EXW DOVR LQ PDQ\
other sectors and industries.  
An in-depth interview study with senior railway specialists involved with 
intelligent infrastructure allowed the development and verification of a 
framework which explains the functions, activities and data processing 
stages involved. The framework includes a consideration of future roles and 
activities involved with intelligent infrastructure, their sequence and the 
most relevant human factor issues associated with them, especially the 
provision of the right information in the right quantity and form to the right 
people. 
In a substantial fieldwork study, a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods was employed to facilitate an understanding of alarm 
handling and fault finding in railway electrical control and maintenance 
control domains. These functions had been previously determined to be of 
immediate relevance to work systems in the future intelligent 
infrastructure. Participants in these studies were real railway operators as 
it was impoUWDQWWRFDSWXUHXVHUV¶FRJQLWLRQLQWKHLUZRUNVHWWLQJV0HWKRGV
used included direct observation, debriefs and retrospective protocols and 
knowledge elicitation. 
Analyses of alarm handling and fault finding within real-life work settings 
facilitated a comprehensive understanding of the use of artefacts, alarm 
and fault initiated activities, along with sources of difficulty and coping 
strategies in these complex work settings. The main source of difficulty was 
found to be information deficiency (excessive or insufficient information).  
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Each role requires different levels and amounts of information, a key to 
good design of future intelligent infrastructure. 
The findings from the field studies led to hypotheses about the impact of 
presenting various levels of information on the performance of operators 
for different stages of alarm handling. A laboratory study subsequently 
confirmed these hypotheses. 
The research findings have led to the development of guidance for 
developers and the rail industry to create a more effective railway 
intelligent infrastructure system and have also enhanced human factors 
understanding of alarm handling activities in electrical control. 
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Glossary  
This glossary defined the terms and acronyms as they will be used in this 
thesis.  
AC Alternating Current 
AH Abstraction Hierarchy 
CCF Control Centre of the Future:-a system giving 
information on train delay 
CDM Critical Decision Method 
CSE Cognitive System Engineering 
CTA Cognitive Task Analysis 
CWA Cognitive Work Analysis 
DC Direct Current 
DL 
 
DNO 
 
Decision Ladder 
 
Distributed Network Operator  
DSM Dynamic Situation Management 
E & P Electrification and Plant maintenance 
ECO Electrical Control Operator 
ECR 
 
ECRO  
 
ECOM 
 
FOC 
Electrical Control Room 
 
Electrical Control Room Operator 
 
Extended Control Model  
 
Freight Operating Company  
 
FMS 
 
GB 
 
Fault Management System 
 
Great Britain  
GPS Geographical Positioning System 
IECC Integrated Electronic Control Centre: a type of 
signalling system 
JCS 
 
KE 
 
Joint Cognitive System 
 
Knowledge Elicitation  
MCC Maintenance Control Centres 
MSSCC Manchester South Signalling Control Centre 
NCC National Control Centres 
NDM Naturalistic Decision Making 
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NR Network Rail 
NX Entry-Exit Panel: a type of signalling system 
PCM Point Condition Monitoring 
RCM Remote Condition Monitoring 
S & T Signalling and Telecommunications 
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
SD Standard Deviation 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
TOC Train Operating Company 
TRUST Train Running System on TOPS: A system providing 
information on train delays 
VDU Visual Display Unit 
WDA Work Domain Analysis 
WESTCAD Westinghouse Control and Display 
WMSC West Midland Signalling Centre 
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1. Introduction  
1.1. Railway control, challenges and potential  
The rDLOZD\ LQGXVWU\ LQ WKH 8. SOD\V DQ LPSRUWDQW UROH LQ*UHDW %ULWDLQ¶V
economy by providing more than 1.32 billion passenger journeys annually 
(Network Rail, 2010). Moreover, due to railways being sustainable and 
environmentally friendly, development targets are in place to double this 
capacity by the year 2030 (Dft, 2010). An intelligent infrastructure project 
is one of the projects with the aim of improving the railway service.  
Currently, railway infrastructure is managed and maintained by 
maintenance control centres, which have a wide range of Remote Condition 
Monitoring (RCM) equipment to check the health state of the assets and to 
manage the maintenance process if an asset has failed. These control 
rooms have various RCM and Fault Management Systems (FMS) which are 
often inconsistent, both in terms of content and form of information 
presentation. Intelligent infrastructure was mainly introduced to focus on 
the improvement of the maintenance regime.  
Network Rail (NR), which owns and maintains the UK railway 
infrastructure, launched an intelligent infrastructure project in 2006. 
Railway intelligent infrastructure aims to use the available technology, 
including reliable sensors, to collect data about key infrastructure assets. 
The data then needs to be analysed, using sophisticated algorithms, so 
that personnel can be informed about the current state of the system as 
well as potential future asset states.  
Recent technological and organisational advances have increased the 
potential for remote access and monitoring of the infrastructure in various 
domains and sectors, including water and sewage, oil and gas, and 
transport. These systems enable accurate and relevant information about 
the state of the infrastructure to be generated quickly and for safety and 
efficiency to be enhanced by optimising the use of the infrastructure. The 
chosen research context for this PhD, however, is not the new technology 
itself but the challenges it poses for work design.  
The challenges for the introduction of intelligent infrastructure need to be 
considered in light of the fact that railway control is a socio-technical 
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environment and that different control settings with various capabilities 
DQG UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV KDYH WR ZRUN DORQJVLGH HDFK RWKHU 2SHUDWRUV¶
understanding of the health status of an asset depends very much on the 
knowledge captured from the context as well as the information presented 
through the systems. Therefore, the development of a human factors 
understanding is a necessary precursor to the ability to inform the effective 
design and development of an intelligent infrastructure system.   
In order to develop a thorough human factor understanding of a rail 
intelligent infrastructure it is necessary to know its functionality and its 
potential users and their needs. However, at the time of starting this PhD, 
actual intelligent infrastructure applications did not exist in NR. This is 
despite the fact that they had been launched and examined as part of a 
long term project over two control periods (each control period is 5 years). 
Although a number of strategic views were developed, the organisation 
was unclear about the functionalities, main users and potential interfaces. 
Therefore, the first objective of this study focused on exploring and 
understanding railway intelligent infrastructure.  
Initial exploratory interviews within NR identified a key challenge in 
developing an effective railway intelligent infrastructure to be the provision 
of the right information to the right person at the right time and in the 
right fashion. Clearly, there is a danger that different groups of personnel 
using intelligent infrastructure for different functions and purposes could be 
swamped by the sheer quantity of information provided to them, without it 
being filtered for relevance. They could be provided with information more 
suited to another job function with different goals. This was also confirmed 
through the literature review. Thus, investigation of three areas of 
challenge was found to be essential to develop an understanding and guide 
railway intelligent infrastructure systems. These challenges include 
information overload, multi-agent control and alarm handling.  
Railway control is a dynamic setting, with information being collected from 
a complex and intertwined environment that is monitored by human 
operators who intervene when necessary. The introduction of supervisory 
control systems meant that an increasing number of activities could be 
conducted from the control room and, with the aid of information displays, 
more information could be presented to the operators (e.g. lever frame vs. 
VDU signalling). However, it is important to understand that just because 
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the technology is capable of presenting the information does not mean that 
it will be useful. In this PhD study, various cases of control similar to the 
future intelligent infrastructure system were used to facilitate an 
understanding of the relevance and sufficiency of information for those 
particular tasks.   
In the setting of railway control rooms, although each control room is 
responsible for particular aspects of running and maintaining the railways, 
all work alongside each other for a safer and more efficient rail service. 
Moreover, as control environments move towards integration and 
centralisation, the findings from one control room will be used in others. 
This is identified as multi-agent control. Within the intelligent infrastructure 
project, integrating the information collected from various RCM seems to 
be one of the core characteristics. Therefore, it was important to explore 
the boundaries and roles associated with it.   
Alarms are generated to notify operators of an existing abnormality. In 
other words, alarms are used to help the operators in monitoring the large 
amounts of data that are presented to operators. However, presentation of  
the amount of alarms that an operator can handle and which are also 
meaningful is one of the most important challenges for the design of any 
control setting and has been a contributing factor to many accidents and 
incidents. Therefore, it is important to explore alarm handling in the 
railway context of relevance to future intelligent infrastructure setting.  
To facilitate exploring and informing the challenges mentioned above, 
extensive interviews were conducted with railway experts involved with the 
intelligent infrastructure project to provide a more detailed understanding 
of the concept and to indentify some potential future functions relevant to 
intelligent infrastructure (these were alarm handling and fault finding). 
These functions were then used as the basis to investigate the potential 
challenges (information overload, multi agent control and alarm handling) 
of intelligent infrastructure. The subsequent deeper study of alarm handling 
and fault finding helped in developing an understanding of relevant human 
performance, as well as the associated information and knowledge 
requirements. These studies led to the generation of hypotheses regarding 
optimal information and knowledge presentation to support operators. 
Three follow-up studies (two field studies and one laboratory study) were 
conducted to investigate these hypotheses.  
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The interview studies identified the main roles and functions that are going 
to be involved with intelligent infrastructure. The two field studies were 
performed in representative domains of intelligent infrastructure and 
identified the knowledge and information requirements of operators during 
these activities. This led to the development of a hypothesis regarding the 
information most suitable for each role. The hypotheses developed were 
then investigated via assessment of the performance of different roles 
when presented with different pieces of information in a simulated 
environment.  
The research presented in this thesis takes into account the needs of 
service users, which clearly requires substantial understanding of human 
factors. At the start of this research project, little or no previous research 
into human factors had been carried out with explicit reference to 
intelligent infrastructure systems. A combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods to research human factors was adopted to develop an 
understanding of the intelligent infrastructure domain and explore its main 
roles, potential functions and challenges, with a focus on human factors 
issues. 
Thus, gaps have been identified not only in the guidance available to NR 
regarding the  implementation of an intelligent infrastructure to meet the 
needs of users and  company goals, but also in the  human factors 
research base needed to understand and design these central systems of 
the future. 
,QWKHHYHQWWHFKQLFDODQGRUJDQLVDWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWVIRU1HWZRUN5DLO¶V
intelligent infrastructure have lagged somewhat behind the work of this 
thesis. Therefore, as well as examining potential human factors from a 
fundamental point of view, empirical research was carried out on  the 
current types of work system and information handling that would typify 
work systems for future intelligent infrastructure. 
This PhD project was conducted in conjunction with and partially funded by 
NR, with the researcher based in the Ergonomics Team in NR for long 
periods. This engagement in the organisation provided the researcher with 
access to various departments and projects that helped to establish a 
network of contacts. Strong relationships were also established with 
various control centres, easing the process of collecting field study data.  
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Furthermore, by getting involved in other projects, the researcher obtained 
a thorough understanding of the organisation, the management structure 
and various departments, as well as the culture of the railway industry.  
This facilitated the gathering of information concerning developments in 
ideas and the implementation of intelligent infrastructure systems. 
1.2. Research aims and objectives 
The overall aim of this thesis is to investigate and to understand the 
relevant human factors for a future intelligent infrastructure on the GB 
railway. This involves studies of behaviour, cognitive performance and 
knowledge requirements for current relevant work functions and, in 
prospect, for the future intelligent infrastructure.  
The objectives of this research project are: 
I. Develop a data processing framework that guide and support 
effective implementation of railway intelligent infrastructure from a 
human factors perspective  
The first objective of this research was to understand the scope and 
functionality of railway intelligent infrastructure. A review of the literature 
DQGWKHFRPSDQ\¶V15GRFXPHQWDWLRQ, along with a series of interviews 
(Chapter 5), facilitated this and led to the identification of human factors  
associated with the different roles of railway intelligent infrastructure. 
Moreover, this information was collated within a framework to show the 
relationship between different activities associated with the process to be 
supported by the future railway intelligent infrastructure system.  
II. (VWDEOLVK DQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI RSHUDWRUV¶ VWUDWHJLHV IRU KXPDQ
supervisory control tasks in alarm handling and fault finding.  
One of the main challenges identified for an effective intelligent 
infrastructure system is the provision of information relevant to operators 
in-time. Two functions important in future were identified as intelligent 
infrastructure systems: alarm handling and fault finding. The second 
objective was focused on understanding alarm handling and fault finding.  
In-depth studies (Chapters 6 and 7) were conducted to understand the 
RSHUDWRUV¶EHKDYLRXUZKLOHFRQGXFWLQJWKHVHWDVNV0DLQRXWSXWVLQFOXGHGD
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GHVFULSWLRQRIRSHUDWRUV¶DFWLYLWLHV their cognitive processes and artefacts 
DSSOLHG IUHTXHQF\ DQG RUGHU 0RUH LPSRUWDQWO\ RSHUDWRUV¶ VWUDWHJLHV
when faced with information deficiencies within current control room 
settings were studied (Chapters 6 and 7). The results of this stage of the 
research led to initial identification of µFRSLQJVWUDWHJLHV¶ 
III. Produce human factors guidance for the future development and 
implementation of intelligent infrastructure systems in the railway to 
match and complement human capabilities and needs. 
The findings of the various studies in this PhD programme ultimately 
informed an effective and successful implementation of railway intelligent 
infrastructure. This guidance had two purposes: firstly, it assisted NR in 
designing and developing the intelligent infrastructure and secondly, 
through the methodological approach adopted and practiced, guidance was 
provided to human factors specialists in exploring cognitive work in real-life 
socio-technical systems. 
As a result of this, the main contributions are listed below and later on in 
the thesis will be evaluated (Section 9.1): 
x Establishment of a data processing framework that identified the 
scope and activities within the railway intelligent infrastructure 
x Identification of human factors issues of most importance to a 
successful implementation of railway intelligent infrastructure. 
x Understanding of activities, artefacts and coping strategies during 
railway alarm-handling and fault-finding 
x Demonstration of the value of applying a combination of methods in 
investigating cognition within socio-technical systems  
x Guidance for an effective implementation of railway intelligent 
infrastructure 
1.3. Thesis synopsis 
Chapter 1 provides a general introduction, background to the research, 
aims, objectives, and organisation of the thesis.  
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Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the railway domain and intelligent 
infrastructure system. Two domains of relevance to future railway 
intelligent infrastructure (railway maintenance and electrical control) are 
then reviewed in terms of activities, environments, technologies and 
current issues. This is followed by a review of intelligent infrastructure 
systems in the railway and other domains. The issues that can challenge 
the successful implementation of these systems are identified and there is 
clarification of the research questions that should be addressed  
Chapter 3 presents a literature review of the paradigms that can guide the 
analysis of control and facilitate the research questions of this PhD. Three 
paradigms, information processing, supervisory control and cognitive 
system engineering, are briefly reviewed in this chapter and their relevance 
to this PhD study is emphasised.   
Chapter 4 describes a methodological approach adopted in this research 
and discusses the various methods applied. Advantages and limitations of 
each of the methods, in relation to the context of this study, are briefly 
reported in this chapter and elaborated in the respective chapters.  
Chapter 5 presents the results of thematic content analysis of 20 hours of 
interviews. The interview study was undertaken with key decision makers 
in NR to identify key concepts of intelligent infrastructure within the 
railway. This led to the development of a framework for railway intelligent 
infrastructure, focusing on its information and knowledge requirements and 
human factors issues. Further card-sorting activities were conducted with 
railway control operators, in order to confirm the content and sequence of 
activities suggested in the data processing framework.  
Chapter 6 details the work undertaken to understand alarm-handling within 
a railway control room. Analysis of 18 hours of observational study is 
presented in this chapter. The main findings include alarm-initiated 
activities, order and duration of the use of artefacts while alarm-handling, 
and coping strategies.  
Chapter 7 reports on the work undertaken to understand fault-finding 
within a railway maintenance control centre. 18 hours of field study 
accompanied by semi-structured interviews with maintenance technicians 
are reported in this chapter. The main findings include fault-initiated 
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activities, types of information applied and the order of their importance, 
as well as the strategies adopted by operators to cope with information 
inefficiencies.    
Chapter 8 reports an experimental study conducted to confirm information 
requirements hypothesised through the findings of the interview study 
(Chapter 5) and the understanding of problem solving tasks from alarm-
handling and fault-finding studies (Chapters  6 and 7).  
Chapter 9 presents a discussion of the main findings of this research in 
relation to its objectives.  
Chapter 10 concludes this research, and shows the value of the 
contributions of this PhD and comments on the future work.  
The structure of the chapters of this PhD is shown in Figure 1-1 below, 
which is accompanied by the objectives pursued in each of these chapters.  
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FIGURE 1-1: THESIS STRUCTURE AND PHD OBJECTIVES  
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2. Background: The railway domain and intelligent 
infrastructure  
This chapter introduces the rail domain and the role of railway intelligent 
infrastructure as a facilitator of a safer, more efficient railway. The first 
section briefly introduces the rail domain in the UK. Two control domains of 
most relevance to railway intelligent infrastructure-railway maintenance 
and railway electrical control- are then reviewed in sections two and three. 
Section four reviews intelligent infrastructure in industries and domains 
other than the railways, such as aviation, nuclear power plants, 
manufacturing and health care, IROORZHG E\ D UHYLHZ RI 1HWZRUN 5DLO¶V
approach to railway intelligent infrastructure. Finally, section five use 
relevant key literature to identify the key challenges of intelligent 
infrastructure and key human factors research questions to be addressed 
for successful implementation of intelligent infrastructure systems.  
2.1. Rail domain  
The railway industry in the UK has an effective and ever increasing role in 
%ULWLVK HFRQRPLF DQG FRPPHUFLDO JURZWK )RU WRGD\¶V FRVW DQG HQHUJ\-
aware public, railways offer an easy, accessible, and sustainable mode of 
transport. Therefore, there is a need to improve the capacity of trains to 
meet increasing passenger numbers (Dft, 2010).  
The railways in Britain comprise a large, complex and intertwined network 
of rail across nine regional routes. There are nearly 20,000 miles of track, 
40,000 bridges and tunnels and 2,500 stations (Network Rail, 2010). 
Network Rail (NR) owns and maintains the GB railway network in order for 
Train Operating Companies (TOCs) and Freight Operating Companies 
(FOCs) to run passenger and freight services.  
TOCs rent the track lines to run their trains. If there are problems with the 
service for which NR is responsible, TOCs are entitled to a fine payable by 
NR due to the damage to their business. Therefore, it is in the best interest 
of NR that faults are managed optimally to keep delays to a minimum. 
Hence, it is critical within NR that all processes work together to ensure 
safe and efficient running of the service.  
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There are three main control processes responsible for running and 
maintaining the railways: signalling control is mainly responsible for 
running the service, electrical control supplies the electrical resources for 
the running of the electric track and maintenance control is responsible for 
maintaining the infrastructure.    
&RQWUROURRPVLQWRGD\¶V railway have systems ranging from 19th century 
lever frames (Figure 2-1) through to Visual Display Units (VDU) systems 
dating from the mid 1990s (Figure 2-2). Despite their differences in terms 
of technological advance, the objectives of these systems are effectively 
the same: 1- to capture information from assets (tracks, signals, electrical 
supplies, trains, etc.), 2- to monitor the performance of the service safely 
and efficiently and, 3- to facilitate human intervention if necessary. 
 
FIGURE 2-1: LEVER FRAME SIGNAL BOX 
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FIGURE 2-2: VDU SIGNALLING 
Of the three control domains mentioned earlier, maintenance and electrical 
control show many of the characteristics (monitoring of asset status,  
maintenance of assets, the need to provide continuous availability of 
infrastructure) that intelligent infrastructure is intended to provide (This 
assumption will be elaborated on in section 2.4). It is also likely that at 
least some of the activities of current maintenance and electrical control 
will be migrated into any new intelligent infrastructure-based control 
environment. With that in mind, the next two sections provide a detailed 
illustration of the nature of both maintenance and electrical control. Each 
control environment is reviewed in terms of the roles of the operators, their 
main activities and the technologies available to them. 
2.2. Railway maintenance control   
Maintenance control is responsible for managing and maintaining the 
wellbeing of the railway infrastructure to ensure the safe and efficient 
running of the service. Today, railway maintenance is managed through 
three sub-groups in the maintenance department: Signalling and 
Telecommunication (S&T), Track Maintenance, and Electrification and Plant 
(E & P).  
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Maintenance operators are responsible for maintaining the railway 
infrastructure in a safe way to facilitate the punctual and efficient running 
of the service. There are generally three different roles within maintenance 
control. In most maintenance control centres, one operator is responsible 
for all of these roles.  
The first role of the maintenance operator is to observe the state of assets 
in the infrastructure (e.g. a failed point machine on the track). When 
he/she notices the failure of an asset, he/she then will plan the rectifying 
procedure and inform respective operational teams. 
The second role is to guide the maintenance team on the rail track to 
diagnose and fix a fault. Maintenance technicians have access to the live 
status of assets via remote condition monitoring systems. Therefore, when 
track workers are testing equipment, they can be informed whether their 
actions have been effective or not.  
The third role is to record the performance of assets and inform policy 
makers so that they can adjust the maintenance regime accordingly. For 
example if a certain point machine keeps failing, then the maintenance 
technician reports it to a route controller so that a wider investigation will 
be carried out.  
2.2.1. Activities  
In order to meet the responsibilities associated with their roles, 
maintenance control operators conduct a number of activities. This is not 
specific to any one of the roles and is spread across all three. According to 
1HWZRUN 5DLO¶V MRE VSHFLILFDWLRQ 1HWwork Rail, 2006) the role of 
maintenance technician control is generally to monitor, handle alarms, plan 
the rectifying procedure and communicate with different railway 
stakeholders.  
Maintenance control operators have a wide range of information displays 
available to them, providing information on the status of the assets in their 
area of coverage. Operators have to monitor these displays on a regular 
basis to check the performance of the assets. 
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Because it is not possible to monitor the status of assets constantly, alarms 
are used. When there is an abnormality, Remote Condition Monitoring 
(RCM) systems identify the failure and notify the maintenance control 
operator via an audible siren. The operators will then have to handle the 
alarms and plan the clearance procedure.  
For example, when a point machine is failed on the track, the maintenance 
operator will notice the fault through an audible alarm generated by the 
RCM system (e.g. Point Condition Monitoring). Moreover, if the 
maintenance workstation is located in the signal box, the signaller orally 
informs the maintenance operators about the fault.  
The maintenance operator uses condition monitoring systems to play back 
and simulate the condition of the point machine to the moment of its 
failure. This helps the operator to diagnose the causes of the failure. Often, 
this is not sufficient for diagnosing the failure and the operator sends a 
track maintenance team to investigate. In the meantime, he informs the 
signaller of potential delays that will affect the operation of the service.  
The railway is a socio-technical environment; communicating between 
different control rooms and operators is a core part of any role. 
Maintenance control operators tend to communicate with signallers, train 
drivers, track workers, TOC representative and members of public.  
2.2.2. Environments 
There are generally two types of maintenance control rooms in the UK 
railways and each is equipped with a wide and varied range of 
technologies, from a workstation located in the signal box (i.e. signalling 
maintenance) to a control room dedicated to managing and directing the 
overall maintenance activity (i.e. National Control Centres). These two 
types of control rooms are briefly described below.  
National Control Centres (NCC) (Figure 2-3) are responsible for monitoring 
and maintaining the railway within specified geographical routes in the UK 
railway network. They are equipped with advanced systems, such as RCM 
systems, timetable schedules, etc. and are responsible for supporting 
different control processes: signallers, electrical control room operators, 
train drivers, TOCs, and outside agencies, such as transport police.  
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FIGURE 2-3: LONDON NORTH EAST NATIONAL CONTROL CENTRE 
The second type of maintenance is more local: it focuses on maintaining 
the operational railways (i.e. signals, points, etc.) and manages the faults 
that affect the running of the service (Figure 2-4). These control rooms are 
usually adjacent to signal boxes or consist of one workstation in a signal 
box. They use a variety of equipment and RCM systems as well as 
signalling video panels that present a schematic indication of the location 
of a train. In the present thesis, operators residing in these control rooms 
ZLOOEHUHIHUUHGWRDVµmaintenance WHFKQLFLDQV¶. 
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FIGURE 2-4: MANCHESTER SOUTH MAINTENANCE CONTROL CENTRE 
2.2.3. Technologies 
RCM systems have been used in the rail network for many years. By 2006, 
NR had 3000 RCM systems across its infrastructure, monitoring 30 asset 
types (Ollier, 2006). RCM systems in NR are divided into two groups: train-
borne RCMs and trackside RCMs. A train-borne RCM is facilitated by 
sensors that are installed on a train, while a trackside RCM has been made 
possible by the help of sensors directly installed on the infrastructure (Bint, 
2008). Examples of trackside RCMs include Points Condition Monitoring 
(PCM), Earth Leakage Detection, Weather Station and Relay Room 
Temperature Monitoring. 
The most common interfaces used in these two types of maintenance 
control rooms are summarised in Table 2-1  
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TABLE 2-1: EXAMPLE OF THE INTERFACES COMMONLY USED IN SIGNALLING 
MAINTENANCE AND NATIONAL CONTROL CENTRES 
Asset 
monitored  
Control system  Description Location 
Signal, point 
machines, 
buildings  
:HVW/RFN
Technician 
Workstation  
Developed by 
Westinghouse Rail 
6\VWHPVIRUXVHE\
signalling technicians 
for monitoring, control 
and fault diagnosis.  
Signal box 
& NCC 
Signals, 
point 
machines,   
:HVW&DG Developed by 
Westighouse Rail 
6\VWHPVLWDOVR
generates information 
about power, fire, 
intruders and HVAC 
regarding the remote 
building with sensitive 
assets within. 
Although it provides 
detailed logged data it 
does not facilitate 
much diagnosis.   
Track 
circuits  
Point 
machines  
Ansaldo (Asset 
watch and Track 
watch) 
Two web-based 
interfaces developed 
E\$QVDOGRWR
provide event logs to 
GHVFULEHDVVHWV¶
EHKDYLRXU$QVDOGR
provides information 
regarding swing times 
of points, voltage and 
current in individual 
circuits.  
Signal box 
& NCC 
Rail 3266 Developed by Strukton 
6\VWHPIRURQOLQH
condition monitoring 
system of point 
machines. It facilitates 
access to historical 
data, analysis, logbook 
and setting 
performance 
indicators. 
NCC 
Track, 
weather 
condition  
:KHHOFKH[ Developed by AEA 
WHFKQRORJ\DQG
monitors the load 
produced in the rail by 
the wheels of each 
passing train and 
measures the size and 
impact of forces from 
damaged wheels.   
NCC 
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Signals, 
track circuit  
Rail weather 
systems  
Developed by 
VaisalaWRXVH
weather forecasts and 
predict the future state 
of assets and adjust 
train speeds 
accordingly.   
Signal box 
& NCC 
Signals, 
track circuit 
TRUST  It provides information 
regarding timetables 
of trains and checks 
whether they are 
running according to 
the planned schedule.  
Signal box 
& NCC 
2.2.4. Current issues  
The technical facilities used in maintenance control are developed by 
different companies, have various capabilities and have been used 
alongside each other. Therefore, there are duplicated and, in some cases, 
inconsistent pieces of information available to the operators. For example, 
in the York NCC WKHUH DUH ERWK 3266 DQG $16$/'2 V\VWHPV WKDW
provide information regarding the condition of the point machines. 
Moreover, these systems are not perfect and there are uncertainties 
involved with them. For example, the loss of connection between the 
logger and the interface can prevent operators from accessing online track 
data. Therefore, the operator cannot diagnose the fault remotely and will 
have to send an investigation team onto the track.  
One of the main problems faced by the maintenance operators is the 
volume of alarms and alerts that are presented to the operators. This is 
due to the huge number of assets being monitored and also due to 
duplications involved with various RCM systems. 
2.3. Electrical control  
Rail Electrical Control Rooms (ECRs) in the UK were originally integrated 
from a number of adjacent railway traction power supply systems. Since 
1932, Electrical Control Room Operators (ECROs) have been responsible 
for remotely opening and closing electrical equipment, instructing staff on 
the operation of manual switches, and leading the maintenance and fault-
finding of electrification distribution and Direct Current (DC) traction 
equipment. To do so, they have two main roles. 
Chapter 2: Background: The railway domain and intelligent infrastructure   
 
19 
 
The first role is to monitor the status of the electrical supply. If there is loss 
of power on the railway tracks, the operator is notified by the SCADA 
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems), and proceeds with the 
appropriate rectifying procedure.  
The second role is to manage and plan the isolation of the tracks when a 
maintenance team needs to work on the track. This also involves 
programming the isolations and switching circuit breakers, informing the 
maintenance team, as well as the signaller controlling that area, about the 
state of the track.  
2.3.1. Activities 
In order to meet the responsibilities associated with their roles, ECROs 
carry out a number of activities. These include monitoring, alarm handling, 
isolating and communicating.  
Similar to the railway maintenance control, monitoring is one of the core 
activities in electrical control. Operators have to monitor the SCADA 
displays in order to get an overview of the state of the power supply on 
different railway tractions.  
Since continuous monitoring of various infrastructural assets is not 
possible, alarms are used to notify operators when there is a problem with 
the safe provision of electrical supplies. Operators notice the alarms 
through an audible siren and handle them depending on their type and 
priority. 
When there is maintenance work scheduled on the tracks, the ECROs have 
to isolate the tractions from the rest of the power supply network so that 
track workers can work on and around the railway track safely. At the 
beginning of each week, a schedule of the planned maintenance work is 
presented to the ECRO. They have to assess and programme these 
isolation requests and prepare them for the ECRO who is going to be on 
shift on the night of the maintenance work. (Most maintenance work is 
conducted during the night shift to avoid service disruptions). Furthermore, 
there are certain situations (e.g. trespass) where the ECRO has to perform 
an emergency isolation.  
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Communication is one of the key activities within the electrical control: 
operators have to get the information from railway track workers and 
maintenance teams to ensure that the tracks are safe to work on. They 
need to inform the signallers whether the tracks are ready and safe for the 
trains to run and, on some occasions, they communicate with members of 
the public when they have to handle an emergency situation. 
2.3.2. Environment 
ECRs are placed separately from signal boxes and maintenance control 
centres. At present, there are 13 electrical control centres under the 
control of NR: five Alternating Current (AC) ECRs (Cathcart, Crewe, Rugby, 
Romford and York) and eight DC ECRs (Lewisham, Brighton, Eastleigh, 
Selhurst, Raynes Park, Canterbury, Paddock Wood and Sandhills). 
2.3.3. Technologies  
$FFRUGLQJWR15¶V³6SHFLILFDWLRQIRUUHPRWHFRQWUROHTXLSPHQWIRUHOHFWULFDO
GLVWULEXWLRQ V\VWHPV´ KDQGERRN 1HWZRUN 5DLO  FRQWURO GLVSOD\V LQ
ECR are human machine interfaces, which display either a mimic diagram 
operated through physical keys and push buttons (Figure 2-5), or full 
graphic VDUs operated through keyboard and mice (Figure 2-6). 
Supervisory control systems in electrical control rooms are in the form of 
SCADA systems. 
As an example, the workstation specification of Lewisham ECR is briefly 
described. Lewisham ECR (Figure 2-6) has three workstations with similar 
information available to all of them. Two ECROs are actively responsible for 
monitoring and operating the systems simultaneously and the third 
workstation is used for emergency situations. Apart from dynamic 
information displays on their desks, there is a static board covering one 
wall of the ECR. This board illustrates an outline of the electrical system 
laid out on the rail network within the area under control. Although the 
board is no longer up to date, some of the less experienced operators use 
this to familiarise themselves with the area. The screen layout of the high 
resolution graphic VDU displays contains the following: alarm banner, 
menu bar/area, system information bar (including date, time, operator log-
in identity), command/error message bar, picture display area, system 
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overview and detailed operating/outstation page or general/system-wide 
pages (e.g. index pages, lists, event logs, trend displays, data 
communication network and status page, current alarm log or AC system 
overview). 
There are three displays on each of the workstations, which are normally 
arranged in the following order (Figure 2-6): 
x Left hand screenÆ supply system overview 
x Central screenÆ operational display  
x Right hand screenÆ alarm information or AC overview (where 
supply system is DC) 
The operational display, as its name suggests, is used to apply operating 
procedures. The other two displays are used to identify and interpret 
problems. 
 
FIGURE 2-5: ELECTRICAL CONTROL ROOM CONTROL PANEL 
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FIGURE 2-6: ELECTRICAL CONTROL ROOM SCADA 
2.3.4. Current Issues  
One of the main problems faced with ECROs is the volume of alarms 
generated by the SCADA. This is especially the case when one abnormality 
triggers other problems and an alarm avalanche occurs. Alarms generated 
in Lewisham ECR in one week from 29/01/2009 to 05/02/2009 were 
totalled to 1884 alarms. Although operators do not have to respond 
immediately to all of these alarms, the number of alarms is a considerable 
issue.  
)XUWKHUPRUH FRPPXQLFDWLRQ DV WKH NH\ SDUW RI (&52V¶ DFWLYLWLHV LV QRW
very efficient. The ECRO is often 2nd or 3rd in line for receiving information. 
For example, in the case of unplanned maintenance work (e.g. due to a 
failed signal), the ECRO would not know until the person in charge of the 
maintenance team needs to get access to the track, whereas the signaller 
would know immediately since the signals in his/her area of coverage have 
failed. However, there are no regulated procedures that would enhance this 
communication.  
2.4. Intelligent infrastructure systems  
Railway development projects were put in place to respond to the shortage 
in infrastructural resources, in order to meet growing demand for capacity 
(Dft, 2010). Crainic et al., (2009) have pointed out that building new 
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infrastructure to fulfil these demands is no longer an option. A more 
optimal approach to infrastructure maintenance is therefore necessary and 
that is to move from breakdown maintenance (fixing after failure) and 
time-based preventive maintenance (fixing following a periodical 
inspection) to predictive maintenance (fixing before failure).  
Reliable sensors, sophisticated algorithms and advanced surveillance 
systems have enabled live monitoring of the infrastructure in complex work 
environments.  This architecture has different names in various industries, 
such as Condition Monitoring Systems in power plants (Hameed et al., 
2009): Condition Based Maintenance in mechanical systems (Jardine et al., 
2006), Structural Health Monitoring in aviation (Buderath & Neumair, 
2007) Pervasive Healthcare in medical systems (Drew & Westenskow, 
2006).  
Integrated information systems to support maintenance and monitoring 
have long been used in different industries and domains. Some examples 
include: manufacturing (Lau, 2002; Jardine et al., 2006), undersea and 
petro-chemical (Strasunskas, 2006), space exploration  (Park et al.,  
2006), civil infrastructure (Aktan et al., 1998; Aktan  et al., 2000), water 
and sewage (Adriaens, et al., 2003), defence (Jones et al., 1998) and 
transportation (King, 2006; Lyons and Urry , 2006; Ollier, 2006; Khan, 
2007; Blythe and Bryan, 2008).  
NR is planning to develop an intelligent infrastructure system as a key part 
of its future development. It is mainly considered as a means of 
centralising and integrating the support that is currently provided to 
infrastructure maintenance by monitoring the condition of assets remotely. 
Potential failure or unnecessary fixed-term replacements will then be 
prevented by providing relevant information to the maintenance function. 
Another main use of intelligent infrastructure in the railway is to facilitate 
optimal asset maintenance. Currently, maintaining assets is performed 
through fixed schedules. This time consuming, costly and risky approach 
can be replaced by analysing real-time asset information and attending to 
track-side equipment only when necessary. Therefore, intelligent 
infrastructure in rail will be introduced to move the railway, and especially 
LWVPDLQWHQDQFHDQGHQJLQHHULQJDFWLYLWLHVIURPDµILQGDQG IL[¶PHQWDOLW\WR
µSUHGLFWDQGSUHYHQW¶DQGSRWHQWLDOO\WRµGHVLJQDQGSUHYHQW¶(Bint, 2008). 
Chapter 2: Background: The railway domain and intelligent infrastructure   
 
24 
 
Figure 2-7 below shows a visualisation of intelligent infrastructure on the 
rail network. This is a simplified version of the model that NR applied to 
guide the implementation of a pilot intelligent infrastructure system 
(Network Rail, 2009). The oval on the left hand side of the figure shows 
some of the infrastructural assets (e.g. embankment, point, signal, level 
crossing, and track) that can potentially benefit from a more optimal 
maintenance regime. Loggers or other data acquisition devices collect 
information regarding these assets (i.e. remote condition measuring). Data 
presented in current systems, such as RCM systems, are presented in an 
integrated database. A strategic infrastructure solution is then required to 
extract the optimum information and present it to the appropriate 
RSHUDWRUV ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV µNetwork Rail is aiming to centralise all data 
derived from all RCM systems¶%LQW pp.3).  
At the time of writing this thesis, NR successfully piloted the intelligent 
infrastructure system between Edinburgh and Glasgow. Over 5000 points 
and 700 signalling power supplies were monitored, leading to over 400 
positive interventions (Network Rail, 2011). Details of the pilot and various 
phases of the project are discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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Strategic intelligent 
infrastructure solution  
Acquire data through 
new data acquisition device or 
loggers 
Examples of rail 
infrastructural 
assets 
Rail track
Level crossing 
Embankment
Signal 
Point machine
Existing proprietary applications 
 
FIGURE 2-7: SIMPLIFIED HIGH LEVEL MODELLING OF INTELLIGENT 
INFRASTRUCTURE IN NETWORK RAIL  
Previous research studies have mainly focused on developing more 
sophisticated and advanced RCM systems for the railway (Marquez & 
Schmid, 2007; Hull, Roberts, & Hillmansen, 2010). The existing proprietary 
applications in Figure 2-7 mainly refer to RCM systems. After prioritising 
failures according to their criticality, RCM enables a human operator  to 
programme the maintenance process in order to mitigate the risk of those 
failures (Carretero et al., 2003). Since these systems are very costly to 
implement, only a number of assets in the railway are being monitored 
with RCM equipment. These are selected on the basis of their safety 
criticality and the effect of their failure on the efficiency of the service (i.e. 
delays and track availability).   
Fararooy (1998) and Clark (2005) investigated RCM systems in railways, 
and pointed to the following limitations for developing an effective RCM 
system: 
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x RCM systems applied in railways are usually standalone systems 
with their own dedicated user interface  
x Lack of standardisation across applications as well as maintenance 
practices 
x Technological issues in developing railway specialised RCM systems   
x Wide scope of coverage  
x Diversity of equipment that needs to be monitored  
x Conflict of interests between various departments, diversity of 
benefits  
x Diversity of responsibilities, with users being responsible for a 
number of tasks  
Carretero et al., (2003) investigated the large-scale application of RCM 
equipment for railway infrasWUXFWXUHWRIDFLOLWDWHDµSUHYHQWLYHPDLQWHQDQFH¶
regime. The need to engage users throughout the development process 
ZDVWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQWDQGWKHIROORZLQJZDVSRLQWHGRXW µeven the best 
methodology in the world will fail if management, staff and workers do not 
support it (Carretero et al., 2003,pp.259)¶ 
Despite detailed and on-going work, conducted to understand and improve 
RCM systems in the railway (Garcia Marquez, Roberts, & Tobias, 2007; 
Lagnebäck, 2007; McHutchon, Staszewski, & Schmid, 2005), almost all of 
the limitations apart from the technical issues still persist. These problems 
have nearly caused RCM systems to lose their business case in railways 
(Bell, 2008). It seems that, in designing these systems, human factor 
issues have not been considered at the early stages.  
Review of the literature of intelligent infrastructure systems in various 
domains (Jardine et al., 2006; Adriaens et al., 2003; Aktan et al., 1998; 
Blythe & Bryan, 2008; King, 2006) confirms that, although these systems 
differ in terms of components and complexity, the main process consists of 
five stages: 
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x Capturing data and attributes from domain components; attributes 
can refer to the environment in which the component is located, its 
age, type, etc. 
Jardine et al., (2006) pointed out that, in the first stage (data acquisition), 
two types of data should be considered: event data and condition 
monitoring data. The former looks into what happened (e.g. breakdown, 
overhaul) and the latter measures the health status of the infrastructure. 
However, they suggest that, despite the importance of collecting event 
data, it is often neglected by developers who wrongly assume that the 
recording of only condition monitoring data will suffice.  
x Patterns of component behaviour are produced. This can be 
achieved through studying historical data or experimental findings.  
This stage includes data cleaning, to ensure that the data is relevant and 
error free, along with data analysis. The data analysis is usually conducted 
through algorithms and mainly includes signal processing, image analysis, 
time-domain analysis and frequency domain analysis (Jardine et al., 2006).  
x Generate system diagnostics and prognostics, followed by the 
analysis of recognised patterns. 
In this stage, sophisticated algorithms are used to assist operators in 
diagnosing faults and suggest rectifying procedures. Although much has 
been done in developing and analysing diagnostics information (Hameed et 
al., 2009), it is more difficult to develop rectifying procedures and present 
operators with a number of options. This can be related to the difficulty in 
understanding the behaviour of assets and, in particular, lack of 
appropriate understanding of the situational information associated with 
the failure.  
x Transfer diagnostics and prognostics to relevant operators. 
In order to ensure effective implementation of an intelligent infrastructure 
system, data obtained from the infrastructure must be transformed into 
useful information, as well as being exploited in the optimal way (Crainic, 
2009). Failure to define the correct purpose for the data may result in the 
system presenting too little information or overloading the operator with 
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inappropriate information. Hence, it is important to realise what level of 
detail is required. For instance, does the operator require a simple binary 
(working / failed) assessment of the status of an asset, or a sufficiently 
detailed measurement? Moreover, the operator should know the effect of 
the measured condition on the overall run of the service in order to predict 
potential failures and behaviours of the asset in the future.   
x Update the pattern log with new conditions. 
This is the stage where information and knowledge captured in earlier 
stages are now fed back to the system (e.g. using artificial intelligence, 
DUWLILFLDOQHXUDOQHWZRUNVRUVLPSO\RSHUDWRU¶V feedback). However, eliciting 
knowledge from real-world maintenance practice is not very 
straightforward and it is not easy to document it digitally for future use 
(Jardine et al., 2006). One solution to facilitate and support this feature is 
to develop a robust understanding of problem solving and fault finding 
SUDFWLFHDVZHOODVRSHUDWRUV¶NQRZOHGJHDQGLQIRUPDWLRQUHTXLUHPHQWV 
Aktan et al., (1998) conducted exploratory research to investigate the 
issues associated with remote sensing of the asset conditions during live 
operations while developing highway bridges. They confirm that, in doing 
so, a wide knowledge of advanced sensors, communication and information 
technology, state parameters, environment, deterioration mechanism and 
performance measures is required. Such intelligent infrastructure systems 
should be able to:  
x Sense the definitive features on the piece of infrastructure 
x Assess the condition by analysing the information captured and 
performance criteria 
x Communicate the findings through appropriate interfaces 
x Learn from infrastructure condition patterns  
x Decide the optimum course of action 
From this, they suggested three main factors to be considered in order to 
develop an effective intelligent infrastructure system: 
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1. The knowledge required for diagnosing problems 
2. The technology necessary for transmitting the knowledge  
3. The people who will work with the technology 
Similarly, Adriaens et al. (2003) noted the stages required for the 
development of intelligent infrastructure for sustaining water resources as: 
specifying boundaries of the system, providing adequate quantifications 
that enable trend analysis, identifying quality indicators and methods for 
interpretation of data and integration of use  (Adriaens et al., 2003). These 
stages reflect the need for reliable and accurate sensors that enable the 
acquisition of useful data.  
From the three factors identified by Adriaens, et al., (2003), technology is 
the least problematic one, especially with the advent of highly sophisticated 
algorithms, artificial intelligence applications, neural network algorithms, 
etc (Adeli & Jiang, 2009). The other two factors (i.e. knowledge and 
people) are more difficult to tackle and usually system developers wrongly 
assume that they can overcome this lack of understanding with additional 
technical functionality, which in practice may lead to more problems.  
Crainic et al., (2009) have explained that we are back to where we started 
15 years ago; the main reason for the introduction of  intelligent systems 
was to deal with the exhausted resources at a time when it was not 
possible to build any more infrastructures to cope with the capacity 
demand. Today the problem remains, as we have exhausted our resources 
again. This time, the resources concern the capacity for operators to 
comprehend and act on the volume of information they are presented with 
(it is hardly possible to present any more information to operators in 
control rooms). Therefore, one of the most important challenges facing the 
success of an intelligent infrastructure system is the management of 
information within the system.  
As mentioned in the previous sections, railway control systems have 
enabled the control of large areas with complex intertwined components 
and have revolutionised the look and functionality of control systems. It 
seems that intelligent infrastructure aims to improve this functionality by 
managing and integrating the existing technologies, thereby assisting 
operators to make more informed decisions. However, the review of the 
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potential domains of intelligent infrastructure (Section 2.2 and Section 2.3) 
suggests a number of challenges that will be potentially even more 
problematic with the introduction of intelligent infrastructure systems. 
These include: 
x Information overload 
x Multi-agent control  
x Alarm handling  
2.4.1. Information overload 
One of the recurring questions in designing dynamic control environments 
such as a railway control is whether more is better. Process and transport 
control systems collect data remotely from complex environments, 
enabling operators to monitor and intervene if necessary (Sheridan, 1992).  
Within railways, advanced technologies, such as the switch from manual 
control to automation, the introduction of highly reliable sensors and the 
application of sophisticated algorithms, have increased the volume of data 
available to operators in their decision making. While this creates 
opportunities for more efficient control, it also places an increasing 
cognitive demand on the operator. 
For example, in Manchester South maintenance signalling centre, 
$QVDOGR V\VWHPV DUH EHLQJ XVHG ZLWK 3266 VLJQDOOLQJ SDQHOV 75867
and CCF. It is important to understand how operators manage the 
information that is presented to them and how they direct their attention 
towards the most useful pieces of information.  
Similar research in complex environments has shown that operators are 
disadvantaged by the provision of multiple sources of information as well 
as multiple opportunities for actions (Omodei et al., 2005; Seagull et al., 
2001). Two examples of information overload include:   
x There is too much information to handle. For example in the Three 
Mile Island incident, operators were bombarded with too many 
alarms with no diagnostic information. In the first few minutes 
alone, more than 500 alarms were generated (Campbell, 1988).  
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x Getting lost in complex sources of information, where the operator 
finds it difficult to make decisions, was evident in the case of the 
USS Vincent shooting down a civilian Iran Air plane because it was 
mistakenly identified as military aircraft on the system (Mitchell et 
al., 2004).   
In an experimental study conducted by Omodei et al., (2005) the average 
performance of fire-fighters was significantly better when they were 
presented with incomplete information compared to situations in which 
they were presented with complete information. The reason suggested for 
this degraded performance was that, in the case of the complete 
information, operators could not optimally prioritise the information in the 
time provided. In other words, the problem of precedence of the 
information inspection over action generation reduced their overall 
performance.   
Understanding and assessing the relevant and sufficient information have 
been mainly the focus of  control domains with high time pressures, 
associated with activities such as fire-fighting (Omodei et al., 2005), health 
care (Seagull et al., 2001) and the military (Thunholm, 2005), to name but 
a few. Despite the alignment of control systems with these standards, 
optimal information presentation is highly dependent on the task that is 
being performed (Speier, 2006). Therefore, there should be a balance 
between the number of tasks for which operators are responsible and the 
amount of information made available to them. Cummings and Mitchell 
(2007) noted that there are limits to how much information operators can 
keep track of before they demonstrate degraded performance.   
In order to facilitate an understanding of these issues in the domain of the 
present study, the following research questions are relevant to this thesis: 
1. What is the optimal hierarchy of information presentation that is 
going to be required within an intelligent infrastructure task? 
2. What is the optimum level of information for a particular problem 
solving task? 
3. How do operators deal with the problem of multiple sources of 
information in railway problem solving? 
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2.4.2. Multi-agent control  
Control environments are moving more and more towards integration and 
centralisation. Therefore, the information generated in one control room 
will be used in another. For example, in railway maintenance, the 
information presented to the maintenance operator in the national control 
centre will be used by track workers. Moreover, different operators are 
responsible for different aspects of a decision making task. The cooperation 
between personnel with different roles within the control environment is a 
key aspect of the success of these control processes.  
Two aspects of the work that should be analysed in order to understand 
and inform these multi agent control systems are:  
1. What are the roles involved with these systems?  
2. What are the goals and objectives of each of those roles?   
There are multiple operators within an intelligent infrastructure system, 
any of whom at any one time might assume a different role and therefore 
require a level of support appropriate to this role. For example, in railway 
intelligent infrastructure, if we assume that  asset failure prevention is the 
ultimate goal, the information provided by the system will be used 
differently by different people (from the track worker on a railway site to 
the operator in a control room and ultimately by the policy maker).  
Hoc (2001) looked into the concept of cooperation between different 
agents in the dynamic environment (e.g. interface, operators, etc.). 
Depending on the situation and the level of autonomy of the agents, they 
have different levels of cooperation with each other and their own 
particular activities to perform. He has recommended that one way of 
developing an understanding of levels of coordination is to decompose one 
goal (i.e. solving a problem) into its sub-goals and look into the activities of 
different agents during each sub-goal. The important point that needs to be 
considered here is that the study has focused on goals rather than tasks. 
Johansson and Hollnagel (2007) confirm the incremental change that is 
LPSRVHGRQKXPDQRSHUDWRUVZLWKLQWRGD\¶VFRPSOH[FRQWUROURRPDQGDOVR
the challenge that is created by changes in their control boundaries. The 
ECOM (Extended Control Model), which describes different stages of the 
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control process for a single controller, can also relate to the activities 
distributed amongst multiple operators. Therefore, it is important to 
understand the boundaries between the different roles of intelligent 
infrastructure and to support each role accordingly.  
Johanssen (1997) conducted a study in control environments in the cement 
industry, where several roles from different domains (i.e. control room 
operators, field operators, maintenance personnel, operational engineers, 
laboratory personnel, etc.) need to cooperate in order to make an 
operational decision. He has developed an information flow from a series of 
expert knowledge elicitation studies to inform the effective implementation 
of these systems. Among the main findings, he recommends that the visual 
and mental coherence of information presented to the operators should be 
considered in order to support effective data acquisition. Operators have a 
sequential approach towards certain sources of information when they 
want to collect information regarding a particular problem. Presenting this 
information in a cohesive way that matches their mental model and 
cognitive processing is necessary for effective decision making.    
Thus, the following research questions are relevant to this thesis: 
1. What are the different roles involved in railway intelligent 
infrastructure? 
2. Thinking about potential functions of a railway intelligent 
infrastructure, what is the sequence of activities?  
2.4.3. Alarm handling  
Technical advances in designing complex control settings allow huge 
amounts of data to be collected from various remote sensors. Presenting 
all of these data seems to be both impossible and unreasonable. Alarms 
are then introduced to assist human operators in managing these 
numerous sources of data.  
According to the Health and Safety Executive in the UK,  poor alarm 
handling continues to be a major safety issue (Wilkinson & Lucas, 2002). It 
was reported as a contributing factor in many major accidents, such as 
Three Mile Island in 1979 (Campbell, 1988) and the Texaco refinery 
explosion in 1994 (Wilkinson & Lucas, 2002; Timms, 2009). In 
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transportation, aircraft hazard reports confirm that problems with alarms 
have contributed to about 50% of all incidents recorded between the years 
of 1984-1994 (Gilson et al., 2001).  
In the Ladbroke Grove enquiry report, alarm handling was noted as a 
contributing factor (Cullen, 2000). Similarly, poor alarm handling is 
suggested to have had an assisting role in the Channel Tunnel Fire (Brown, 
1999). Major problems associated with alarms include alarm flooding, poor 
system state indication, poor priority management and nuisance alarms 
(Wilkinson & Lucas, 2002; Gilson et al., 2001; Seagull & Sanderson, 2001).  
Woods (1995) conducted a study to understand alarm handling in various 
domains and to explore the cognitive activities associated with it. He 
suggested that the alarm problem can be addressed from two viewpoints: 
perceptual functions and how informative the alarms are. The former 
focuses on perceptual signals used to identify abnormal conditions, as well 
as their alerting potential, whereas the latter relates to alarm semantics 
and how informative they are (Woods, 1995). 
Many key research projects have focused on alarm handling response 
times (Stanton, 2006), direction of attention (Woods, 1995; Gilson et al., 
2001) PRGHOOLQJ WKH RSHUDWRUV¶ GLDJQRVWLF SUocedures (Woods, 1995; 
Stanton & Baber, 2006), information load (Woods et al., 2002) and how 
informative alarms are (Seagull & Sanderson, 2001). It seems that early 
research studies were mainly focused on improving alarm perception. 
Understanding what makes an alarm meaningful became much more 
important later on.  
Robinson et al., (2006) introduced various factors affecting the usability of 
auditory displays, alarms and warnings. Design factors that need to be 
considered in relation to auditory displays include: appropriate level of 
sensitivity, contrast between the audible siren and background noise, 
perceived urgency of the task and the alarm respectively as well as 
multiple alarms (Robinson et al., 2006). These factors, in their wider sense, 
refer to the two perspectives introduced by Woods (1995): how informative 
the alarm is and alarm perception. Many researchers have approached 
alarm problems from either of these viewpoints. These studies have their 
basis in field observations that are then further investigated within 
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controlled laboratory environments. In the majority of these studies, non-
expert volunteers or a combination of expert and novice volunteers 
participated. The measures used to evaluate the suggested improvement 
usually included: time to diagnose, mental workload, number of controlled 
actions and quality of response (Stanton, 2006; Gilson et al., 2001). 
Based on this, the following research question is relevant to the thesis: 
1. What are the railway alarm handling activities and artefacts?  
2.5. Chapter summary 
This chapter reviewed the railway control domains that are going to be of 
high importance to the railway intelligent infrastructure project. The roles, 
activities, environments and technologies available in the existing control 
domains are initiated. This has led to the introduction of intelligent 
infrastructure, which potentially is going to be of assistance to the domains 
mentioned in this chapter (maintenance control and electrical control). 
Intelligent infrastructure aims to facilitate integration and centralisation of 
existing systems that are currently available to the operators in 
maintenance control rooms. This is to enhance safety and efficiency, two 
main priorities of Network Rail (Network Rail, 2010).  
For example, safety is promoted because if the remote sensing 
technologies are used to their potential then this can enable maintenance 
technicians to get a better understanding of the track without sending track 
workers on site and reduce the associated safety risks. Furthermore, 
notifying maintenance operators of a future failure based on data collected 
from the remote sensors can reduce the delay minutes, increase the 
service capacity and increase the efficiency of the service.   
Despite the need to understand the roles of operators in complex control 
settings such as railway control rooms, the socio-technical nature of these 
domains imposes challenges on researchers to explore them. The research 
questions investigated within this PhD study aim to understand and guide 
these challenges. Furthermore, these challenges will focus on different 
objectives of this PhD study. Table 2-2 below summarises these questions, 
their corresponding objectives and the relevant chapters were these 
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studies have been performed. These challenges are categorised in three 
groups and include: 
x Information overload 
1. What is the optimal hierarchy of information presentation that is 
going to be required within an intelligent infrastructure task?  
2. What is the optimum level of information for a particular problem 
solving task? 
3. How do operators deal with the problem of multiple sources of 
information in railway problem solving? 
x Multi-agent control 
1. What are the different roles involved with railway intelligent 
infrastructure? 
2. Thinking about the potential functions of a railway intelligent 
infrastructure, what is the sequence of activities?  
x Alarm handling   
1. What are the railway alarm handling activities and artefacts?  
TABLE 2-2: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE OBJECTIVES AND 
STUDIES  
Research 
questions  
 
Objectives  Chapters  
What is the optimal 
hierarchy of 
information 
presentation that is 
going to be required 
within an intelligent 
infrastructure task?  
I-Develop a data processing 
framework that guide and 
support effective 
implementation of railway 
intelligent infrastructure from a 
human factors perspective  
 
III-Produce human factors 
guidance for future 
development and 
implementation of intelligent 
infrastructure systems in the 
railway, which will match and 
complement human capabilities 
and needs. 
 
 
Chapter 5: 
interview study  
 
Chapter 5: card 
sorting study  
 
Chapter 6 and 7: 
explore particular 
problem solving 
tasks that will be 
most relevant to 
railway 
intelligent 
infrastructure 
tasks   
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What is the optimum 
level of information 
for a particular 
problem solving 
task? 
 
I-Develop a data processing 
framework that guide and 
support effective 
implementation of railway 
intelligent infrastructure from a 
human factors perspective  
 
III-Produce human factors 
guidance for future 
development and 
implementation of intelligent 
infrastructure systems in the 
railway, which will match and 
complement human capabilities 
and needs. 
 
 
Chapter 6 and 7: 
investigate 
particular 
problem solving 
tasks  
 
Chapter 8: 
investigate the 
hypothesis 
associated with 
the optimum 
level of 
information  
How operators deal 
with the problem of 
multiple sources of 
information in 
railway problem 
solving? 
 
II- Establish an in-depth 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIRSHUDWRUV¶
strategies for alarm handling 
and fault finding. 
Produce guidance for future 
development and 
implementation of intelligent 
infrastructure systems in the 
railway, which will match and 
complement human capabilities 
and needs. 
 
III- Produce human factors 
guidance for future 
development and 
implementation of intelligent 
infrastructure systems in the 
railway, which will match and 
complement human capabilities 
and needs. 
 
 
Chapter 6 and 7: 
investigate the 
case of multiple 
source of 
information in 
railway 
maintenance 
control  
What are the 
different roles 
involved with railway 
intelligent 
infrastructure? 
 
I- Develop a data processing 
framework that guide and 
support effective 
implementation of railway 
intelligent infrastructure from a 
human factors perspective 
 
III- Produce human factors 
guidance for future 
development and 
implementation of intelligent 
infrastructure systems in the 
railway, which will match and 
complement human capabilities 
and needs. 
Chapter 5: The 
interview study 
that led to 
identification of 
the roles  
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Thinking about 
potential functions of 
a railway intelligent 
infrastructure what 
are the sequence of 
activities? 
II-Establish an in-depth 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIRSHUDWRUV¶
strategies for alarm handling 
and fault finding. 
Produce guidance for future 
development and 
implementation of intelligent 
infrastructure systems in the 
railway, which will match and 
complement human capabilities 
and needs. 
 
III- Produce human factors 
guidance for future 
development and 
implementation of intelligent 
infrastructure systems in the 
railway, which will match and 
complement human capabilities 
and needs. 
 
Chapter 6 and 7: 
alarm handling 
and fault finding 
study  
What are the railway 
alarm handling 
activities and 
artefacts? 
II-Establish an in-depth 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIRSHUDWRUV¶
strategies for alarm handling 
and fault finding. 
Produce guidance for future 
development and 
implementation of intelligent 
infrastructure systems in the 
railway, which will match and 
complement human capabilities 
and needs. 
 
III- Produce human factors 
guidance for future 
development and 
implementation of intelligent 
infrastructure systems in the 
railway, which will match and 
complement human capabilities 
and needs. 
 
Chapter 6 : in-
depth analysis of 
railway alarm 
handling   
In order to explore these research questions a comprehensive approach to 
the understanding of control domains should be used. A selection of 
paradigms of analysis of control is reviewed in the next chapter. These 
guide the selection of research methodologies adopted within this PhD 
programme.    
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3. Paradigms to the analysis of control 
The previous chapter reviewed railway control domains and introduced 
intelligent infrastructure as a new system that aims to improve the safety 
and efficiency of the railway service. From this, a number of research 
questions were identified; if not investigated these could impose serious 
challenges for the successful implementation of railway intelligent 
infrastructure. As mentioned in chapter two, the research questions are 
relevant to three groups of challenges and are listed below: 
x Information overload 
1. What is the optimal hierarchy of information presentation that is 
going to be required within an intelligent infrastructure task?  
2. What is the optimum level of information for a particular problem 
solving task? 
3. How do operators deal with the problem of multiple sources of 
information in railway problem solving? 
x Multi-agent control 
4. What are the different roles involved with railway intelligent 
infrastructure? 
5. Thinking about the potential functions of a railway intelligent 
infrastructure, what is the sequence of activities?  
x Alarm handling   
6. What are the railway alarm handling activities and artefacts?  
This chapter introduces and reviews paradigms that can facilitate 
investigation of these research questions. The first section reviews the 
information processing paradigm which investigates control settings via an 
understanding of linear interactions between human operators and control 
settings. The second section explores a supervisory control paradigm, in 
ZKLFK RSHUDWRUV¶ UROHV GXULQJ  LQWHUDFWLRQV ZLWK WKH V\VWHP LV H[SORUHG
section three reviews a cognitive system engineering paradigm, in which 
the co-agency between operator and  system is explored. Section four 
states the relevance of these paradigms to the research questions of this 
PhD.  
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3.1. Information processing paradigm  
Early studies designed to understand human-machine interactions were 
mainly limited to the analysis  of human interactions with physical 
artefacts, along with other observable activities in the control room 
(Cacciabue, 1997). Neisser (1967) and Newell and Simon (1972) were 
DPRQJ WKH ILUVW WR WKHRULVH DERXW WKH QHHG WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH RSHUDWRUV¶
cognitive activities and formulate human operators as information 
processors. More sophisticated models became necessary to explain the 
RSHUDWRUV¶ UHDVRQLQJ DQG GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ SURFHVV ZLWK WKH LQFUHDVLQJO\
complex and automated technologies in control rooms (Cacciabue, 1998). 
Understanding human behaviour has long been of interest to system 
designers; among the very first and most pervasive models is the S-O-R 
model (Stimulus, Organism, and Response) (Rassmussen, 1986). Although 
the idea was to associate human functions with their cognitive processing, 
the notion was mainly based on the engineering concept of the black box. 
Therefore, human functions are mostly considered as separable rather than 
parallel procedures. However, due to its simplistic approach of associating 
stimuli with responses, it is still being used as a common means to explore 
control settings.   
In other words, the information processing paradigm is the outcome of a 
linear and fragmented view of human-computer interaction, in which 
humans are seen as information processors and it is possible to explore 
their activities through investigating the information inputs (stimulus) and 
outputs (response) (Rasmussen, 1986).   
This paradigm has long been used to guide an understanding of the 
components of control processing (e.g. Rasmussen, 1986; Pendergrass et 
al., 1987; Ruterburg, 1995; Cacciabue, 1998). The aim is to model 
cognitive activities in control rooms by associating human cognition with 
WKH VHTXHQFH RI WDVNV  )RU H[DPSOH WR µidentify the specific attention 
devoted to the stages or mental operations that occur between the stimuli 
and responses (Cacciabue, 1998), S¶ 
One example of such models is presented in Cacciabue (1998) 
(Figure 3-1), and is briefly reviewed here. Four cognitive functions 
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responsible for converting stimuli into a response are: perception, 
interpretation, planning, and execution. The feeders and effectors of these 
cognitive functions are memory/knowledge base as well as allocation of 
resources.  
 
FIGURE 3-1: A MODEL OF INFORMATION PROCESSING TAKEN FROM CACCIABUE 
(1998, P.20)  
µ3HUFHSWLRQ¶ UHIHUV WR WKH UHFHSWLRQ RI D VHQVRU\ VWLPXOXV WKDW DFWLYDWHV
information seeking for further processing. µ,QWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶ UHIHUV WR D
detailed elaboration of the perceived information to form an understanding 
RIWKHSUREOHPµ3ODQQLQJ¶LVWKHVWDJHDWZKLFKGHFLVLRQVDUHEHLQJPDGHWR
VXSSRUW WKH RSWLPXP FRXUVH RI DFWLRQ DQG µH[HFXWLRQ¶ UHIHUV WR WKH
implemenWDWLRQ RI WKDW DFWLRQ µ0HPRU\NQRZOHGJH EDVH¶ UHIHUV WR WKH
RSHUDWRU¶V H[SHULHQFH DQG LQGLYLGXDO GLIIHUHQFHV )LQDOO\ µDOORFDWLRQ RI
UHVRXUFHV¶ LV WKH DYDLODELOLW\ RI XVHIXO UHVRXUFHV WR WKH RSHUDWRUV
(Cacciabue, 1998). 
Ezzedin and Kolski (2005) have proposed a model (Figure 3-2) to represent 
the cognitive activity of railway controllers. In order to represent the 
RSHUDWRUV¶ information processing, they divided situations into the 
categories of normal and abnormal. This model consists of two main 
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processing units: operational and cognitive. Moreover, static and dynamic 
descriptions were defined to enable adaptations of human behaviour in real 
life situations. This model does not factor in the dynamic nature of the 
control task and is limited to the activities anticipated by the designer. 
 
FIGURE 3-2: MODEL OF COGNITIVE ACTIVITIES OF RAILWAY SUPERVISORY 
CONTROLLERS, TAKEN FROM EZZEDIN & KOLSKI (2005)  
Information processing paradigms have been widely used to facilitate 
studies associated with decision making, problem solving, as well as alarm 
handling. Models of alarm handling were introduced to guide the 
exploration of the various stages conducted by operators when handling 
alarms; very early ones include that of Lees (1983), which has three 
stages: detection, diagnosis and correction. A model suggested by Rouse 
(1983) also has three stages: detection, diagnosis and compensation. 
Although other models are available, as  noted by Stanton (2006), there is 
little evidence that these models reflect a real life alarm handling 
environment. To overcome this uncertainty, Stanton et al (1998) identified 
a sequence of activities that are initiated by the generation of an alarm 
(Figure 3-3).   
This model includes two sets of events: routine and critical. When an alarm 
is generated, operators observe the reported warning and accept if it is 
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genuine. Based on their understanding of a failure, operators might 
analyse, correct, monitor, or reset the alarm.  If the cause of the failure is 
unknown, then the operator will conduct a series of investigations to 
diagnose the problem. Finally, they monitor the situation to ensure that the 
abnormality is dealt with (Stanton, 2006). 
 
FIGURE 3-3: ALARM-INITIATED ACTIVITIES, TAKEN FROM STANTON, (2006) P. 
1008 
Examination of these examples shows that information processing as a 
paradigm has facilitated the exploration of control settings on the basis of a 
sequence of conceptual activities that occur in the control room. Despite 
being very useful, this approach focuses only on the information that is 
processed and does not include the contextual characteristics that have led 
to that form of information processing (Kerstholt & Raaijmakers, 1997).  
Moreover,  cognition is not bound to an individual human operator; 
understanding the information processing in increasingly complex and 
multi-agent environments needs to include constraints and affordances of 
the context (Hollnagel, 2002).  Hutchins (1995) argues that early cognitive 
studies attempted to understand the human individual, leaving issues such 
as context, culture and even history for later. This would not lead to an 
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accurate understanding of the domain, since those marginalised issues 
(context, culture, etc.) are at the core of human cognition.  
Thunholm (2005) also confirms the dynamic nature of decision making in 
the battlefield. He claims that the nature of military decision making is not 
an independent process, but the state of the problem evolves on the basis 
of the expertise and the actions of the decision maker. The model 
suggested by Thunholm (2005) aims to model the planning process under 
time pressure. The focus of this model is to plan, modify, and refine one 
course of action, instead of understanding how one action is chosen from a 
series of alternatives. 
In search of a way to apply realistic settings to modelling decision making, 
Ranyard and Williamson (2005) applied a conversation-based process 
tracing method to uncover information requirements during planning. Two 
methods were joined together to capture information resources in the real 
life environment: an active information search combined with limited 
information techniques were adapted to capture the knowledge utilised by 
decision makers in real life settings. Finally, the information was organised 
through content analysis techniques and presented within a matrix to 
elaborate on the decision makers¶ search patterns. These techniques 
guided the data collection methods adopted in the present PhD study.  
Hoc and Amalberti (2005) suggested a Dynamic Situation Management 
(DSM) model, focusing on how operators make compromises for optimal 
planning. This model suggests that, apart from the time and resources 
required for the short term control of the system, it is equally important to 
consider unexpected events, which might pile up and affect the long term 
control of the system. This emphasises the need to include context early on 
in the process.  
Reason (1987), pointed out that, despite their great potential, complex 
control systems have failed in emergencies. This is partially due to 
LQFRQVLVWHQF\ EHWZHHQ WKH V\VWHP DQG KXPDQ RSHUDWRUV¶ LQIRUPDWLRQ
processing and the fact that, during problematic situations, operators are 
more likely to use their knowledge-based heuristics rather than the pre-
programmed instructions. Reason suggested that it is necessary to design 
a new generation of systems that incorporates basic human cognition at 
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the outset. Hence, in these dynamic situations, merely looking at the stand 
alone functionality of the system would not be sufficient; a more cognitive 
approach is required (Hoc, 2001). The supervisory control paradigm 
reviewed in the next section is one step towards such a transition.  
3.2. Supervisory control paradigm  
The advances in technical equipment in control rooms have changed the 
role of operator to that of supervisor. Rouse (1976) noted this and  
predicts that, with technological advances, machines will become more and 
more involved in the control process, to a point where there will be 
intersecting and overlapping areas of responsibilities (Rouse, 1976).  This 
change has inspired the supervisory control paradigm. 
Sheridan (2002) lists six levels of control that show the historical trend 
from manual to supervisory control. These stages are 1- direct human 
control, 2- indirect human control, 3- computer aided indirect control, 4- 
supervisory control, 5- remote supervisory control and 6- remote multi-
task supervisory control.  
Sheridan and Hennessy (1984, p.8) defined supervisory control as: 
µactivities of the human supervisor who interacts via a computer with a 
complex and semiautonomous process.¶ They simply assign machines to 
transfer sensed and modified information of an on-going physical process 
to a human operator. In other words, the system acts as a mediator 
between the two (Sheridan, 1997).  
Automation is a distinct feature of supervisory control models, as noted by 
Miller and Prasuraman (2007), who state that there should be flexible 
delegation of automation to various tasks within the control environment. 
They have therefore argued that the most important aspect of supervisory 
control is task delegation and, in order to conduct a successful delegation, 
detailed task decomposition is necessary. 
User interaction with automatic systems has received much research 
attention. Endsley and Kaber (1999) conducted a study to assess the 
effects of automation on performance, situation awareness and workload.  
Semi-automated systems (intermediate levels of automation) were 
LQWURGXFHGWRRYHUFRPHWKHµRXWRIWKHORRS¶SHUIRUPDQFHSUREOHPWKURXJK
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joint human-system interaction. Parasuraman and Riley (1997) confirmed 
that over-reliance on automated systems occurs through a lack of 
understanding of the automated procedure, choosing not to use them at all 
or when there are too many false alarms, and a lack of focus on the human 
RSHUDWRUV¶QHHGs when designing the system.   
Identifying the activities involved in the supervisory control system seems 
to be a reasonable way of exploring and investigating these systems. 
According to Sheridan (1992), supervisory control behaviour consists of 
five basic elements: plan, teach, monitor, intervene and learn (Figure 3-4). 
These elements are briefly explained below.  
Plan: the human operator has to understand how the process works and 
ZKDWWKHV\VWHP¶VREMHFWLYHVDQGFRQVWUDLQWVDUHHQDEOLQJWKHPWRGHFLGH
on a control strategy (e.g. decide on alarm priorities). 
Teach: to instruct the computer, based on the planned programme (e.g. 
define alarm priorities in colour coding or setting a threshold level on the 
machine)  
Monitor:  Systems taught or instructed, as in the previous stage, will work 
automatically; the human operator needs to ensure that the system and 
these automated features are working properly. A problem arises when 
there are too many variables to monitor, which is almost always the case in 
WRGD\¶VFRPSOH[VRFLR-technical environments. A potential solution to assist 
operators in monitoring is notifying them of any abnormalities through 
alarms (Chapter 2).  
Intervene: the operator needs to intervene when they find anomalies or if 
any abnormalities are observed. Problems arise when the operators are 
uncertain as to whether they should intervene, due to lack of information 
or lack of transparency between the human operator and the automated 
component. Furthermore, when operators are faced with a high workload 
or stress, they might fail to detect the need for intervention (Sheridan, 
2002).  
Learn: Operators learn from their experience and apply their knowledge in 
future supervisory control roles.  
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FIGURE 3-4: SHERIDAN'S (1992) SUPERVISORY CONTROL MODEL 
Brandin and Charbonnier (1994) identified the tasks within the supervisory 
control systems associated with an automated manufacturing system as:  
1-  monitoring of the work cell behaviour via sensory feedback 
2-  evaluating the control  
3-  enforcing corrective procedures when necessary.  
Brandin and Charbonnier (1994) also suggested that, in order to develop 
VXFK V\VWHPV LW LV LPSRUWDQW WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH GRPDLQ¶V SK\VLFDO
characteristics and other behavioural specifications.  
Cummings et al. (2010), explored human supervisory control within 
nuclear power plants and associated the five elements of human 
supervisory control (Figure 3-4) with various features of the system,  the 
human operator being one of them (Figure 3-5). For example, monitoring 
is a process that includes observing the interface to learn from it or to plan 
a course of action. The planned action is conveyed to the system when the 
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operator feels the need to intervene on the basis of what they have 
monitored.  
 
FIGURE 3-5: HUMAN SUPERVISORY CONTROL IN THE NPP CONTEXT ( CUMMINGS ET 
AL. 2010) 
A supervisory control paradigm has guided many research studies in 
understanding  the features in complex control settings: aviation (Endsley 
& Kriss, 1995; Wickens, Mavor, & McGee, 1997; Morphew & Wickens, 
1998; Sarter & Amalberti, 2000; Metzger & Parasuraman, 2005), nuclear 
and process control (Moray, 1997; Mumaw et al., 2000; Guerlain, 2002) 
health care (Leape, 1994;Helmreich & Musson, 2000; Guerlain et al., 
2005), automobiles (Sheridan, 1992; Fong & Thorpe, 2001), and military  
(Amalberti & Deblon,  1992; Cummings & Mitchell 2006; Crandall & 
Cummings, 2007; Cummings & Mitchell, 2007). However, the supervisory 
control paradigm focuses mainly on physical or mechanical functions, 
rather than cognitive and mental functions.  
Looking into the studies mentioned above and from the work of Sheridan 
and Henassy (1984), Kirlik et al., (1996), Xiao et al., (1997) and Hollnagel 
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(2000), it seems that two major themes can be used to explore  control 
environments from a supervisory control point of view. These are listed 
below and explained in the present section. 
1. 8QGHUVWDQGLQJ RSHUDWRUV¶ VWUDWHJLHV ZKLOH LQWHUDFWLQJ ZLWK WKHVH
complex systems  
2. Understanding the optimum resource and function allocation for the 
control demands 
3.2.1. Understanding operators¶ strategies  
Human operators tend to adopt strategies and shortcuts to overcome the 
limitations imposed by technical systems, including those of inefficient 
information presentation in supervisory control systems.  
Systems should support operators while they are bombarded with 
information from various sources and have to make decisions quickly and 
accurately. This implies a strong need to understand the strategies used by 
control room operators for troubleshooting and decision making.  A review 
conducted to understand problem solving strategies in battle decision 
making, defined cognitive strategies as:  
«´regularities in reasoning that can be crafted to guide decision making in 
a particular set of circumstances for doing an action in the most effective 
manner´(Pounds  & Fallesen, 1994,p.1).   
Kim and Seong (2007) conducted a study to provide recommendations for 
the information types presented to nuclear power plant operators and the 
XVHRIRSHUDWRUV¶GLDJQRVWLFVWUDWHJLHV7KH\GHILQHGVWUDWHJLHVDV 
³A sequence of mental effectors that operators used to transform an initial 
state of knowledge into a final goal state of knowledge¶¶ (Kim & Seong, 
2007, p.171) 
$QRWKHU VWXG\ ZKLFK DQDO\VHG GHFLVLRQ PDNHUV¶ EHKDYLRXUV LQ G\QDPLF
V\VWHPV ZDV FRQGXFWHG E\ .HUVWKROW  +H DQDO\VHG RSHUDWRUV¶
strategies (judgment-oriented vs. action-oriented strategies) when making 
decisions, depending on various information costs (e.g. how time 
consuming it is to collect that information). This study suggested that 
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operators had different problem-solving strategies, depending on the cost 
of the information presented to them. If the cost was high, decision makers 
selected an action-based strategy and, if the information cost was low, 
decision makers chose a judgment-based strategy (Kerstholt, 1996). This 
shows a link between oSHUDWRU¶V VWUDWHJLHV DQG WKH W\SH RI LQIRUPDWLRQ
presented to them.  It is to be noted that the type of information in this 
case refers to the level and nature of information, rather than its format.  
Patrick et al., (2006) analysed human control process strategies within 
control room teams. Findings suggest that operators within various teams 
and various control rooms selected different goals and strategies to detect, 
diagnose and conduct problem solving.  These were found to be very much 
dependent on their contextual and situational differences. Moreover, this 
FRQFOXVLRQVXJJHVWV WKDW LQRUGHU WRXQGHUVWDQGWKHRSHUDWRUV¶ VWUDWHJLHV
and derive general design recommendations, it is important to consider 
various situational conditions. 
Schriver et al., (200 H[DPLQHG SLORWV¶ GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ VWUDWHJLHV ZKLOH
presented with different cues. They found that, depending on the cue, the 
level of attention among operators will vary and that affects their potential 
strategy and consequently affects their decision making performance. It is, 
therefore, safe to assume that the cues selected for attention by operators 
can be used as an indication of their particular strategies.  
Dynamic decision behaviour infers that human operators constantly adapt 
their actions to the situation, depending on their strategies. Various factors 
can affect the strategies adopted by decision makers. These include 
information cost (Kerstholt, 1996), information type (Kim & Seong, 2007), 
cognitive feedback (Seong & Bisantz 2008) and information processing 
modes (Rasmussen & Lind, 1982). 
Within an intelligent infrastructure system, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, information overload will be a recurring dilemma. As with the 
technological advancements, there will be selection of information available 
to the operators. Knowledge of the strategies they use can guide designers 
in presenting operators with information congruent with their strategies.  
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3.2.2. Resource and function allocation within a supervisory 
control   
Technology was initially introduced in control rooms to assist operators 
with  physical tasks;  gradually it became sufficiently advanced to assist 
operators with  cognitive processing as well as physical tasks (Hollnagel & 
Woods, 1983). Whilst this creates opportunities for more efficient and 
proactive control, it also places an increasing cognitive demand on the 
operator (Roth et al., 2002; Woods, 1985;Woods et al., 2002).  
Within supervisory control, resources refer to both cognitive abilities 
(memory, attention, workload, etc.) and physical artefacts (phone, 
information display, memory pads, automated features of the supervisory 
control systems, etc.0RUHRYHURSHUDWRUV¶NQRZOHGJHDQGFRPSHWHQFHWR
solve a problem, as well as the time available to complete control tasks has 
to be considered for both design and evaluation of supervisory control 
systems. Therefore, it is important to understand the resources available 
within a control room, along with their effect on the control.  
Nilsson and Johansson, (2006) studied the use of artefacts in a mixed 
reality environment in terms of support given to the functions of the 
V\VWHP7KLVVWXG\LQYHVWLJDWHGWKHDUWHIDFWVIURPWKHXVHUV¶YLHZSRLQW,W
recommended a new approach for assessing the usability of the mixed 
reality system, since these artefacts encouraged new methods of 
LQWHUDFWLRQDQGWKHXVHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHVHV\VWHPVZHUHGLIIHUHQWIURP
other human-machine ones.   
Furthermore, although supervisory control paradigms have enabled  the 
work environment to be described in terms oI RSHUDWRUV¶ UROHV ZKLOH
interacting with the control systems, it does not provide the means for 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHHIIHFWRIVLWXDWLRQDOFKDQJHVRQVXSHUYLVRUV¶UROHV%RWK
strategic analysis and function allocation within a supervisory control 
paradigm are necessary features; however, they still focus on the routine 
situations an operator has to attend to in sequence (Thistle, 1996). As the 
work on strategies has illustrated, interaction with supervisory control is 
highly dependent not just on the design of the technology, but on a range 
of individual and contextual factors.   
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Woods and Roth (1988) specified that operators needing the most support 
during emergency situations are let down by technology design that is 
incompatible with the demands of the operator or the operational context. 
Therefore, more holistic paradigms are required to guide design in these 
situations. Cognitive system engineering, described in the following 
section, is one example of such a paradigm.  
3.3. Cognitive system engineering paradigm  
Earlier in this chapter, two paradigms for understanding control 
environments were described, whereby physical and mechanical 
characteristics (response to a stimuli or the reaction to a supervisory 
system) were analysed. Woods and Roth (1988) argue that this is not 
sufficient to explain control complexities. Cognitive System Engineering 
(CSE) is a paradigm that attempts to address this challenge.  
CSE refers to the need for an understanding of mental processes in 
complex control settings in order to develop efficient design within these 
systems. In other words, CSE is a paradigm that facilitates an in-depth 
understanding of the control environment. Various features in the control 
setting affect RSHUDWRUV¶ DQG GHVLJQHUV¶ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH V\VWHP
consequently affecting their information processing (Hollnagel, 2002). 
Hoffman and Militello (2009, p.95) defined CSE as:  
 ³A type of applied cognitive science, trying to apply what is known from 
science to the design and construction of machines.´ 
In a paper by Hollnagel and Woods (1983), CSE was re-emphasised as the 
paradigm that can facilitate better design of control systems that support 
human limitations and cognitive challenges. Many researchers have used or 
been inspired by this paradigm (e.g. Norman, 1988; Woods & Sarter, 
2000; Hoffman & Militello, 2009; Norros & Salo, 2009; Dalal & Kasper, 
1994; Paradis et al., 2002; Ryder et al., 1998). 
Roth et al., (2002) listed three interconnecting elements in every cognitive 
V\VWHP DV D µFRJQLWLYH V\VWHP WULDG¶ FRQVLVWLQJ RI DUWHIDcts, world, and 
agents (Figure 3-6).  
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µ$JHQWV¶UHIHUVWRHLWKHUDKXPDQRUDPDFKLQHWKDWSURFHVVHVLQIRUPDWLRQ
DQGSHUIRUPVWDVNVZLWKLQFRJQLWLYHV\VWHPVµ:RUOG¶Ls the environment in 
which agents are active; this defines the social, organisational and 
FRQWH[WXDOFRQVWUDLQWV µ$UWHIDFWV¶UHIHUVWRDQ\REMHFWVDQGUHVRXUFHVWKDW
assist agents to conduct their tasks.  
 
FIGURE 3-6: COGNITIVE SYSTEM TRIAD TAKEN FROM ROTH ET AL. (2002) 
Figure 3-7, taken from Hollnagel and Woods (1983), shows the stages 
required for developing a cognitive system understanding to guide the 
design of man-machine systems. It must be noted that this diagram 
highlights both the top-down and bottom-up nature of CSE. At the top end, 
it is important to understand the technical demands and, at the bottom, it 
is necessary to assess the applied cognition within the control room. 
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FIGURE 3-7: COGNITIVE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING IN THE DESIGN PROCESS TAKEN 
FROM HOLLNAGEL & WOODS (1983, P. 592) 
In order to facilitate this understanding, CSE focuses on understanding 
three threads within the work setting: use of artefacts, coping with 
complexity and joint cognitive systems. These are briefly described below.  
3.3.1. Use of artefacts 
Artefacts will affect the way human operators work and collaborate in the 
FRQWURO HQYLURQPHQW DQG WKHUHIRUH KDYH DQ HIIHFW RQ WKH RSHUDWRUV¶
cognition (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006). As Woods (1998) pointed out, new 
design is developed with the hypothesis that artefacts can improve the 
performance and quality of the interaction. Therefore, it is important to 
XQGHUVWDQGKRZRSHUDWRUV¶ZD\VRIWKLQNLQJFKDQJHZLWKWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRI
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new artefacts; this will not be possible without understanding how 
operators conduct their tasks with their current artefacts. 
 ³An artefact is a device used to carry out or facilitate a specific function 
that is part of work (Hollnagel & Woods 2005S´ 
The reason for understanding cognitive processing in control rooms is even 
more important when it comes to introducing new technologies. New 
artefacts introduce new levels of complexity for operators, causing new 
forms of errors (Hoffman & Militello, 2009).  
Exploration of the artefacts in control room settings has been widely used 
to inform current best practice within the control room or to develop an 
understanding with regard to future settings.  Furniss and Blandford (2006) 
explored the artefacts available to medical dispatch units in lieu of 
understanding the distributed cognition within the context of the study.   
Ryder et al., (1998) focused on the procedures associated with decision 
making tasks and modelled the interaction of artefacts in the form of a task 
analysis. This was to guide the design of a new telephone operator 
workstation. Paradis et al., (2002) conducted a form of Cognitive Work 
Analysis for designing decision support systems in defence and, in the first 
steps of this analysis, identified the relevant artefacts.   
3.3.2. Coping with complexity  
Complexity is caused when operators are faced with multiple channels of 
information and control lines dividing their attention. This is the case in 
WRGD\¶VFRPSOH[FRQWUROURRPV where the amount of data presented on the 
systems has dramatically increased (Cumming et al., 2006; Harper, 
Michailidou, & Stevens, 2009; Woods et al., 2002).  
Cummings et al., (2006) listed the sources of information complexity as: 
x Volume of information 
x Ambiguous sources of information  
x Unclear relationship between different information sources  
When faced with these complexities, heuristics are being used to reduce 
the cognitive load in order to overcome the shortcomings and make the  
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optimum decision (Cummings & Mitchell, 2006). These are, in other words, 
shortcuts applied by operators that consequently make their decisions 
somewhat biased. These decision biases should be identified and managed 
to avoid risky operations. Under time pressure, these heuristic biases might 
be misleading and result in a wrong decision. Assimilation bias and 
automation bias are two of the best known and most researched biases 
(Cummings et al., 2010). 
Paradis et al., (2002) applied CSE to guide the design of intelligent decision 
supports in defence. One advantage of using CSE was noted to be its 
ability to indentify cognitive demands and to consider ways in which 
technology could be exploited to deal with these demands. They adopted a 
pragmatic approach by breaking down the activities into small engineering 
steps and conducting an analysis of each step. 
Hollnagel and Woods,(2005) have identified the strategies potentially 
applied by operators to cope with complexities due to information 
inefficiencies. These are listed in Table 3-1 below.  
TABLE 3-1: COPING STRATEGIES FOR INFORMATION INPUT OVERLOAD AND 
INFORMATION INPUT UNDERLOAD (TAKEN FROM HOLLNAGEL & WOODS 2005, P. 
80-81) 
Strategy  Definition 
Omission Temporary, arbitrary non-processing of 
information; information is lost 
Reduced precision  Trading precision for speed and time, all input is 
considered, but only superficially; reasoning is 
shallower 
Queuing  Delaying response during high load, on the 
assumption that it will be possible to catch-up 
later (stacking input) 
Filtering  Neglecting to process certain categories; non-
processed information is lost  
Cutting categories  Reducing the level of discrimination; using fewer 
grades or categories to describe input  
Decentralisation  Distributing processing if possible; calling in 
assistance  
Escape Abandoning the task; giving up completely; 
leaving the field 
Extrapolation ([LVWLQJHYLGHQFHLVµVWUHWFKHG¶WRILWDQHZ
situation; extrapolation is usually linear, and is 
often based on fallacious causal reasoning  
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Frequency gambling  The frequency of occurrence of past items/ 
events are used as a basis for recognition/ 
selection  
Similarity matching  The subjective similarity of past to present 
items/event is used as a basis for 
recognition/selection 
Trial-and-error (random 
selection) 
Interpretations and/ or selection do not follow 
any systematic principle 
Laissez-faire An independent strategy is given up in place of 
just doing what others do  
3.3.3. Joint Cognitive Systems 
Joint Cognitive System (JCS) views the cognitive system as a result of 
human-computer co-agency rather than human-computer interaction. 
What matters is the performance of the whole unit, rather than the 
individual. In other words, it is not defined by what it is but it focuses on 
what it does. 
The main objective of a JCS is to achieve the goal, i.e., the intelligent 
outcome of the system. Any restrictions, such as lack of time, resources or 
HYHQ RSHUDWRUV¶ competence, which prevent the JCS from achieving the 
goal, are considered as a complexity and need to be managed.  
Although it is feasible to investigate the first two threads of CSE (use of 
artefacts and coping with complexity) the third thread (JCS) is not easy to 
explore (Norros and Salo, 2009) and it therefore lead to an incomplete 
CSE. Understanding JCS requires the researcher to identify the 
characteristics of the system that has to be in place in order to maintain 
control in its dynamic environment.  
To achieve a JCS understanding of a control system, three entities should 
be explored. The two obvious ones are human and system and the third 
one, which is quite difficult to investigate, is their cognitive coupling, 
Relationship between cognitive characteristics of the user and cognitive 
characteristics of the system (Dalal & Kasper, 1994).  
According to Dalal and Kasper (1994) the characteristics of these entities 
(user and system) are related to the goals, knowledge, problem solving 
strategies and cognitive styles. The relationship between user and system 
will determine how successful their joint behaviour will be and how flexible 
the joint system is in complex situations. Furthermore, what defines this 
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relationship is the problem or situation in which the coupling takes place. 
The characteristics of the problem solving task will lead to the selection of 
goals by the user, who adopts certain cognitive styles and problem solving 
strategies. Therefore, contextual understanding is very important in the 
study of JCSs.   
Although CSE is a well-known and widely used concept, its application and 
successful implementation can be quite challenging (Lind, 2009). One of 
the challenges to an understanding of the relationship between user and 
system is identification of the boundaries between their cognitive 
characteristics.  
It is equally important to realise that a new approach requires new ways of 
collection and data analysis. Lind (2009) argues that a lack of theoretical 
understanding of the relationships between automatic systems, their 
process controls and human machine design explains the lack of industrial 
impact of such systems. 
It seems that CSE is often mistakenly viewed as a method or framework, 
rather than a paradigm. It is important to remember that CSE is a µway¶ to 
solve the problem, rather than a solution on its own. Woods et al. (1996) 
noted that CSE investigates the cognitive work when people (or group of 
people) pursue goals and how their behaviours and strategies are adopted 
to optimise these goals.   
3.4. Relevance of the Paradigms in this PhD study 
Earlier in this chapter, three paradigms that have been used to explore and 
understand control environments were reviewed. This section will revisit 
the research questions associated with this PhD study and discuss the 
paradigms that can guide them. Moreover, in order to facilitate to guide 
the selection of these paradigms, their potential and limitations are briefly 
described here. 
From the literature reviewed in this section, it seems that although 
information processing models lack the contextual characteristics of the 
control environment, they are very useful in developing an understanding 
of specific aspects of decision making activities, as in the studies reviewed 
earlier. Moreover, in order to understand human operators as information 
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processors, observing and analysing individuals in a structured way can be 
sufficient. 
The supervisory control paradigm explores two main themes and focuses 
on the roles of operators while interacting with the system. These themes 
LQFOXGHLQYHVWLJDWLQJRSHUDWRUV¶VWUDWHJLHVDQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKHUHVRXUFH
and function allocations associated with each role. This paradigm also 
investigates the domain in procedural form. However, instead of focusing 
RQ RQH FRJQLWLYH DFWLYLW\ DQG DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V LQIRUPDWLRQ SURFHVVLQJ
associated with it, the supervisory control paradigm looks at a range of 
activities involved in one role.  
The cognitive system engineering paradigm focuses on performance in the 
work environment. Therefore, an understanding of the domain and the 
roles within it is required to facilitate this. In order to develop such an 
understanding it is important to have access to detailed situational 
knoZOHGJHRIRSHUDWRUV¶FRJQLWLRQLQWKHZRUOG 
These paradigms were used to facilitate the investigation of different 
research questions in this PhD study. These paradigms have been selected 
on the basis of the outcomes of the research questions as well as the 
feasibility of collecting data to inform the relevant studies. It must be noted 
that these research questions are not limited to any one paradigm and 
often various aspects of one research question are explored through a 
number of paradigms.  
 Questions 1 & 2: What is the optimal hierarchy of information 
presentation that is going to be required within an intelligent 
infrastructure task? What is the optimum level of information for a 
particular problem solving task? 
When thinking about the different tasks of the intelligent infrastructure 
V\VWHP HJ DODUP KDQGOLQJ RSHUDWRUV¶ SURFHGXUHV ZKLOH SHUIRUPLQJ
these tasks should be analysed. Therefore, an information processing 
paradigm is required at the beginning to develop an understanding of these 
procedures (Chapters DQG7KHZRUG µKLHUDUFK\¶ HVSHFLDOO\ LQ WKH
context of intelligent infrastructure systems, refers to various levels of 
roles and responsibilities and requires a supervisory control paradigm to 
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develop an understanding of resource and function allocations associated 
with different roles (Chapter 5). $V WKH ZRUG µRSWLPDO¶ GLUHFWO\ OLQNV ZLWK
µSHUIRUPDQFH¶D&6(SDUDGLJPLVUHTXLUHGWRIDFLOLWDWH LQYHVWLJDWLRQRIWKH
optimal hierarchy of information presentation.   
 Question 3 & 6: How do operators deal with the problem of multiple 
sources of information in railway problem solving? 
Dealing with a problem and managing a complex situation correspond to 
performance and it seems that the best way to develop such an 
understanding is through a CS( SDUDGLJP LQ ZKLFK RSHUDWRUV¶ FRSLQJ
strategies are explored. In so doing, detailed understanding of the 
artefacts and their uses in different situations is necessary (Chapters 6 and 
7) 
 Question 4: What are the different roles involved in railway 
intelligent infrastructure? 
Understanding the roles of operators while interacting with intelligent 
infrastructure, in terms of their specific requirements, is similar to the 
supervisory control paradigm in which different elements are activated 
during various activities. Therefore, the activities and functions associated 
with the intelligent infrastructure system were explored (Chapter 5). 
 Question 5: Thinking about the potential functions of a railway 
intelligent infrastructure, what is the sequence of activities?  
The sequence of activities refers to an understanding of two things: the 
activities and the procedures the operator performs in order to complete 
tasks. Therefore, a supervisory control paradigm is adopted to explore and 
investigate the activities, functions and resource allocations. Moreover, 
selecting specific aspects of the activity, it is possible to apply an 
information processing paradigm to investigate the sequence of activities in 
WHUPVRIRSHUDWRUV¶LQIRUPDWLRQIORZ&KDSWHUs 6 and 7).  
3.5. Chapter Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the paradigms that can be used to understand 
control environments. The three paradigms reviewed were information 
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processing, supervisory control and CSE. It seemed that these and more 
specifically the CSE paradigm provided the means to explore and 
investigate the research questions of this PhD study. Moreover, the threads 
associated with these paradigms such as use of artefacts and coping 
strategies in the CSE paradigm as well as resource allocation and 
RSHUDWRUV¶ VWUDWHJLHs in supervisory control paradigm acknowledges the 
need to investigate the research questions of this PhD study in order to 
develop a thorough understanding of intelligent infrastructure systems.  
Exploration of these issues within complex and dynamic control 
environments, such as railways, needs a combination of methodological 
approaches that are cohesive, feasible and ecologically valid. In the next 
chapter the methods that facilitated this PhD study have been reviewed.  
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4. Research framework and study methods  
Previous chapters have introduced intelligent infrastructure systems and 
described potential challenges in the rail domain. This is followed by 
specific research questions along with paradigms that can guide the 
explorations of these questions. This chapter presents and reviews the 
methodological approaches that can guide the objectives of the research. 
Each method is reviewed in turn to assess feasibility and relevance to the 
domain of intelligent infrastructure. Details of the use and implementation 
of each of these methods are discussed in subsequent chapters.  
4.1. Research Methods 
Field studies are no longer purely anthropological, with the researcher 
immersed in the domain without interruption, nor are laboratory studies 
just about measuring variables (Hoffman & Woods, 2000). It is very 
difficult to mark the boundaries between qualitative and quantitative 
methods when the aim is to understand the context. This was certainly the 
case in this PhD study.  Therefore, throughout this research, a combination 
of methods was adopted to explore the context, systems and human 
operators. Structured data collection techniques, e.g. verbal protocol, video 
recording were used to provide a comprehensive overview of the task 
under study and within its context. Furthermore, laboratory studies were 
developed to facilitate a targeted analysis of selected aspects, such as 
information presentation for alarm handling. Details of the methods and 
their subsequent chapters are summarised in Table 4-1. Different methods 
informed the selection of the later studies. Figure 4-1 shows the flow of the 
methods used in this PhD programme, as well as how they have facilitated 
each other.  
 
 
Chapter 4: Research framework and study methods  
 
63 
 
TABLE 4-1: OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, METHODS AND OUTPUTS 
Objective  Methods Output Chapter 
Develop a data processing 
framework that guide and 
support effective 
implementation of railway 
intelligent infrastructure 
from a human factors 
perspective  
Workshop  
Interview 
study  
Field study  
Data processing 
framework  
 
General 
understanding of 
intelligent 
infrastructure  
 
Human factors 
issues associated 
with intelligent 
infrastructure  
2 & 5 
Establish an in-depth 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIRSHUDWRUV¶
strategies for human 
supervisory control tasks in 
alarm handling and fault 
finding.  
 
Field study  
Interview 
study  
 
Understanding 
problem solving  
6 & 7  
Produce human guidance 
for future development and 
implementation of 
intelligent infrastructure 
systems in the railway, 
which will match and 
complement human 
capabilities and needs.  
 
Field study 
Interview 
study  
User trials  
Inform 
knowledge and 
information 
requirement of 
intelligent 
infrastructure 
(general 
guidance) 
5,6,7& 8 
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Work shop Unstructured interviews 
Observational study  
Semi-structured  interviews 
Familiarisation 
observation 
Field study  Verbal 
protocol
Video 
recording 
Observational 
checklist 
Experimental study 
Lab-based Field-based 
Knowledge 
elicitation Laboratory  
 
FIGURE 4-1: METHODS USED IN THIS PHD AND HOW THEY HAVE INFORMED EACH 
OTHER 
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4.2. Workshop and interviews  
4.2.1. Workshop 
Workshops enable the collection of the opinions of Subject Matter Experts 
(SMEs) on various aspects of a topic. It is useful to initiate an 
understanding of a domain by validating and verifying the findings, 
brainstorming a problem or getting a general feeling about a particular 
issue (Robson, 2011)   
The railway has many intertwined components and it is not feasible to 
investigate all aspects of a future project in detail. Network Rail (NR) uses 
workshops to engage potential users of a future system in the design and 
development phases of its projects. It is particularly useful since designers 
can narrow down the scope of the system and possible functionalities 
required by the users.  
In this study, the researcher attended a one day workshop held by NR in 
NRYHPEHU  7KLV ZDV WKH UHVHDUFKHU¶V YHU\ ILUVW H[SRVXUH WR WKH
intelligent infrastructure project. The attendees were senior managers in 
the company who were deeply involved with the project.  
4.2.2. Interviews  
Interviewing is one of the most commonly used tools for eliciting 
knowledge and structuring empirical findings (Fontana & James, 2000). 
Many studies use interviews to understand the socio-technical nature of 
work; some of the examples of their use in the railway include studies by 
Farrington-Darby et al.(2006); Pickup et al. (2003); Wilson & Murphy, 
(2002). 
Robson (2011) categorised interviews into three main forms: unstructured, 
semi-structured and structured. In this study two of these forms, 
unstructured and semi-structured, have been applied at various stages and 
are briefly discussed below. Figure 4-2 lists the various forms of interviews 
used in this PhD study. 
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Interviews and workshop 
Unstructured interviews Workshop   
Semi-structured 
interviews   
Railway intelligent 
infrastructure    
Maintenance control      Electrical control 
x To explore the domain 
x To familiarise the researcher 
with these domains
x To assess the feasibility of 
running the study  
Method 
Domain
 
Objectives
 
Investigate the concepts of 
interest in more detail 
Explore the concepts
 
 
FIGURE 4-2: VARIOUS FORMS OF INTERVIEWS AND WORKSHOPS USED IN THIS 
PHD STUDY AND THEIR OBJECTIVES  
4.2.2.1. Unstructured interviews 
The unstructured interviews utilised in this PhD programme were 
performed to achieve two purposes: 1- to facilitate an exploration of the 
domain (exploratory interviews), and 2- to become familiar with a specific 
aspect of the domain (familiarisation interviews). The researcher then used 
other methods to investigate these domains in more detail.  
A number of familiarisation interviews were conducted in this PhD 
programme. The aim of these interviews was to briefly introduce the 
domain of study to the researcher and to assess the feasibility of carrying 
out the study within various contexts. For instance, it would be important 
to establish whether conducting the study in a railway Electrical Control 
Room (ECR) during peak time would interfere with the safe and efficient 
operation of the control room and how the researcher could manage and 
mitigate such risks. Moreover, these interviews helped the researcher to 
obtain a general understanding and appreciation for the context of the 
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study; for example, the observational checklist (Section 4.3.2.3) was 
designed after a series of familiarisation interviews.  
These interviews were unstructured, and the interviewees (railway 
operators in all of the cases) were asked to describe their main 
responsibilities and provide a high level outline of the work in the control 
rooms, along with the available resources and challenges they have while 
conducting various problem solving tasks. Overall, nine interviews were 
conducted (a total of 17 hours) in four different control rooms (one 
electrical and three maintenance control centres). 
Table 4-2 below summarises the familiarisation interviews conducted 
throughout this research.   
TABLE 4-2: INTERVIEWS 
Location 
/Area of 
study/interest   
Number of 
interviewee
s 
Role of 
interviewees 
Duration 
(per 
interviewee)  
Relevant 
chapter  
Supervisory 
control systems 
in railway  
1 Senior system 
developer  
2Xhours 2 
Intelligent 
infrastructure 
project  
2 Senior 
ergonomist   
1Xhour 2 & 5 
Electrical 
control room  
1 Head of 
electrical 
control  
1Xhour  6 
Electrical 
control room  
2 Electrical 
control room 
operator  
3Xhours  6 
Maintenance 
control centre  
3 Maintenance 
control centre 
2Xhours  7 
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4.2.2.2. Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviewing is a method that enables  qualitative data to 
be captured and guides the researcher towards an understanding by 
exploring various aspects of the complex work setting (Robson, 2011). 
Semi-structured interviewing is different from unstructured interviewing in 
the sense that there are a number of predefined questions to guide the 
study. However, since the domain is not fully known, the structure of the 
questions addressed in this study can only be partially designed (Schmidth, 
2004).   
In this PhD study, semi-structured interviews were informed by the 
cognitive task analysis approach.  
4.2.2.2.1. Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) 
Task analysis forms an envelope of procedures and contextual facts which 
can elaborate human behaviour in working environments (Shephard & 
Stammers, 2005). The change in the role of human operators, from actors 
to thinkers, led to the development of a framework capable of capturing 
both physical activities as well as mental processes in complex control 
settings. Therefore, the concept of CTA was formed (Hoffman & Militello, 
2009).  
CTA aims to cover three aspects of human-machine interaction: technical 
skill, context, and mental model (Cacciabue, 1998). It can therefore 
provide researchers with information regarding the working environment, 
structure of cognitive plans, and links between tasks and goals. To achieve 
this level of understanding of tasks, different forms of data collection and 
analysis are employed. These methods have to be more focused on internal 
processes and mental operations than mere observation of physical 
interactions. Various techniques have been adopted to engage with this 
level of detail. 
2¶+DUHHWDO(1998) confirmed that CTA is an appropriate approach to the 
exploration of  complex cognitive tasks. However, the effectiveness of the 
approach is highly dependent on the rHVHDUFKHU¶V NQRZOHGJH RI WKH
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domain, as well as the extent and quality of resources available to the 
study. 
Hollangel (1993) introduced Goals-Means Task Analysis (GMTA). The idea 
of this approach was to break the task into its goals and sub-tasks, 
followed by defining elementary actions, pre-conditions and post-conditions 
linked to the task. Pre-conditions are the goals of previous tasks that 
activate the current task; post-conditions are the output of the successful 
execution of the task and will be considered as the pre-conditions for other 
tasks in the sequence.  
More qualitative data collection techniques seem essential to the delivery of 
the level of detail required, as well as the provision of insights from 
working environments. These techniques include interviews, field 
observations and verbal protocols (Corbett, Koedinger, & Anderson, 1997; 
Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006).  
Hoffman et al., (2009) used CTA to explore issues in the procurement of an 
intelligent decision support system. In doing so, they conducted a thematic 
analysis of a series of documentations relevant to the topic of study and 
performed structured interviews with experts.  
One form of CTA, which has widespread use in various studies as an 
explanation of decision making activities, is the Critical Decision Method 
(CDM) developed by Klein (1989). 
CDM is a retrospective interview technique with a focus on exploring 
decision making in its natural setting. These environments enforce various 
challenges on the decision maker, including time pressure, high 
information content and dynamic conditions (Klein et al., 1989). 
2µ+DUH HW DO  GHVFULEH &'0 as a knowledge elicitation strategy, 
based on the critical incident technique.  It elicits knowledge from both 
interviews and protocol analysis with talk aloud, aiming to assess human 
problem solving skills in naturalistic decision making contexts (Shadbolt, 
2005). 
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In CDM, the researcher asks questions from expert operators regarding a 
FHUWDLQ LQFLGHQW7KHTXHVWLRQVXVHG LQ WKLV WHFKQLTXHDUH FDOOHG µSUREHV¶
which focus on various aspects of decision making. Figure 4-3 shows an 
H[DPSOHRIWKHLQWHUYLHZµSUREHV¶VXJJHVWHGE\.OHLQHWDO 
 
FIGURE 4-3: CRITICAL DECISION INTERVIEW PROBES TAKEN FROM KLEIN ET AL. 
(1989 P. 466) 
Crandall (1989) conducted a CDM study with twenty fire commanders to 
explore their tactical and strategic decisions at the scene of a fire. This 
PHWKRGHQDEOHGKHUWRLGHQWLI\WKHFRPPDQGHUV¶SHUFHSWXDOFXHVDQGJDYH
an indication of how their decision making changes with the dynamics of 
the situation.  
Wong and Blanford (2002) used the CDM technique to understand the 
decision making of ambulance dispatchers. Thirteen dispatchers were 
interviewed and the timeline of the incidents they believed to be 
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memorable led to an in-depth understanding of their roles as well as their 
constraints.  
The first series of semi-structured interviews were conducted to inform the 
UHVHDUFKHU¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIUDLOZD\LQWHOOLJHQWLQIUDVWUXFWXUH7KHVHFRQG
series of semi-structured interviews were conducted in the maintenance 
control room, in order to facilitate a detailed understanding of fault finding 
(Chapter 7). The questions of this study were formed in a similar manner 
to the probes in the CDM VXJJHVWHG E\ 2¶+DUH HW Dl., (1998). The last 
series of semi-structured interviews was performed to facilitate the 
selection of an alarm scenario. This alarm scenario was used to further 
investigate the data processing framework (Chapter 5).    
4.3. Observation 
Observational studies are at the core of understanding any socio-technical 
environment. In this project, they were conducted for two purposes: 1- to 
become familiar with the domain of the study (familiarisation study), and 
2- to explore a specific research question (field study).  
4.3.1. Familiarisation observation 
µ)DPLOLDULVDWLRQ REVHUYDWLRQV¶ ZHUH FRQGXFWHG DV D IDFW ILQGLQJ DQG
exploratory activity, which consisted of visits to signal boxes, maintenance 
control centres and electrical control rooms.  
The familiarisation observations were designed to assist the researcher in 
REWDLQLQJDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI WKH VWXG\¶VGRPDLQPDLQO\ UDLOZD\ FRQWURO
rooms and remote condition monitoring equipment. These observational 
studies were conducted for two purposes: 1- fact finding and exploratory 
understanding of the domain, e.g. observing various types of signalling 
control: lever frames, NX panels, VDU and IECC, and 2- to familiarise the 
researcher with the details regarding a specific study, e.g. pre-study 
observation in Lewisham ECR. A total of 31 hours of observations were 
performed in 11 railway control rooms, which are summarised in Table 4-3 
below. 
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TABLE 4-3: FAMILIARISATION OBSERVATIONS 
Date Location Duration 
(hours) 
Relevant 
chapter  
October 2008 Rugby signal 
box 
(VDU)  
2  2 
October-
November 
2008 
Lewisham ECR 
(VDU-SCADA) 
4 2 & 6 
October 2008 York signal box 
(IECC)  
4 2 
October-
March 2008 
London North 
East route 
control-York  
4 2 
November 
2008 
Wembley signal 
box 
(NX) 
2 2 
December 
2008 
Manchester 
signal box  
(Lever frame)  
1 2 
December  
2008 
Liverpool signal 
box  
(lever frame) 
1 2 
February 
2009  
London Bridge 
signal box (NX)  
2 2 
April 2009  Rugby ECR 
(VDU-SCADA) 
3 2 & 6 
May 2009  Manchester 
South MCCS 
4 2&7 
May 2009  West Midlands 
signalling centre   
4 2 & 7  
4.3.2. Field study  
The second piece of observational research was an investigation into the 
main functions of a potential intelligent infrastructure that has analogues 
within existing systems, i.e. alarm handling in a railway electrical control 
room. These studies are referrHGWRDVµILHOGVWXGLHV¶LQWKLVWKHVLV 
Field studies are useful for developing an understanding of the domain in a 
comprehensive way (Bisantz & Drury, 2005); they enable  researchers to 
identify significant issues in complex socio-technical settings. Sundstrom 
and Salvador (1995) have noted that structured field studies can 
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interconnect with exploratory observational studies to produce an 
understanding of user needs.  
The field studies conducted as part of this research are designed to 
investigate potential intelligent infrastructure functions within existing 
control settings. Since SCADA systems are the closest to an intelligent 
infrastructure system and centralised RCM within the railway industry, 
SCADA-based ECRs were selected for the field studies. Moreover, the 
interview studies identified alarm handling as one of the essential functions 
of the future intelligent infrastructure system. Therefore, a total of 18 
hours of field studies were conducted in one railway ECR. It is common to 
use a combination of methods to capture complex control domains, such as 
the use of a combination of observational checklists and field visits to 
understand signalling and automation (Balfe, 2010). In this PhD, a 
combination of video recording, verbal protocol and observational 
checklists were used to facilitate observations.   
4.3.2.1. Video recording  
Data from video recordings is a useful tool that enables the researcher to 
review and analyse the activities during the field studies with more 
accuracy (Robson, 2011). This method is of specific relevance to the 
exploration of socio-technical environments since it facilitates the capture 
RIDQXPEHURIVRXUFHVRILQIRUPDWLRQVXFKDVWKHRSHUDWRUV¶LQWHUDFWLRQV
with the technical system and their conversations with other team 
members. 
Video recording was used in this PhD to capture detailed information, such 
as the artefacts used, the screen the operator was attending to, time spent 
thinking without clicking on any of the buttons, etc. Furthermore, the 
RSHUDWRUV¶FRPPHQts regarding the alarm, during and after handling, were 
recorded.  
4.3.2.2. Verbal protocol  
When operators are conducting cognitive activities (i.e. remembering, 
monitoring, etc), it is often the case that their thinking is not visible and 
observation of the responses alone is not sufficient to get a clear 
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understanding of the activity. In other words, human behaviours, while 
interacting with cognitive systems, are not usually in the form of 
observable actions. Verbal protocol analysis facilitates the capture of these 
mental processes whereby the operator explains their actions, either while 
performing the tasks or following the completion of the activity (Bainbridge 
& Sanderson, 2005). 
Throughout the alarm handling study conducted in the ECRs, operators 
were asked to explain their actions and their reasoning, either while 
handling or after they had cleared the alarms. Approximately two hours of 
the RSHUDWRUV¶ talk-aloud was audio recorded. This data also informed the 
completion of the observational checklist, discussed below (Chapter 6).  
4.3.2.3. Observational checklist  
An observational checklist is a technique that enables the findings from the 
observational studies to be structured. Many researchers have benefitted 
from the use of observational checklists in order to organise their 
understanding of the domains. More specifically, observational checklists 
are useful for informing the design and development of socio-technical 
systems. Some of these domains include virtual reality (Neale, Cobb, & 
Wilson, 2000), nuclear power plants (Mumaw  et al., 2000) and Railways 
(Balfe, 2010; Dadashi.Y, 2009).  
An observational checklist was designed on the basis of a familiarisation 
observation session conducted in an ECR. The observational checklist 
developed for the objectives of this PhD was time-stamped. It recorded the 
artefacts adopted by operators while alarm handling. One column in the 
FKHFNOLVW UHFRUGHG WKH RSHUDWRUV¶ FRPPHQWV UHJDUGLQJ WKHLU VRXUFHV RI
difficulty (Chapter 6). 
4.4. Experimental studies  
Experimental studies enable a hypothesis to be explored and investigated 
in an isolated environment. These studies are very popular among human 
factors researchers. The core reason for using experimental studies in 
human factors studies is twofold: 1- to facilitate the quantification of an 
improvement in the human-machine interaction, and 2- to perform a 
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structured comparison between a set of pre-defined design 
recommendations (Role & Diaz-Cabrera, 2005).    
The aims and objectives of this PhD programme have been   driven mainly 
by qualitative studies and studies of real-life situations. However, there 
were certain circumstances in which the use of qualitative assessment 
alone was not sufficient to meet the objectives of this study.  
The levels of information obtained from the interview studies reflected 
information content as well as a hierarchy associated with it. Although the 
observational studies conducted as part of the field studies in electrical 
control did qualitatively confirm the framework, the need for a more direct 
and robust method of assessment was greatly felt. Therefore a knowledge 
elicitation exercise was designed.  
Furthermore, following the identification of the problem solving stages and 
its association with the data processing framework, it was hypothesised 
that different information is targeted at improving the performance at 
different stages. Since it was not possible to isolate the stages of problem 
solving in a real-life situation, this had to be simulated in a laboratory 
study. More specifically, as it would have been impossible for expert 
operators to isolate their cognitive processing stages, students were used 
as participants.  
The difference between experimental studies and observational studies in 
this PhD is that, in the observational studies, the researcher is observing 
the research environment (e.g. ECR) as events occur in it. In the 
experimental studies, the researcher defines and controls the events that 
are occurring in the research environment. Depending on the type of the 
research environment, two forms of experimental studies are utilised in 
this PhD programme: field and lab-based.    
4.4.1. Field-based study 
A knowledge elicitation study was designed to underpin the optimal type 
and order of information required for the alarm management problem 
solving task. In a review conducted by Hoffman (2008), knowledge 
elicitation (KE) was recognised as one of the methods of cognitive task 
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analysis and one that facilitates an in-depth understanding of the 
RSHUDWRUV¶ FRJQLWLYHSURFHVVLQJZKLOHGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ9DULRXV WHFKQLTXHV
can be used for KE, such as interviews, task analysis, unobtrusive 
observation, verbal protocol, rating and sorting tasks, limited information 
problems, etc.  
In this study, an alarm scenario was developed in which railway operators 
were asked to rate pieces of information potentially required for the 
problem solving task in terms of importance. They were then asked to 
place this information within the three categories (sets of information) 
identified in Chapter 5.  
4.4.2. Lab-based study  
Interest in laboratory studies and simulated environments increased with 
UHVHDUFKHUV¶QHHG WR LQYHVWLJDWH LVRODWHGDQGSDUWLFXODUDVSHFWVRIKXPDQ
behaviour. However, the hypotheses explored through laboratory studies in 
complex socio-technical environment are often derived from field-based 
and observational studies (Wilson, 2000).   
Findings from the qualitative methods undertaken in this PhD study 
classified various stages of decision making and identified their optimal 
level of knowledge and information presentation. These recommendations 
were investigated within a laboratory study. Details of this study are 
reported in chapter 8 of this PhD thesis.  
4.5. Cognitive work analysis  
Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) is used in this PhD to capture the data from 
all of the methods above in a coherent way to represent the domain. CWA 
is a conceptual and system-based approach for analysing human 
information interactions in highly dynamic socio-technical work places 
(Sanderson et al.,1999; Fidel & Pejtersen, 2004).  It was initially proposed 
by Rasmussen et al, (1994), and subsequently modified by Vicente (1999) 
and Lintern (2009). Table 4-4 below lists the CWA stages in each of the 
three approaches.  
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TABLE 4-4: COGNITIVE WORK ANALYSIS STAGES 
Rasmussen et al. (1994) Vicente  (1999) Lintern (2009) 
Work domain analysis 
Activity analysis in work 
domain terms 
Activity analysis in decision 
making terms 
Activity analysis in terms of 
mental strategies 
Analysis of work organisation 
Analysis of system users 
Work domain analysis 
Control task analysis 
Strategies analysis 
Social organisation and 
cooperation analysis 
Worker competencies 
analysis 
Work domain analysis 
Work organisation 
analysis 
Cognitive 
transformation 
analysis 
Strategies analysis 
Cognitive processing 
analysis 
Social transaction 
analysis 
The stages of CWA (Rasmussen et al., 1994; Vicente, 1999; Lintern, 2009) 
are used mainly to analyse the structure of work domain and work tasks, 
initially through the form of means-end hierarchy. This leads to an analysis 
of cognitive processes (Reising & Sanderson, 2002) and strategies. 
Sanderson et al. (1999) reviewed the potential of CWA to inform all stages 
of the system life-cycle, including requirements, specification, design, 
simulation, evaluation, implementation, operator training, and 
maintenance.  
CWA is used to structure common observational methods that provide 
useful material about human information behaviour, often in textual 
narratives. Nirula and Woodruff (2006) considered CWA as an ³LQWHgral 
SUHFXUVRUWRDQ\GHVLJQLWHUDWLRQ´. CWA has been applied to system design,  
although most  works  have focused on the initial stages of the CWA 
framework, such as Work Domain Analysis (WDA) and Abstraction 
Hierarchy (AH) (Groppe et al., 2009; Reising & Sanderson, 2002; Janzen & 
Vicente, 1998; Golightly et al., 2011). For example, Groppe et al., (2009) 
DVVHVVHG SLORWV¶ RSHUDWLRQDO LQIRUPDWLRQ UHTXLUHPHQWV GXULQJ DLUSRUW
collaborative decision making, using WDA. Reising and Sanderson (2002) 
formalised an ecological user interface design approach with an AH. Janzen 
and Vicente (1998) applied the AH to quantify human attention allocation 
within various levels of the hierarchy in a thermal-hydraulic process 
simulation.  
Nirula and Woodruff (2006) conducted a full CWA to understand the design 
implications of ubiquitous computing in schools. In order to fulfil the 
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requirements of the stages, they started with an observational study, 
followed by interviews and focused field observations, which gave an 
indication of the activities in the environment. Verbal protocol with end-
users after they had used the interfaces, together with the results obtained 
from observational studies, were analysed to capture the strategies 
adopted by users. In this PhD, CWA was used to guide the understanding 
of railway alarm handling, decision ladders were utilised to facilitate 
cognitive transformation analysis.  
4.5.1. Decision Ladder 
The Decision Ladder is a method that was developed for modelling 
cognitive activity throughout control tasks (Rasmussen, 1986). The 
Decision Ladder aims to identify various information processing modes. In 
dynamic socio-technical environments the shift between these modes is 
difficult (functional fixation). These modes can be categorised into two 
groups: 1- information processing activities, and 2- the state of knowledge 
resulting from information processing. This information has been shown 
with different symbols, to enable predictable design.   
Rasmussen (1986) also listed the sequential levels of information 
processing while the operator is making a decision, as below:  
x Detect the need for intervention 
x Observe the essential data required for decision making 
x  Analyse the available evidence 
x  Evaluate the possible consequences 
x  Select the target state  
x  Select the appropriate task, depending on the available resources  
x  Select the procedure with the least effort required to conduct the 
task  
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5DVPXVVHQ¶VDecision Ladder (1986) gives designers a very good overview 
of various processing modes. It is a template which frames potential 
cognitive states and processes within a standardised model of cognition: 
attention, interpretation, evaluation and decision-making, planning and 
action. 
The Decision Ladder can also represent short-cuts through cognitive 
processing, known as shunts and leaps, which is the kind of cognitive 
activity that is typical of expert performance. It also enables the impact of 
automation on cognitive processing to be predicted by demonstrating the 
impact of interventions on specific cognitive sequences. In most real life 
decision making situations, these phases do not actually occur or, at least, 
not in such a structured way. It is mainly a framework to present the 
logical sequence of information processing. Some argue that this model is 
too reductionist, and cannot reflect the dynamic work environment (Hoc & 
Amalberti, 1995) but, since it is very useful in representing the sequence of 
information processes and states, it has been adopted along with other 
methods (e.g. verbal protocol).   
4.6. Participatory observation 
Participatory observation was an underlying approach throughout this 
research. It is mainly rooted and practised in social science. By allowing 
the researcher to merge in the domain of the study, observational biases 
inherited from other methods are minimised. This facilitates a meta-
understanding of the domain under study by changing the role of the 
researcher from a mere observer to an active member within that domain 
(Robson, 2011; Schensul, Schensul, & Lecompte, 1999). In this PhD, 
participatory observation involved the researcher as an active member of 
the Ergonomics team in NR.  
As mentioned in the second chapter of this thesis, the railway is an 
intertwined organisation; there are many different sectors, each with 
different cultural attitudes and priorities. Participant observation enabled 
the researcher to become familiar with this culture, as well as achieving a 
certain level of trustworthiness and engagement within the organisation, 
concerning various subject matters (Robson, 2011).  
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$VDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHGRPDLQGHSHQGVRQWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VVXEMHFWLYH
interpretation, the period of participant observation should be long enough 
IRUWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VVXEMHFWLYHFRPSUHKHQVLRQ to be drawn from experience 
(Robson, 2011). To achieve this, during this PhD programme 
(approximately three years) the researcher was an active member of the 
Ergonomics Team, as well as being involved in a number of projects whilst 
conducting her PhD. Projects with some relevance to this PhD study are 
briefly discussed below.   
The researcher was a member of the Alarm Strategy Working Grouping 
within the company. This group has been established in NR to develop an 
integrated understanding of alarm principles: creation, routing, 
presentation and lifecycle management of alarm data, in both operational 
and asset management sectors. Members of this group include senior 
managers within signalling and telecommunication, operational strategy, 
asset management, electrical control, intelligent infrastructure and 
ergonomics. During the monthly meetings, the researcher has been able to 
establish an overview of alarm systems in various control settings as well 
as their priorities and potential challenges.   
One of the major challenges facing the efficiency of railway maintenance is 
inconsistency of technical equipment available to operators with similar 
roles and responsibilities. To overcome this issue, NR commissioned the 
Ergonomics team to study the feasibility of a standardisation of the 
systems within the ECR setting. The researcher was supporting a senior 
ergonomist in this project. This project involved the development of an in-
depth understanding of current practices carried out by ECR operators, the 
time required for each of their tasks, as well as issues associated with 
teamwork and collaboration in and between control room environments. 
Within the ECR standardisation project, the researcher was involved with 
data collection, as well as the analysis of findings in relation to its aims. A 
number of ECRs were visited as part of this study, including Lewisham ECR 
near London. This project helped the researcher to obtain a broad 
understanding of ECR settings in railways. More importantly, the 
UHVHDUFKHU¶V IDPLOLDULW\ZLWKWKLVFRQWUROURRPDQGWKHUDSSRUWHVWDElished 
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between the researcher and the operators, were reasons for choosing this 
ECR for some of the studies conducted as part of this PhD.  
In addition, the Operational strategy team in NR commissioned the 
Ergonomics Team to develop a workload assessment toolkit for railway 
ECR. The researcher led this project. This study was followed by the ECR 
standardisation study mentioned earlier. It required an in-depth 
understanding of various tasks conducted within an ECR and of the factors 
that can influence the complexity of various tasks. This is an ongoing 
project; the researcher has used her expertise developed through other 
projects in the same domain, as well as the theoretical understanding 
captured as part of her research, in order to derive the ECR workload 
assessment toolkit. 
4.7. Chapter summary  
This chapter has reported on the methodological approaches utilised 
throughout this PhD. A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods 
was used in order to explore and investigate various aspects of the rail 
domain in the interest of the objectives of this PhD. Looking at the 
paradigms and research questions mentioned in previous chapters, it 
became clear that some methodological approaches had to address the 
domain qualitatively in order to help explore and understand intelligent 
infrastructure. Hence, mainly interview studies and observations were 
used. When a number of tasks were selected as representative of 
intelligent infrastructure systems, more targeted research questions were 
investigated through a combination of observation studies, verbal protocols 
and video recordings structured in forms of CWA or CDM. A focused and 
isolated hypothesis was formed with regard to the optimal level of 
information required and a small scale lab-based study was conducted to 
examine the trend suggested by the hypothesis. Indeed, the benefit of 
using the lab-based study is not in the significant differences, but in the 
capacity to apply field studies and qualitative approaches to the 
development of a hypothesis concerning information relevancy and 
sufficiency for a complex system, such as an intelligent infrastructure 
system.   
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5. Understanding intelligent infrastructure within Network 
Rail  
In order to develop a thorough understanding of railway intelligent 
infrastructure it is necessary to know its functionalities and its potential 
users. However, at the time of starting this PhD, actual intelligent 
infrastructure applications did not exist in Network Rail (NR).This is despite 
the fact that they have been launched and examined as part of a long term 
project over two control periods (each control period is 5 years). Although 
a number of strategic views were developed, the organisation was unclear 
about the functionalities, main users and potential interfaces.   
Knowing that there had been an intelligent infrastructure project in NR 
since 2006, it was assumed that a detailed understanding would be 
available both from members of the intelligent infrastructure and asset 
PDQDJHPHQWWHDPVDVZHOODVWKHFRPSDQ\¶VGRFXPHQWDWLRQ+RZHYHUD
review of NR documentation, reported as the familiarisation process in 
Section5 5.1, suggested otherwise. It was apparent that within the 
company the notion of intelligent infrastructure was an ill-defined and 
vague concept. Despite a number of policy and future planning documents 
identifying various phases of the project from a technical viewpoint, little 
thought appeared to have been given to the users and the functions of 
these systems and how they could co-exist with other control room or on-
track tasks. 
In order to better understand the scope, policies, roles, equipment, 
challenges and relevant human factors issues for rail intelligent 
infrastructure, a series of studies was conducted by the author. These were 
designed to meet the first objective of this PhD study:  
I. Develop a data processing framework that guide and support 
effective implementation of railway intelligent infrastructure from a 
human factors perspective  
This chapter starts with the familiarisation process that was conducted 
prior to the interview study. This is followed by a description of the 
methods of data collection and data analysis as well as a justification of the 
selected coding schemes used for the analysis of the interview 
Chapter 5: Understanding railway intelligent infrastructure in Network Rail   
 
83 
 
transcriptions. Then the findings of the interview study are reported, 
subsequently integrated into a data processing framework. A third study is 
then reported working with railway SMEs to verify the content and 
sequence of the data processing framework when performing a task similar 
to those of future railway intelligent infrastructure. These studies are then 
discussed and the chapter is summarised.  
5.1. Familiarisation process  
A series of familiarisation activities were conducted in order to accelerate 
WKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VXQGHUstanding of the overall concept and potential users of 
a rail intelligent infrastructure system. These activities comprised a number 
of exploratory interviews, attendance at a one day workshop held by NR as 
ZHOO DV D UHYLHZ RI WKH FRPSDQ\¶V 15 GRFXPHQWDWion regarding the 
intelligent infrastructure project.  Findings from these activities led to the 
design and implementation of the interview study (Section 5.2); 
preliminary findings captured through the familiarisation process are 
presented.  
5.1.1. Review of Network Rail documentation 
The idea of intelligent infrastructure systems in NR was initiated in 2006, 
due to the need for change in the maintenance regime. In 2007, a good 
practice guide was produced by NR, Metronet, Tube Lines and the Railway 
Industry Association (Network Rail et al., 2007) to facilitate an 
understanding of the concept of intelligent infrastructure.    
The objective of intelligent infrastructure, as presented in the good practice 
guide is: µWRGHOLYHULPSURYHPHQWE\DSSOLFDWLRQRILQWHOOLJHQFHWKURXJKWKH
infrastruFWXUH GHVLJQ DQG PDLQWHQDQFH F\FOH¶ (Network Rail et al., 2007, 
p.3). Intelligent infrastructure was seen to be about measuring and 
collecting integrated information about the condition of railway assets to 
improve maintenance efficiencies, enhance safety and operational 
performance, leading to a more affordable railway. 
The intelligent infrastructure project was planned as a railway 
enhancement project rather than an operational one. Therefore, the need 
to assign a priority group to the project was not felt until late 2008. 
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Moreover, as a pragmatic approach is required for the implementation of 
such a large scale project, the company should have devised a strategy to 
implement it in stages. The strategy report produced by the intelligent 
infrastructure team in December 2009 (Network Rail, 2009) identified the 
main departments associated with these systems as asset management, 
operations & planning and regulations. This confirms the broad spectrum of 
functionalities that needed to be addressed by the project.  
Monitoring of the infrastructure in a systematic and effective way is the 
first enabler of developing intelligent infrastructure systems and includes: 
infrastructure monitoring train, infrastructure monitoring infrastructure, 
train monitoring infrastructure and train monitoring train. Figure 5-1, taken 
IURP1HWZRUN5DLO¶VVWUDWHJ\UHSRUWVKRZVWKLVVFRSLQJ7KHTXDGUDQWZLWK
the blue box around it (infrastructure monitoring infrastructure) is 
identified as a higher priority than the infrastructure monitoring train or 
train monitoring infrastructure. The fourth quadrant (train monitoring train) 
is completely out of the scope of this PhD as it is the train operating 
FRPSDQLHV¶ UHVSRQVLELOLW\; at the time of PhD programme, the train 
monitoring train had not been included within the scope of the company 
project.  
 
FIGURE 5-1: INTELLIGENT INFRASTRUCTURE SCOPE QUADRANTS TAKEN FROM 
NETWORK RAIL, 2009 
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In order to guide the project development phases, NR is using ISO 13374 
standard for remote condition monitoring (Figure 5-2)(Network Rail, 2009). 
NR has used ISO 13374 ± Parts 1 and 2: condition monitoring and 
diagnostics of machines-data processing, communication and 
presentation- to inform various development stages. The model 
proposed in this standard consists of six stages: 1- data acquisition, 2- data 
manipulation, 3- state detection, 4- health assessment 5- prognosis 
assessment and 6- advice generation.  
 
FIGURE 5-2: ISO 13374 STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK TAKEN FROM NETWORK RAIL, 
2009 
A broad range of remote condition monitoring (RCM) systems is now being 
used by NR all around the country. The first phase was to narrow the scope 
of the project geographically, with approximately 2000 locations selected. 
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Assets selected for this phase of the study are those with higher impact in 
terms of safety and minutes of delay if a failure occurs.  
The Edinburgh-Glasgow route was selected to pilot the implementation 
phase of the NR intelligent infrastructure project. The aims of this phase 
were to integrate and improve current condition monitoring equipment, 
develop an interface that can collate and present the data collected from 
the available RCM systems and to assess the feasibility of an intelligent 
LQIUDVWUXFWXUHV\VWHPZLWKLQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VFXUUHQWEXVLQHVVSURFHVV 
Four critical assets (in the company, referred to as golden assets) were the 
focus of the first phase of the pilot. These include 130 point ends, 13 DC 
(Direct Current) Track Circuits, 24 Signalling Power Supply Cables and the 
Edinburgh and Cowlairs Interlocking. The area under coverage and a 
number of golden assets monitored are shown in Figure 5-3 below.  
 
FIGURE 5-3: EDINBURGH & GLASGOW PILOT MAP, TAKEN FROM NETWORK RAIL, 
2009 
Although there are detailed descriptions regarding the technical aspects of 
this project - the interface as well as the RCM equipment that has to be 
fitted on the assets - little was known about the business process and the 
effect of change on the existing maintenance regime. 
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5.1.2. Exploratory interviews  
In October 2008, the researcher interviewed four senior employees of NR 
(Table 5-1). These were unstructured interviews and participants were 
asked to describe their understanding of railway intelligent infrastructure.  
The selection of interviewees for this part of the study was based on the 
UHVHDUFKHU¶V QDLYH DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW LQWHOOLJHQW LQIUDVWUXFWXUH ZDV D ZHOO
defined concept. Therefore, it was believed that an opportunistic sample 
would potentially provide enough information to guide understanding. 
However, the lack of understanding of the domain around the company 
revealed through these exploratory interviews led to a more detailed 
interview study (Section 5.2). 
Four senior employees who were involved with the project were 
interviewed, one system developer, two ergonomists and one electrical 
control specialist.  These interviewees were asked to discuss the concept of 
intelligent infrastructure in relation to their area of expertise.  
Findings from these interviews revealed that intelligent infrastructure 
seems to have been seen as a solution to most of the problems currently 
facing railway performance. In the eyes of these interviewees, intelligent 
infrastructure is something of a superhero! All participants were aware of 
its potential benefits and knew about the project to an extent but, 
ironically, were unable to give a consistent definition of intelligent 
infrastructure, although they all agreed on the strong connection between 
RCM and intelligent infrastructure. Furthermore, information management 
and user engagement were noted as two of the challenges for the 
implementation of the project. 
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TABLE 5-1: FAMILIARISATION INTERVIEWS  
Number of 
interviewees  
Role of interviewees Duration (per 
interviewee)  
1 Senior system developer  2Xhours 
2 Senior ergonomist 1Xhour 
1 Head of electrical control  1Xhour  
5.1.3. Workshop  
In November 2008, NR held a one day workshop to assess the functionality 
of the semi-functional prototype developed for the Edinburgh-Glasgow 
pilot. 18 NR employees, senior managers and engineers, whose roles would 
be affected by intelligent infrastructure systems, as well as system 
developers from the contracted company, attended this workshop. The 
author attHQGHG WKH ZRUNVKRS WR UHSUHVHQW 1HWZRUN 5DLO¶V (UJRQRPLFV
Team. 
Issues discussed during this workshop covered the scope and 
functionalities of the intelligent infrastructure system. Attendance at this 
workshop provided the basis for a subsequent interviewing phase and was 
the starting point of sampling for interview participants. At this stage, an 
early version of the intelligent infrastructure data processing framework 
(Figure 5-4) was drafted and investigated throughout the semi-structured 
interview study. An alternative route would have been to wait and 
construct the framework only on the basis of all the interview material from 
the full sample, but the availability of such a senior set of interviewees 
meant that a decision was taken to develop an early version which would 
be commented on in subsequent interviews. 
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5-4: AN EARLY VERSION OF THE INTELLIGENT INFRASTRUCTURE FRAMEWORK 
DRAFTED AFTER THE WORKSHOP  
This framework describes the dataflow in the potential intelligent 
infrastructure system. Intelligent infrastructure has to collect and then 
collate data from various assets (point machines, level crossings, etc.) 
through existing and new sensors. These data would then be collated and 
reconstructed in a meaningful way to show key symptoms about a 
particular asset and to generate an alarm when there is a high chance of 
that asset failing in the near future. The alarms are then analysed and 
handled. The ultimate goal of intelligent infrastructure appears to be the 
ability to assist operators in making more informed decisions and to feed 
the expertise back into the system.  
5.2. Semi-structured interviews  
The initial research required to inform the objectives of this PhD study 
revealed a lack of conceptual understanding in the company about 
intelligent infrastructure. Therefore, a more comprehensive semi-structured 
interview study was conducted for a deeper exploration. Although 
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individual interviewees did not have a consistent definition of the concept, 
data collected from the sample did help an understanding of the potential 
functionalities, roles, benefits, and human factors issues involved in railway 
intelligent infrastructure. 20 semi-structured interviews were conducted 
between November 2009 and January 2010 with rail staff who were 
knowledgeable about, or were potential users of, intelligent infrastructure 
and its information systems.  
Given the poor company documentation, paucity of thinking about 
fundamental systems and the lack of real current implementation projects, 
such an interview study, whilst not ideal, did seem to be the best route to 
advance understanding and to start to structure the data flows and 
consequent human factors concerns. 
5.2.1. Participants 
The first interviewees were chosen on the basis of the suggestions of 
experts who attended the workshop (Section 5.1.3) as well the 
recommendaWLRQ RI 1HWZRUN 5DLO¶V 'LUHFWRU RI (QJLQHHULQJ DW WKH WLPH
snowball sampling was used afterwards. Four participants were from 
companies other than NR and 16 participants were from various 
departments in NR (Table 5-2). 
TABLE 5-2: PARTICIPANTS OF THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW STUDY  
No Company Role 
/Department  
Note 
1 High Speed 
Trains 
2(HS2) 
Director HS2 is responsible for developing 
high speed rail; those at HS2 have a 
modern approach to traditional 
railway problems. The director of 
+6ZDV1HWZRUN5DLO¶V&KLHI
Engineer when the intelligent 
infrastructure project was first 
launched in 2006. His view of the 
original understanding of the system 
and the musts, wants and hopes 
regarding the system provided an 
interesting insight into the 
challenges of implementing the 
project  
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3 Invensys  Research & 
Development  
Invensys was the developer 
contracted by Network Rail to 
design and build the intelligent 
infrastructure interface. Their views 
were captured since they, as 
developers, should have a clear idea 
of the overall functionality of the 
system. 
1 Network Rail Director of 
Railway 
Systems and 
Vehicle 
Engineering 
Application of remote condition 
monitoring systems has been 
directed and led by railway systems 
and vehicle engineering. The 
director of this department has up 
to date information regarding 
available RCM equipment, its 
implications and how it would shape 
a successful intelligent infrastructure 
system. 
1 Network Rail Intelligent 
infrastructure 
project 
manager  
The aim of the intelligent 
infrastructure team within the asset 
management section is to design, 
develop and evaluate the intelligent 
infrastructure pilot and assess the 
feasibility of expanding this project 
to a national level.  
2 Network Rail Ergonomics An overview of the findings from the 
familiarisation exercises revealed a 
lack of understanding of human 
factor issues. Two senior members 
of the Ergonomics team who were 
specialised in alarms and interface 
development were interviewed to 
capture the potential human factors 
challenges. 
4 Network Rail Information 
management  
The information management team 
in Network Rail has responsibility to 
develop system and information 
requirements for the intelligent 
infrastructure interface. Views of 
four members were captured to 
XQGHUVWDQGGHVLJQHUV¶DQG
GHYHORSHUV¶YLHZVRIWKHV\VWHP 
1 Network Rail Signal and 
Telecommunic
ation  
Signalling and telecommunication is 
responsible for transferring 
operational data to signal boxes and 
fixing the failures to ensure 
signallers will receive correct 
information to run the service. 
Although intelligent infrastructure 
does not directly affect their role, 
the use of RCM equipment can 
potentially enhance their  
 Chapter 5: Understanding railway intelligent infrastructure in Network Rail   
 
92 
 
performance. 
2 Network Rail Corporate 
development  
This department has responsibility 
to transform and improve the 
running of the railway Despite the 
vagueness of such a task, intelligent 
infrastructure nicely sits in this 
department; issues like business 
change and organisational 
challenges will be of interest to this 
department.  
1 Network Rail Infrastructure 
investment  
This department aims to ensure that 
the infrastructure is kept in 
optimum condition with regard to 
cost-benefit models. Intelligent 
infrastructure is not an immediate 
operational priority and the savings 
will emerge in time.  
1 Network Rail Operation and 
customer 
service 
$OWKRXJKLQWHOOLJHQWLQIUDVWUXFWXUH¶V
current scope does not include 
issues directly affecting customer 
service, such as passenger 
information, ticketing information, 
etc,  the views of the Director of 
Operations and Customer Service 
were captured in relation to future 
SROLFLHVDQGYDULRXVGHSDUWPHQWV¶
expectations of the way this project 
is going to affect them.  
1 Network Rail Maintenance 
control centre  
Currently, maintenance control 
centres are the main area of work 
for the intelligent infrastructure 
system. An interview with a 
maintenance technician in a control 
centre aimed to capture his view 
and understanding of the intelligent 
infrastructure. This was to explore 
WKHXVHU¶VSHUVSHFWLYHRIWKH
system. 
1 Network Rail Scope and 
development  
This department is responsible for 
organising and structuring future 
policies in the company, depending 
on the available constraints and 
demands.   
1 Network Rail Train 
technology  
Currently much train borne remote 
condition monitoring equipment 
(e.g. LIVE train) exists. These would 
constitute part of the larger scope of 
intelligent infrastructure project.  
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5.2.2. Apparatus 
Apparatus used for this study comprised DQ 2O\PSXV GLJLWDO YRLFH
UHFRUGHUWRUHFRUGWKHLQWHUYLHZVDQG1YLYRVRIWZDUHXVHGIRUWKHGDWD
analysis. An information sheet was designed to guide the participants 
throughout the interviews (Appendix 12.1). 
5.2.3. Design 
Information sheets were sent to participants prior to the study to introduce 
it and to provide a set of questions to be asked during the study. These 
questions were formed during the familiarisation process (Section 5.1) and 
ZHUH FRQILUPHGE\1HWZRUN5DLO¶V &KLHI RI (QJLQHHULQJDW WKH WLPH 7KH\
are listed below: 
1. What do you understand to be the future of Intelligent 
Infrastructure for Network Rail? 
2. What do you think is the purpose of Intelligent Infrastructure?  
3. Do you consider RCM as a type of intelligent infrastructure? 
4. :KDWGRHVµUHPRWH¶LQ5&0PHDQ" 
5. :KDWGRHVµLQWHOOLJHQW¶LQLQWHOOLJHQWinfrastructure mean? 
6. How will the information required for an intelligent infrastructure be 
captured? 
7. What do you think are the main functions of an intelligent 
infrastructure information display? 
8. Which control rooms need to be in direct contact with intelligent 
infrastructure systems?  
9. What are the challenges for designing an effective intelligent 
infrastructure system? 
10. What are the main roles and responsibilities of operators working 
with intelligent infrastructure systems? 
Participants were not limited to responses to the questions presented to 
them. Depending on their expertise and domain of work, some questions 
were elaborated, whereas some remained unexplored. For example, a 
member of the Information Management team would not know much about 
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TXHVWLRQ µ¶ZKLFK UHIHUV WRSRWHQWLDO UROHVDQG UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVRI IXWXUH
railway intelligent infrastructure systems.  
5.3. Analysis  
Twenty hours of interviews were transcribed (approximately 55,000 words) 
and analysed. Thematic content analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Neale 
& Nichols, 2001) was used for this purpose. An example of an interview, 
along with one of the coding schemes used, is shown in Appendix 12.2.  
Thematic content analysis provides an in-depth understanding of the 
domain from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives. Apart from 
data collection, which was described earlier in this chapter, four stages are 
needed to conduct thematic content analysis:  data collation, theme 
definition and classification, higher order theme selection, and presentation 
of a classification matrix (Figure 5-5).  
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Data collection 
Data collation 
Theme definition 
classification 
Higher order theme 
selection 
NR workshop 
Familiarisation interviews
NR documentation 
Transcribed 
Classification one : general 
understanding of intelligent 
infrastructure  
Classification two: human factors 
issues   
Classification three : intelligent 
infrastructure data processing 
framework 
 
FIGURE 5-5: THEMATIC CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEW STUDY  
In order to understand intelligent infrastructure, three questions were 
raised. These questions guided the classification of the themes which were 
investigated throughout the interview analysis.  
1- What is railway intelligent infrastructure?  
Following the early familiarisation stage, there was no apparent consistent 
understanding of intelligent infrastructure within railways, therefore the 
first theme of the transcribed interviews was designed to provide a general 
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understanding of intelligent infrastructure. The interviewees were asked to 
describe what they think intelligent infrastructure is, to consider its use to 
them and its potential roles. Since the participants were selected to 
represent key departments involved with the project, it was reasonable to 
assume that the collation of their understanding would give an indication of 
the definition of railway intelligent infrastructure. 
2- What are the human factor issues associated with it?  
Lyons and Urry (2006) recommended key features that need to be 
understood and put in place for a successful transport intelligent 
infrastructure system. These include: society and social practices 
(economic prosperity, social cohesion, and environmental sustainability), 
governance (market force, public policy and politics), systems (land-use 
systems, social system, and transport system), transport (travel and 
traffic) and individuals. Despite greater levels of automated data collection 
and analysis, people are still at the core of these system features   which 
means good design and implementation requires explicit definition of the 
key human factors and the systems requirements they pose. Therefore, the 
second theme was aimed to identify the human factor issues associated 
with this project.  
One of the questions on the information sheet of the interview study asked 
about potential challenges of the project. This was designed mainly to 
encourage participants to talk about different problems along with the 
development and implementation of the project. These challenges and 
problems were then interpreted in the light of potential human factor 
issues.  
3- What is the data processing associated with railway intelligent 
infrastructure systems?  
Guiding the knowledge and information required for better implementation 
of a railway intelligent infrastructure system was one of the objectives of 
this PhD study. In doing so, it was important to understand the flow of 
information and stages of work for hypothetical intelligent infrastructure 
tasks. A third classification was established to analyse the interview 
 Chapter 5: Understanding railway intelligent infrastructure in Network Rail   
 
97 
 
transcripts in the form of various pieces of data attended to by operators 
and the flow of information during a hypothetical intelligent infrastructure 
process. This led to assessing and refining the data processing framework 
that had been drafted during the workshop.  
5.3.1. Data collation  
7KH WUDQVFULEHG LQWHUYLHZV ZHUH SUHVHQWHG RQ D 0LFURVRIW ([FHO
spreadsheet. Columns of this VSUHDGVKHHW UHSUHVHQW SDUWLFLSDQWV¶
comments focusing on similar concepts (technology, definition, challenges, 
etc.). Rows of the spreadsheet show the number of participants 
commenting on those similar concepts; an example extract from the 
spreadsheet is shown in Figure 5-6. 
7KH UHVHDUFKHU¶V FKRLFH RI KHDGLQJV IRU WKH FROXPQV RQ WKH VSUHDGVKHHW
was simply to provide a starting point for the analysis and this was 
modified throughout a number of iterations. Moreover, a member of the 
8QLYHUVLW\ 2I 1RWWLQJKDP¶V +XPDQ )DFWRUV 5HVHDUFK *URXS ZLWK JRRG
railway knowledge was asked to review these headings and comment on 
them.  
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FIGURE 5-6: EXAMPLE EXTRACT FROM THE SPREADSHEET USED FOR EARLY STAGES OF DATA COLLATION 
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5.3.2. Theme definition classification  
7KHFROXPQKHDGLQJVDQG WKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ comments guided the analysis 
of themes. The original headings of the spreadsheet, as shown in 
Figure 5-6, were definition, purpose, benefit, current RCM systems, future 
RCM plans, functions, cognitive functions, challenges, roles and 
responsibilities, intelligence, human factors issues and system distribution. 
To simplify the analysisFRPPHQWVUHODWHGWRµSXUSRVH¶DQGµGHILQLWLRQ¶ and 
FRPPHQWVUHODWHGWRµIXQFWLRQV¶DQGµFRJQLWLYHIXQFWLRQV¶ZHUHFRPELQHG 
The headings shown in Figure 5-6 mainly classified the questions asked on 
the information sheet and aims to facilitate the analysis of themes directed 
towards the objectives of the PhD. The rationale for selecting the theme 
classifications is mentioned in section 5.3; this led to three rounds of 
coding, as described below. Higher order themes were then selected, 
depending on the classification conducted in the previous stage. Three 
higher order themes were selected for the purpose of this study: 
x General understanding of intelligent infrastructure systems 
x Human factors issues  
x Data processing framework 
The first round of coding interview transcripts started with a set of 
classifications but evolved as new concepts emerged. This was focused on 
developing a general understanding of railway intelligent infrastructure. 
Issues associated with definitions, benefits, roles and functionalities of 
railway intelligent infrastructure were explored. 
The second round of coding addressed human factor issues, with a focus on 
the following: automation, decision making, human machine interaction, 
monitoring, organisational culture, planning, safety and human reliability, 
situation awareness, system reliability, user engagement, and workload.  
)LQDOO\ LW ZDV LPSRUWDQW WR FDSWXUH SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ YLHZV DERXW WKH GDWD
processing of the future railway intelligent infrastructure. The transcripts 
were therefore re-reviewed for the third round, this time with a focus on 
the work and information flow of current RCM systems in use and those for 
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potential intelligent infrastructure systems of the future. The headings used 
to organise this review were as follows: asset, sensor, data, data 
processing, database, information, information development, knowledge, 
knowledge integration, and intelligence. All of the headings used in the 
three rounds of coding were commented on by two members of the 
Ergonomics Team, and later verified by railway electrical control room 
operators (Section 5.5). 
Consequently, every interview transcription was coded three times. Nvivo 
ZDVXVHGWRRUJDQLVHWKHVHFRGes and facilitate the merging of different 
groups of codes. Therefore, it was made possible to specify which human 
factor issues are associated with which functions within the railway 
intelligent infrastructure.  
5.4. Findings of the semi-structured interviews  
Findings of the interview study are presented in four sections. The first 
three report the specific findings associated with the coding of definition 
of intelligent infrastructure, human factors issues and data processing. 
The fourth section synthesises and integrates the findings to form a 
data processing framework.  
5.4.1. Railway intelligent infrastructure 
The first round of coding explored the definition and functionality of 
LQWHOOLJHQW LQIUDVWUXFWXUH IURP SRWHQWLDO XVHUV¶ SRLQW RI YLHZ  The 
findings will be influenced by LQWHUYLHZHHV¶ DVVXPSWLRQV RI ZKDW WKH\
believe a hypothetical intelligent infrastructure should look like. 
Intelligent infrastructure is defined as a means of support to more 
reliable and effective railway maintenance. However, the extent of its 
capabilities varies in the eyes of different users. Maintenance staff 
(maintenance control centre, railway engineering) viewed  the systems 
as  somewhat more advanced RCM systems, whereas members from 
the infrastructure investment and corporate development teams 
seemed to view intelligent infrastructure as  pioneering technology that 
could solve ³all´ railway problems. The truth probably resides 
somewhere between these two extremes.   
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Figure 5-7 shows the coding associated with the general understanding 
of railway intelligent infrastructure. The SHUFHQWDJH RI SDUWLFLSDQWV¶
comments referring to each of the themes is also shown. These 
percentages might represent tKH LQWHUYLHZHH¶V level of concern or 
familiarity with various themes. For example, the two highest 
percentages are associated with the benefits of intelligent infrastructure 
systems and the system distributions; the former is a potential 
advantage and the latter is more of a concern.  
Intelligent infrastructure uses technology to provide data pertinent to asset 
condition, thus providing a decision aid. Its main focus is on the provision 
of information about the asset to support real time condition monitoring as 
well as high level asset management. 
The benefits are targeted at safety and efficiency. These comprise more 
informed scheduling for the maintenance regime, producing reductions in 
the costs associated with poor maintenance including regulator financial 
fines resulting from delays.  
The intelligence can either be built into the asset or can lie in the 
interpretation of the information captured from that asset. This varies 
between asset types. For example, when assessing the condition of 
points, enough information can be obtained from the asset on the track to 
enable the full understanding required for diagnosis and even prognosis 
of a failure. 
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FIGURE 5-7: INTERVIEW ANALYSIS: GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF RAILWAY 
INTELLIGENT INFRASTRUCTURE  
In terms of roles and responsibilities, distribution of the intelligent 
infrastructure can be layered and distributed both centrally and locally. 
Therefore, various roles with different demands and priorities are 
involved. Three main roles were identified as control room operators, track 
workers and strategic analysts. 
Control room operators are responsible for responding instantly to high 
priority alarms. They are based in local control rooms, which are 
designed to support an operational railway by conducting temporary 
corrective actions. Track workers get the information from control room 
operators regarding a potential failure and then feed back information 
about the condition of that asset. Strategic analysts receive 
diagnostic reports from control room operators in order to make 
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decisions about future plans, speed restrictions, maintenance regimes, 
etc. and feed that information back to both control room operators and 
track workers. This higher level of analysis is conducted in central control 
locations. They are responsible for informing future policy and strategy 
towards adjustments, metrics, trends and other parameters to support 
permanent corrective actions. 
The main functions of operators interacting with railway intelligent 
infrastructure systems are monitoring, problem solving, alarm handling, 
fault finding, diagnosis, planning and optimization. Operators are informed 
of a defect through an alarm or an alert; this is combined with the opHUDWRU¶V
knowledge of the environment and the level of risk associated with that 
fault in choosing an optimum corrective action. 
,QWHUYLHZHHV¶ NQRZOHGJH RI H[LVWLQJ 5&0 V\VWHPV DQG WKHLU
assumptions about the proposed intelligent infrastructure system led to 
the identification of a number of challenges. These can be categorised 
into three groups: technical, business change and corporate 
development.  
Technical challenges were mainly noted by the members of Information 
Management team (who are responsible for designing and managing 
the development of the pilot) and are as follows: 
x Current RCM systems are designed to monitor fixed assets. As part 
of the wider scope of intelligent infrastructure it is important to be 
able to collect and monitor data about dynamic assets (e.g. trains).  
x Geographical Positioning Systems (GPS) technologies are very 
advanced. However, in order to detect point machines centimetres 
away from each other, they need to be even more accurate.  
x Algorithms are required to derive predictive intelligence for the 
decision makers. 
Almost all of the participants agreed that, although these challenges 
are important as in any other new project, they are manageable and 
will not determine the success or failure of the project. Challenges of 
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concern to business change or corporate development, however, could 
have a fundamental impact on the project, including: 
x User engagement; there is no value in a perfect system if no one 
uses it. An appropriate level of engagement and sense of 
ownership needs to be built. 
x Standardisation of the approach and the process; this is mainly 
to collect the information consistently and to have a similar 
process to handle it. 
x Different groups in the company have different performance 
priorities, with a particular conflict between running trains and 
carrying out engineering work.  
x *RRGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIDQDVVHW¶VEHKDYLRXULQGLIIHUHQWFRQWH[WV
is required. 
x Selection of critical assets and sufficient metrics should enable 
diagnosis without risking safety. 
x The extent of safety criticality assurance needs to be identified. 
5.4.2. Human Factors issues 
The second round of coding analysed the interview transcriptions in 
terms of the human factors associated with the intelligent infrastructure 
systems. Some of these issues were grounded in the familiarisation 
exercise and others emerged from the semi-structured interview study.  
The relevant human factor issues identified during the interviews are 
presented in Figure 5-8. These categories are not mutually exclusive and 
often overlap theoretically and in practice. As an illustration of this, a 
number of issues have been represented as a scenario below, with relevant 
human factors issues underlined in parentheses. Note must be taken that 
this scenario is just to show an example of the most relevant human 
factors issues and, in most of these cases, more than one code is 
applicable. This emphasises the interdependency and complex nature of 
intelligent infrastructure systems. 
Chapter 5: Understanding railway intelligent infrastructure in Network Rail   
 
105 
 
 
FIGURE 5-8: INTERVIEW ANALYSIS: HUMAN FACTOR ISSUES IN RAILWAY 
INTELLIGENT INFRASTRUCTURE 
Scenario: A circuit breaker is located in a very busy junction (situation 
awareness); it has two other circuit breakers adjacent to it (situation 
awareness). Sensors attached to the circuit breaker record information 
about its condition every 30 seconds (system reliability) and send them to 
a database (system reliability). The data stored will be analysed through 
the pre-defined algorithms to enable state detection (automation). If it has 
a significantly different condition from the circuit brHDNHUV¶ QRUPDO
condition it will generate an alarm (automation) to inform the operator 
about the abnormality (monitoring). The operator receives the alarm and 
analyses it to find the potential causes of the detected abnormality 
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(decision making). He/she uses the information presented on the SCADA 
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems (Human Machine 
Interaction, monitoring, automation, system reliability), consults with 
his/her colleagues (organisational culture) to diagnose the fault (decision 
making) and to identify the potential corrective action required. Following 
this understanding, the operator has to plan (planning) the optimum 
corrective action (safety and human reliability) and to do so he/she has to 
consider external factors (situation awareness), such as time of failure 
(e.g. peak time) and the feasibility of track access to conduct onsite 
maintenance work, etc. 
Figure 5-8 only represents WKH OHYHO RI LQWHUYLHZHHV¶ GLUHFW DQG LQGLUHFW
awareness of the human factors issues. It only suggests the existence of 
these human factors. Throughout the course of this PhD, the researcher 
developed a much better understanding of the importance of these human 
factors and this will be discussed in chapter nine of the thesis.   
5.4.3. Data processing in railway intelligent infrastructure 
systems 
The data processing framework drafted through the familiarisation 
exercise was assessed through a third iteration of interview 
transcription analysis.  Since participants were selected from the most 
knowledgeable informants with regard to the intelligent infrastructure 
project, the concerns connected with data processing, shown in 
Figure 5-9, reflect well the perceived importance within NR. In this 
section these themes are explained and, at the outset, it should be 
noted that terms such as data, information, knowledge and intelligence 
are not used in exactly the same way as in some of the literature on 
knowledge (e.g., as in  Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1984). The terms data, 
information and knowledge are used only to emphasise the changes in 
WKH RSHUDWRUV¶ XQGHUVWDQGing of the situation that is necessary to 
handle problems in the optimum way. The following describes the 
different features of the data processing framework.    
Asset: any feature used to facilitate the running of the railway is 
considered to be an asset. This consists of a wide range of equipment 
on track, such as rail, point machine, level crossing, signal, as well as 
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the embankment where the rail tracks are located. Moreover, control 
room systems, such as signalling systems or electrical control room 
SCADA systems can also be considered as railway assets.  
Sensor:  assets are remotely located and spread over an area as big as 
the country; sensors are used to enable the collection of data regarding 
various assets. This ranges from RCM equipment attached to the point 
machines to event frequency collectors at the ticket barriers to count 
the number of passengers on each train. 
Data: every asset has a number of attributes, such as age, type, 
location, etc. Moreover, assets contain dynamic attributes, such as the 
current voltage in a point machine or temperature. These data are 
logged and collected through sensors and then stored.   
Database: the data collected are stored in large databases; these 
databases can be either relational or distributed.  
Information: the data collected in the database has to be interpreted to 
become meaningful. Influential attributes (e.g., temperature of a point 
heater) would be analysed on the basis of known standards and made 
available to operators. Forms of presentation vary from a simple excel 
spreadsheet to a sophisticated information display. 
Information development: merely being presented with a piece of 
information would not lead to an action. The agent (i.e., the human 
operator or a machine) should analyse and assess the information 
made available to them and develop an understanding of the situation.  
Knowledge: information developed either through the use of advanced 
WHFKQRORJLHVRUDKXPDQRSHUDWRU¶VH[SHUWLVHLVFRQVLGHUHGWRestablish 
and then extend knowledge of the situation.   
Knowledge integration: the railway is a multi-agent and distributed 
system and, in order to assess a situation optimally, it is necessary to 
integrate knowledge from various work settings. For example, in a 
railway signalling control room, the signaller should be aware of the 
situation on track as well as in the adjacent signalling control centre.  
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Intelligence: the integrated knowledge then would contribute to the 
selection of a suitable course of action. Intelligence can relate to any 
source of decision aid, planning or knowledge base that contributes to 
this optimisation. At the moment, only the human operator is capable 
of making such decisions but, as part of the larger scope of intelligent 
infrastructure system, the intelligence can be built into an asset. 
The interviewees were least concerned with issues associated with 
databases and sensors, mainly because the available technological 
advances can facilitate these aspects of the project. Intelligence and 
knowledge integration received the highest expressions of concern, 
reflecting the need to understand these better.  
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FIGURE 5-9: INTERVIEW ANALYSIS: DATA PROCESSING FRAMEWORK IN RAILWAY 
INTELLIGENT INFRASTRUCTURE 
5.4.4. Integration of the thematic content analysis into a data 
processing framework: from data to intelligence?  
Inspection of the outputs from the three different iterations of coding 
(intelligent infrastructure, human factors issues and data processing 
framework), to examine their relationships and overlapping areas, led to 
development of the data processing framework presented in Figure 5-10. 
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19,92IDFLOLWDWHVDPRGHOOLQJRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSVDPRng the themes to 
identify the relevant factors. This makes it possible to comment on the 
human factors issues that are relevant to the different functions and roles 
within intelligent infrastructure. Similarly, it is possible to identify various 
stages of data processing (described in the previous section) with different 
functions as well as human factors.  
Table 5-3 shows an example of the three coding groups taken from the 
interview transcripts of one of the participants. This interviewee was the 
project manager of the NR intelligent infrastructure, who stated:  
³7KHUH LV D KXJH DPRXQW RI H[SHUWLVH LQYROYHG ZLWK WKH GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ
and fault finding; a lot of people are surprised to know what exactly it is 
that happens to an asset. For example, I was surprised to see that there 
are cases where fluctuations to resistance ± in a point current- are normal; 
there are many contributing factors and this is where humans become 
useful. To be honest, we really want to know how an expert does this job 
because that can be what it is that contributes to reduction in VHUYLFH´ 
TABLE 5-3: EXAMPLE OF THE SYNTHESIS OF THE THREE CODING GROUPS  
Coding 1 (General 
definition of 
intelligent 
infrastructure)  
Coding 2 (Human 
Factors  
Coding 3 (Data 
processing)  
Role and functions: 
alarm handling and 
fault finding  
Challenge: 
understanding the 
expertise 
Benefit: the benefit lies 
in understanding how 
experts do their job  
Expertise and decision 
making involved with 
interpretation of the 
status of assets  
Information 
processing: status of 
asset is observed (data 
processing) but due to 
RSHUDWRU¶VH[SHUWLVH
fluctuations of the 
resistance are normal.  
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The data processing framework shows the transition of data from raw 
data captured from an asset through to a database that keeps all of 
the recorded data and the processes required to interpret these (e.g. 
algorithms, thresholds), leading to a ³smart´ course of action. 
Depending on the roles and responsibilities of the intelligent 
infrastructure users, four levels of understanding have been specified:  
1. Data: not yet interpreted facts which possibly represent only 
the evidence of a problem or even just the existence of an asset. 
2. Information: relationships between, and integration of, the facts, 
maybe in the form of cause and effect. 
3. Knowledge: interpretation and reasoning applied to the 
information. 
4. Intelligence: consideration of the asset, its condition and any 
problems within the whole work or socio-technical system, in a 
form to support asset management decisions and more 
extensive problem solving. 
Data and information layers correspond to stages 1, 2 and 3 of ISO 
13374 (Figure 5-2) and enable remote condition measurement of the 
infrastructure through capturing, sensing, recording and processing of 
the raw data. The knowledge layer corresponds to the fourth stage of 
ISO 13374 and enables remote condition monitoring via development 
of the information. Finally, the intelligence layer corresponds to stages 
5 and 6 of ISO 13374 and enables remote condition management through 
integration of the knowledge within various external effectors.
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FIGURE 5-10: DATA PROCESSING FRAMEWORK OF RAILWAY INTELLIGENT INFRASTRUCTURE 
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5.5. Knowledge elicitation to assess the data processing 
framework   
The data processing framework developed as described above is a 
potentially useful tool in understanding the various activities involved in 
intelligent infrastructure. However, this framework was first established 
after a one day workshop, and then was iteratively further developed and 
tested to a limited extent through interviews. However, some further 
verification (if not validation) was seen as useful and so a knowledge 
elicitation exercise was carried out to test if it would be possible to confirm 
the content and hierarchy of the framework.  
The approach of the knowledge elicitation was to use an example of an 
alarm handling scenario to assess the content and hierarchy of information 
type, and the order in which the layers of data, information, knowledge and 
intelligence in the framework. 
Railway ECR operators were asked to place various pieces of information in 
the order in which they would potentially need them in order to handle the 
alarm scenario. They were then asked to group the information within the 
three categories: data and information, knowledge and intelligence.   
5.5.1. Participants  
Seven railway electrical control room operators participated, all male with 
an average age of 53 and with an average of 28 years of experience. The 
University of Nottingham ethical guidelines were followed. The information 
sheet and consent forms can be found in appendix 12.3. None of the 
participants had been involved previously with the interview study and had 
not reviewed the draft of the data processing framework. 
5.5.2. Apparatus  
7KHHTXLSPHQWXVHGLQFOXGHGD'HOOODSWRSZLWK´VFUHHQXVHGWRYLHZ
VFUHHQ VKRWV UHOHYDQW WR WKH DODUP VFHQDULR $Q 2O\PSXV GLJLWDO YRLFH
UHFRUGHU ZDV XVHG WR UHFRUG SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ FRPPHQWV $Q DODUP VFHQDULR
was developed and relevant screenshots of the information displays on the 
SCADA were simulated accordingly. The development and design of these 
screenshots are described below.   
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5.5.2.1. Development of the alarm scenario  
An alarm handling scenario was developed through two interview sessions, 
each of two hours, with an ECR operator. The ECR operator was asked to 
think of a scenario with the following characteristics:    
x It is not a common fault and operators would not know easily the 
answers to the problem.  
x There is more than one correct approach to the problem. 
The first session conducted with the ECR operator focused on the selection 
of an appropriate scenario. A semi-structured interview was conducted and 
the following questions were asked to highlight the characteristics required 
for the alarm scenario: 
1. What do you consider to be one of the most problematic alarms in 
your control room? Why?  
2. How often does this alarm occur? 
3. Do you think this is a difficult alarm or an easy one? 
4. What is the procedure for dealing with this alarm? 
5. +RZPXFK³XQFHUWDLQW\´LV involved with this alarm? 
6. Are there different methods of dealing with this alarm? 
Alarms generated due to High Voltage (HV) loss were selected for the 
scenario. A second session (two hours) with the same ECR operator was 
then used to understand the specific alarm scenario in-depth and to collect 
information about how participants might handle it. Screen shots of the 
pages on the SCADA that might be potentially useful were collected and an 
initial understanding of how participants might approach the problem was 
developed. Details regarding various information displays available to 
railway electrical control room operators are reported in Chapter 6.  
The High Voltage (HV) feeder provides electrical supply to a number of 
outstations on the railway network. Loss of this supply will lead to the 
outage of a large area of the network and, therefore, it is important to 
rectify the loss of supply as soon as possible. Since HV supply covers a 
wide area, unless the fault is from the site controlled by Distribution 
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Network Operator (DNO), it can be due to equipment failures or circuit 
breaker trips on the network.  
This fault is not very common and operators will not automatically know 
the solution. This is a very serious failure: it certainly causes service 
outages but it can also lead to derailments. Therefore, both safety and 
efficiency of the network is at high risk and operators would feel pressured 
to deal with this problem as soon as possible.  
As the failure that caused the HV loss could be located anywhere in the 
area covered by that HV feeder, the scope of search for the solution is 
quite wide. This is followed by a progressive recharge of potentially faulty 
outstations; if the recharge is successful then that outstation is not 
contributing to the fault.   
In the scenario presented, participants were asked to diagnose the alarm 
and review the stages required to handle it. The progressive recharge 
process was not included at this stage since it was not feasible to simulate 
the situation on a SCADA and the searching task conducted at this stage 
was not the focus of this study.  
Information displays required by the operator to diagnose and handle this 
alarm scenario were identified.  Since there is no simulation environment in 
the electrical control room to simulate the faulty condition, screen shots of 
the relevant information displays were edited to replicate a HV loss alarm.  
Information displays identified for handling this scenario are: alarm banner, 
outstation page, AC overview, DC overview, alarm list and event log. The 
alarm banner is presented on top of an operational display; it consists of 
colour coded faulty locations (Figure 5-11).  Each outstation page relates to 
a specific faulty location. Figure 5-12  shows the outstation page on South 
Bermondsey; tracks that could have been affected by HV loss are changed 
(e.g. rectifier 1543 has gone hollow) and there are signs of circuit breaker 
tripping on a number of tracks. These two are both located on the same 
LQIRUPDWLRQGLVSOD\RQWKH(&5RSHUDWRU¶VZRUNVWDWLRQZKLFKLVUHIHUUHGWR
as the operational display).    
AC overview is also used by operators to capture an overall understanding 
of the level of voltage available in different areas as well as the locations 
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which had alarmed. Figure 5-13 shows an AC overview with a HV loss of 
supply. The colour on various branches shows the available voltages; when 
it is white it means that there is no voltage available. This is the case from 
branches to the left of the New Cross Grid feed (Figure 5-13). In addition, 
all of the outstation locations alarming on the alarm banner are shown in 
red in the AC overview. 
The DC overview can also provide the operator with useful information 
regarding the fault, as shown in Figure 5-14. DC overview provides 
information regarding the circuit breaker trips most likely to have failed 
due to the HV loss. Operators might also use the alarm list (Figure 5-15) 
and the event log to investigate previous failures, the time at which 
equipment started to fail and the locations.  
 
FIGURE 5-11: ALARM BANNER  
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 FIGURE 5-12: OUTSTATION PAGE 
 
FIGURE 5-13: AC OVERVIEW 
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FIGURE 5-14: DC OVERVIEW 
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FIGURE 5-15: ALARM LIST 
5.5.3. Procedure  
This study took approximately 30 minutes per participant. Participants read 
the information sheet and signed the consent form (Section 12.3). After 
viewing Figure 5-16, which contained the alarm banner, they were 
SUHVHQWHG ZLWK WKH OLVW RI DYDLODEOH LQIRUPDWLRQ GLVSOD\V RQ D 0LFURVRIW
([FHO VKHHW DQG DVNHG WR UDQN WKH preferred order of information 
presentation (Figure 5-16). As shown in Figure 5-16, not all of the 
information pages available to the operators were selected. In the example 
below, the operator thought that the AC overview (with connectivity OFF) 
is of no use and therefore did not rank it at all.   
 
FIGURE 5-16: EXAMPLE OF DISPLAY SELECTION FOR ONE PARTICIPANT 
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Participants were then presented with the information displays in the order 
they had requested and were asked to handle the alarm in a simulation 
exercise. They were asked to talk aloud and their comments were 
recorded. Whilst viewing each of the pages requested, participants were 
asked to point out the information they used on each page. (e.g., colour of 
the alarm and the name of the locations on the alarm banner). The 
researcher then wrote these pieces of information on cards. Participants 
then ranked the order of importance of these pieces of information 
(Figure 5-17).  
 
FIGURE 5-17: EXAMPLE OF CARD SORTING ACTIVITY 
After handling the alarm and ranking all of the pieces of information 
according to their use, the researcher briefed participants regarding the 
data processing framework. Participants were asked to group all of the 
cards within the three information levels: data and information, knowledge 
and intelligence. The procedure for the whole of this part of the study is 
summarised in Figure 5-18 below.  
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FIGURE 5-18: TIME LINE FOR THE PROCEDURE  
5.5.4. Findings of the knowledge elicitation exercise  
The AC overview was the first page that operators requested to view, with 
6 out of seven operators requesting this first. The event log was requested 
as the second page by three participants, two wanted it to be viewed as 
their fourth page and one wanted it as his third page. However, one of the 
participants did not seem to need the event log at all. He mentioned that 
maybe the event log is useful 20 minutes after occurrence of the fault, but 
not straight away. 
DC overview was requested by three operators as their third option; two 
operators wanted it to be viewed as their fourth page, one requested it as 
his second page and one operator requested it as his fifth page. One of the 
participants mentioned that ³ORoking at the locations which have alarmed, 
there is no DC in some of these sites, so I will be drawn to conclude that 
$&IDLOXUHKDVFDXVHGWKH+9ORVV´ 
The outstation page was requested with the most diverse priorities, two of 
the operators requesting it as their third page, the others requesting it as 
their first, second, fourth and sixth option, and one operator said that it 
was not required to handle the alarm. This is the same participant who did 
not find the event log useful. Only one of the operators requested CCF, and 
mentioned that this was used for reference purposes only and was not very 
influential on the diagnosis. These findings are shown in Figure 5-19 below. 
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The average rank of each of these pages suggests that AC overview is 
requested 1st, event log is requested 2nd, DC overview is requested 3rd and 
outstation pages are requested 4th.   
 
FIGURE 5-19: ORDER OF PAGES REQUESTED BY OPERATORS AFTER THEY VIEWED 
THE ALARM BANNER 
Participants attended differently to the various pieces of information on 
each of the pages they viewed. Various pieces of information associated 
with different pages and their perceived importance are presented in 
Table 5-4 below, where all of the sources of information considered to 
handle the alarm are presented. Furthermore, content of the information 
on these pages is specified. The rank of these pages, depending on the 
PDMRULW\ RI WKH SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ YLHZV LV VKRZQ LQ WKH WKLUG FROXPQ RI WKe 
table. When there was no agreed rank it LVQRWHGDVµQRWGHFLGHG¶ 
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TABLE 5-4: IMPORTANCE OF PIECES OF INFORMATION AND THEIR ORDER ON THE 
PAGES REQUESTED BY OPERATORS 
Information 
source  
Content of the information considered 
on each page  
Rank  
Alarm 
banner  
Colour of alarm banner  
Amount of alarmed assets on that location   
Name of the alarmed location 
First  
AC overview 
 
Colour of the branches coming out of the 
feeder 
End of the feeder is open 
Locations of the alarms (overview) 
Geographical scope for the tripped 
rectifiers, colour of alarmed outstations   
 
Second  
Event log  Time of the first failure in that location  Third 
DC overview  Amount of CB tripping  
Status of the tripping, check if it responds 
to re-energising  
Location of tripping 
Fourth  
Outstation 
page 
 
Flashing failed equipment  
What is the failed equipment (on top of 
the page) 
Status of circuit breakers  
Location of the tripped circuit breakers  
Fifth  
CCF  Trains in the section that seems to have 
tripped  
Not decided  
Reference 
book  
Diagrams  Not decided  
Signaller  Layout information regarding the track   Not decided  
HV 
Coordinator  
Use DINIS (most economical re-feeding 
solution) 
Not decided  
Distribution 
Network 
Operator   
Investigate if the loss is from the provider  Not decided  
5.5.4.1. Data processing framework  
Participants categorised information on the cards according to the three 
levels of information of the data processing framework. 2SHUDWRUV¶
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comments recorded throughout the study were most useful in this stage. 
Although ECR operators placed various pieces of information in different 
groups, in some of the cases they could not draw a definite line between 
YDULRXV OHYHOV RI LQIRUPDWLRQ ,Q WKHVH FDVHV WKH RSHUDWRU¶V FRPPHQts 
were used to analyse the findings in more detail. The content of the 
information pages identified in the previous section is categorised within 
the three levels of information, as shown in Table 5-5 
TABLE 5-5: CONTENTS OF INFORMATION PAGES AND THEIR GROUPING IN THE 
THREE LEVELS  
Level of 
information  
Content of information on different information 
page 
Level 1: Data 
and information  
Amount of circuit breaker tripping on DC overview  
Names of the alarmed locations on the alarm banner 
Calls from signal box 
Confirmation from DNO 
Colour of the branches on AC overview 
Colour of the banner 
Number of alarmed outstations 
Flashing banner 
Time of the failure 
Type of equipment 
Status of the circuit breaker  
Level 2: 
Knowledge  
Work in the area 
Location of train 
Location of circuit breaker tripping 
Geographical scope of the tripping 
Loss of supply at the feeder  
Location of alarms on the alarm banner  
Loss of signal supply  
Fault history on the event log  
Level 3: 
Intelligence  
Relationship of the feeders with each other 
Intelligent advisory systems  
Diagrams on the reference book  
In most of the cases, participants were consistent in their categorisations, 
but in some cases there were differences. For example, almost all of the 
participants thought that time of the failure of the equipment presented on 
the event log has to be among level 1 information, but one participant 
thought that this more relevant  to level 2.  
The prioritisation of the information can be used to determine the content 
of information required on each page and the order in which they should be 
presented to the operators. Furthermore, this information is categorised 
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within the three levels of data and information, knowledge, and 
intelligence. This finding is summarised in Figure 5-20. 
Information associated with the first level includes the number of circuit 
breakers that have tripped, names of the locations, colour of the branches 
on the AC overview, etc. This confirms the prior understanding of the data 
processing framework.  The information in level one refers to a basic 
understanding of the system. Therefore, the stages that should be 
performed either by the machine or by the operator include the 
categorisation and filtering of this basic data, without the need for much 
interpretation.  
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FIGURE 5-20: DATA PROCESSING FRAMEWORK AND THE INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR HV LOSS ALARM HANDLING 
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5.6. Discussion  
This chapter has described a series of studies that have been conducted to 
guide the research questions of this PhD study and subsequently its 
objectives, and in particular to address the first objective: to identify the 
human factors of most relevance to railway intelligent infrastructure and, in 
so doing, develop a framework that focuses on data processing 
requirements to support informed decision making. 
Due to the lack of a consistent definition of the railway intelligent 
infrastructure within NR, as shown by the familiarisation study, the 
interview study might seem not to be the best way of collecting information 
about intelligent infrastructure systems. However, the sample of 
participants was a high level one in terms of systems understanding and 
ability to influence change in the company, and selection of informants and 
the open ended questions gave interviewees an opportunity to express 
their vision of intelligent infrastructure systems. Moreover, the analysis of 
findings from the interviews showed a consistent pattern which guides the 
development of an understanding of roles, functionalities, benefits, 
potential, human factor issues and also the data processing associated with 
NR intelligent infrastructure. Given the paucity of project implementations, 
company reports and documentation and lack of agreement on definition 
and priorities, it is possible that this interview study was the only way to 
slowly target in on the key issues. Had the sample been more available 
(they were amongst the busiest people in the company), a Delphi exercise 
might have been used, but the chances of a second never mind a third 
agreement iteration were slim.  
From these findings, railway intelligent infrastructure is defined as: An 
integration of existing RCM technologies that is distributed both locally and 
centrally and used by different operators in identifying and handling faults 
in the infrastructure assets in order to improve safety and efficiency of the 
rail service.  
The benefits of intelligent infrastructure systems comprised 19% of the 
comments in total, followed by system distribution (16%). This simply 
reflects the way the intelligent infrastructure project has been dealt with 
during the two control periods (10 plus years) after its launch. Almost 
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every interviewee agreed that it is very beneficial to maintain assets before 
they fail, but they were also alert to the practical challenges of system 
distribution.  
Three key roles were specified for users of the railway intelligent 
infrastructure system: track workers, control room operators, and strategic 
analysts. The current focus of the intelligent infrastructure system is on the 
control room operators. It therefore follows that this role, with a specific 
focus on its relation to alarm handling and fault finding, was investigated in 
much of the empirical work of this thesis. Here it should be acknowledged 
that the concentration of this whole exercise (familiarisation exercise, 
interviews and KE exercise), and especially the knowledge elicitation, has 
been centred only on one of the three user roles previously identified, 
control room operators. Subsequently, all the empirical work reported in 
the next chapters concentrates on this role. Obviously such a major 
systems change as intelligent infrastructure will bring with it changes in the 
priorities, functions and whole role of those using the system, but care has 
been taken to carry out the detailed field study on alarm handling and fault 
finding which the large majority of participants had identified to not 
change, in principle, too radically with new systems. The situation is likely 
to be very different with, say, track workers and engineers who gather 
data from on-track, where the whole way of doing work is likely to be very 
different in future. This is the main reason why the detailed empirical work 
has not been applied to track work or strategic analysts. However, some 
implications for how this work will be carried out in future will be addressed 
in summary form in the overall discussion of chapter 9. 
Functionalities of the railway intelligent infrastructure featured in 8% of the 
comments as transcribed in the interview study. The dominating function 
selected was that of problem solving and, more specifically, handling 
alarms and finding the faults identified on the intelligent infrastructure 
interface.  
Although a majority of the semi-structured interview participants and a 
number of other relevant company staff commented on the framework and 
generally agreed with its content and sequence of data processing stages, 
it was useful to adopt a more robust knowledge elicitation technique to 
confirm various features of the framework. The knowledge elicitation 
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exercise was, in fact, conducted after the alarm handling study reported in 
chapter 6, although reported here for reasons of thesis logic. Therefore, 
the researcher had a clear knowledge of the railway ECR, which informed 
the development of the scenario and choice of various information displays 
utilised for handling the alarm scenario.   
The selection criterion for the alarm handling scenario was for it to be 
challenging and cognitively demanding so that it would trigger the 
cognitive processing stages identified in the data processing framework. 
The HV loss alarm was difficult to handle; operators could have different 
approaches to solving the problem and a large area would have been 
affected by this fault.  
The data processing framework and the identification of human factor 
issues associated with railway intelligent infrastructure as described in this 
chapter comprise two of the main deliverables of this thesis. These have 
been refined and further investigated through the field studies reported in 
the following chapters. Therefore, issues associated with this framework 
will be discussed again and in more detail in chapter 9.  
Consideration of the decision making processes under intelligent 
infrastructure, and best human factors advice on systems design and 
implementation, necessitates investigation of the cognitive processes 
relevant at various levels of the data processing framework, according 
to the role and needs of different staff. Questions need to be asked 
such as what data will be used for, how massive quantities of raw data 
could be reduced and filtered for different needs of different stakeholders 
and what decision support routines are required. Moreover, the decision 
making processes of track workers, control room operators and strategic 
analysts are most likely to not require the same type of information as 
each other, and so this must be accounted for in wider subsequent work. 
However, for the purposes of this thesis, and since the intelligent 
infrastructure project was nationally launched in time, two similar domains 
highly relevant to control room operators as intelligent infrastructure user 
were selected for detailed investigation - alarm handling and fault finding. 
These two studies are reported in chapters 6 and 7.   
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5.7. Chapter summary  
This chapter described the studies conducted to initiate an exploration of 
railway intelligent infrastructure and establish a data processing framework 
and first identification of relevant human factors. Following a familiarisation 
study with four NR rail experts), it became evident that there was not a 
common understanding of intelligent infrastructure sufficient to properly 
inform the work of the PhD. Therefore, a semi-structured interview study 
was also carried out with a sample of senior company staff with knowledge 
of, and interest in, intelligent infrastructure. Three themes were selected 
and applied to a thematic content analysis of the transcripts of these 
interviews, and synthesis of these themes led to the development of a data 
processing framework. Finally, in order to verify to an extent the content 
and hierarchy of the data processing framework, a knowledge elicitation 
exercise was conducted with control room operators. Findings informed the 
general understanding of intelligent infrastructure and identified its roles, 
functionalities and relevant human factors. A data processing framework 
was developed which showed the hierarchy of information throughout an 
intelligent infrastructure task. 
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6. Alarm handling in railway Electrical Control Rooms    
In the previous chapter alarm handling and fault finding were identified as 
two of the most important and yet challenging human or human-
automation functions of intelligent infrastructure systems. This chapter 
reports a study relating to the second objective of this PhD study, which is 
WR HVWDEOLVK DQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI RSHUDWRUV¶ VWUDWHJLHV IRU KXPDQ
supervisory control tasks in alarm handling.  
Alarm handling will be one of the core functions of intelligent infrastructure 
systems. This is the case in the current railway maintenance regime and it 
is going to be a key part of the proposed intelligent infrastructure system.  
Since there is no relevant rail intelligent infrastructure system currently in 
existence, it was important to find a control setting similar to the proposed 
intelligent infrastructure system. Electrical Control Room (ECR) displays are 
SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems, which are the 
systems currently in use in the rail industry with the greatest similarity to 
intelligent infrastructure systems. Therefore, these were investigated and 
similarities between the two domains are elaborated later in this chapter. 
Taking alarm handling as a task representative of a future intelligent 
infrastructure system and re-visiting the research questions first introduced 
in chapter two, the following concerns are addressed in this study:  
1. How do operators deal with the problem of multiple sources of 
information in railway problem solving? 
2. Thinking about the potential functions of a railway intelligent 
infrastructure, what is the sequence of activities in alarm handling? 
3. What are the railway alarm handling activities and artefacts? 
Field studies, semi-unstructured interviews, structured observations and 
video recordings were used to investigate of the above questions. This was 
WR HQVXUH WKH FDSWXUH RI RSHUDWRUV¶ FRJQLWLYH SURFHVVLQJ ZKLOH KDQGOLQJ
alarms, an understanding of which can then guide future design. This 
guidance will not only develop systems appropriate to operatoUV¶
requirements, but an understanding of the field will also raise awareness of 
problematic or risky activities, which can then be reduced.    
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In this chapter, the techniques adopted to familiarise the researcher with 
the domain and to prepare the study setting are explained first. Section 6.2 
reports the field study conducted in the railway ECR. Analysis of the field 
study and findings in relation to the research questions of this study are 
reported in Section 6.3. Findings from the field study were used to facilitate 
a Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) and are reported in Section 6.4. Finally, 
the findings of both parts of the study are reported and discussed in 
section 6.6.  
6.1. Domain familiarisation  
The researcher visited Lewisham ECR for two sessions prior to the set up of 
the field study. The aim of these visits was to become familiar with the 
domain, to identify peak times as well as key artefacts used frequently 
while handling alarms and to understand the potential risks of conducting a 
real-time field study. 
Unstructured interviews were performed with ECR operators to initiate an 
understanding of alarm handling activities and potential challenges. 
Operators were simply asked to talk about alarm handling in their control 
rooms and to identify issues affecting the performance of alarm handling.  
They talked about the process in terms of their experience as well as the 
control room specifications and regulations. Moreover, having these two 
sessions prior to the actual study helped the researcher to build rapport 
with the operators and ensure that they were fully informed about the aims 
of the study and the various stages of data collection associated with it. 
These visits also informed the design of an observational checklist, which 
was then used in the field study (section 6.2).The findings of these initial 
visits are reported in section 6.1.1 below. 
6.1.1. Early findings  
Rail ECR alarms are events configured in the system that require the 
RSHUDWRU¶VDWWHQWLRQIROORZLQJDQ\IRUPRIDEQRUPDOLW\LQWKHUDLOQHWZRUN¶V
electrical supply system (e.g. through AC overhead wires or DC third rail). 
They are announced by an audible alarm and the updating of any related 
symbols on an alarm banner, as well as the provision of live indications on 
the SCADA display.  
Chapter 6: Alarm handling in railway Electrical Control Room   
 
133 
 
The SCADA display in the ECR  has been  developed on the basis of  
1HWZRUN5DLO¶VV\VWHPVSHFLILFDWLRQUHFRPPHQGDWLRns (Network Rail, 2008) 
and it corresponds to EEMUA standards (EEMUA, 1999) 2SHUDWRUV¶
workstations consist of four colour monitors, one keyboard, a pointing 
device (e.g. a mouse) and a workstation rack.  
Lewisham ECR (Figure 6-1) has three workstations with similar information 
available to all three. There are four information displays on each 
workstation: the left screen displays the East London line overview, the 
centre left screen displays the DC (Direct Current) overview and the centre 
right screen, which is used for alarm handling, contains all of the 
operational displays. Finally, the right screen displays the AC (Alternating 
Current) overview and the AC connectivity page.  
 
FIGURE 6-1: ECR WORKSTATION IN LEWISHAM (UK) 
Two ECR operators are active at one time and the third workstation is used 
for emergencies, when extra staff are required. Of the two workstations, 
one of the operators is considered to be in charge and acts as a supervisor. 
Apart from dynamic information displays on their desks, there is also a 
static board covering one wall of the ECR, as shown in Figure 6-2. This 
board shows the links and platforms of the area under control. Although 
the board is now out-dated in some ways, some of the less experienced 
operators use this to familiarise themselves with the area.  
East London Line Overview DC overview Operational display AC overview 
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FIGURE 6-2: LEWISHAM ECR 
According to NR specifications, one of the features of ECR alarms is that 
they have been prioritised by a ranking system, with six being the lowest 
priority alarm and one being the highest. System failures are always 
priority six and the rest of the alarm priorities are configurable by the 
engineers.  Alarm priority is colour-coded, with an additional seventh 
colour for cleared alarms. For the Lewisham ECR, priority codes used are 
as shown in Table 6-1. 
TABLE 6-1: ALARM PRIORITIES  
Numbers Priority  Colour  
Priority 1 Extra high For future use  
Priority 2 High  Red 
Priority 3 Medium  Pink  
Priority 4  Low Brown  
Priority 5  Extra low  This is shown in the 
event log only, it does 
not produce an audible 
or visual alarm 
Priority 6  System alarms  
Clearing alarms  
Light grey 
Green   
Any unacknowledged alarm appears on the alarm banner, which is located 
on the operational display, shown in Figure 6-3. The alarm banner can 
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contain up to seven alarms and, if there is more than that at one time, an 
arrow is displayed at the right hand side in the colour of the highest 
priority alarm not displayed (Figure 6-3). If the cursor is placed over an 
outstation alarm button and the mouse is clicked, the outstation schematic 
page will be displayed, from which the alarm can be accepted. Once the 
alarm is accepted by the operator as a true fault, that outstation name will 
be removed from the alarm banner panel to be replaced with another 
outstation with an unaccepted alarm, should there have been more than 
seven outstations with an unaccepted alarm. 
Display area
Alarm 
banner
Page 
buttons
Menu
 
FIGURE 6-3: OPERATIONAL DISPLAY 
The number of alarms generated in Lewisham ECR in one week from 
29/01/2009 to 05/02/2009 was 1884 (Figure 6-4). This means that 
approximately 10 alarms per hour were generated. Most of these alarms 
take between 40 seconds to 3 minutes to handle. This number includes 
alarms and events that operators need to notice but immediate 
intervention or response is not necessarily required. Cases requiring 
immediate intervention can be as few as 2 or 3 alarms per hour.  
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FIGURE 6-4: ALARM FREQUENCY IN ONE WEEK ±THE NUMBER OF ALARMS IN THE 
HOURS OF ONE WEEK 
In normal situations, many of these alarms will be spurious or 
confirmations of pre-planned events such as testing, although the operator 
needs to be vigilant for real alarms amid these low priority events. In 
emergencies, such as major power failures, the number of incoming events 
may peak at 200 alarms per hour, which requires the support of relief 
operators and might lead to major service disruption while the alarms are 
processed.  
During the early field studies, it became apparent that operators had to 
GHDOZLWK WZRW\SHVRIDODUPVUHIHUUHG WRDV µH[SHFWHG¶DQG µXQH[SHFWHG¶
alarms.  Maintenance procedures on the track can cause abnormalities and, 
consequently, a series of alarms will be generated in the control room. 
However, in these cases the operators are likely to be expecting the alarm 
as they know the schedule and details of the maintenance being carried out 
on the track. Therefore, these alarms would not surprise the operators. 
This is obviously different to cases when the operators are not expecting 
the alarm and the alarm therefore alerts them to a new problem. 
As noted in the challenges of intelligent infrastructure systems, information 
overload was considered to be one of the major sources of difficulty in 
electrical control rooms. Therefore, one of the research questions of this 
PhD study was to understand how operators deal with multiple sources of 
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information in railway network control problem solving. After the 
familiarisation visits, operators noted that information deficiencies can 
PHDQ WKDW DODUPV PD\ KDYH µKLJK LQIRUPDWLRQ¶ RU µORZ LQIRUPDWLRQ¶  ,W
VKRXOG EH QRWHG WKDW WKHVH WHUPV UHIHU WR RSHUDWRUV¶ Vubjective 
interpretations of the situation, used since it was not possible to objectively 
assess the sufficiency and relevancy of the information presented to 
operators during real-time alarm handling.   
µ+LJK LQIRUPDWLRQ¶ UHIHUV WR FDVHV LQZKLFK WKHUH LV excessive information 
and the operator is overloaded with unnecessary information (e.g. 
GXSOLFDWLRQVRIVRXUFHVRILQIRUPDWLRQµ/RZLQIRUPDWLRQ¶UHIHUVWRFDVHVLQ
which the operator does not have sufficient information to diagnose and 
handle the alarm.  
6.2. Field study  
The familiarisation visits led to an assessment of the feasibility of and 
resources required for the field study. Four sessions of 4.5 hours each were 
SODQQHG ZLWK WKH RSHUDWRUV 7KH RSHUDWRUV¶ DFWLYLWLHV DQG WKH XVH RI
artefacts when handling real-time alarms (both expected and unexpected) 
were recorded and analysed in detail.  
In order to capture similar numbers of alarms in both groups (expected 
and unexpected), four different shifts were selected: two day shifts and 
two night shifts. The familiarisation visits showed that nearly all of the 
expected alarms occur during night shifts as this is the time usually 
scheduled for maintenance work.  
6.2.1. Participants  
Six electrical control room operators in Lewisham participated in the study. 
They were all male with a mean age of 51 years. According to Network 
5DLO¶V JUDGLQJ V\VWHP ZKLFK UHIHUV WR RSHUDWRUV¶ \HDUV RI H[SHULHQFH
qualifications and training, participants were all considered to be 
competent. They were approached in November 2008 and agreed to 
participate in the study. Participants were assured about the issues 
associated with data confidentiality and anonymity.  Data were recorded on 
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a basis of the number of alarms generated, not on the basis of the 
individual attending to them. 
6.2.2. Apparatus  
$ 6RQ\ GLJLWDO YLGHR UHFRUGHU ZDV XVHG WR UHFRUG WKH DODUP KDQGOLQJ
process from the moment the audible siren was generated until it was 
FOHDUHGRQWKH6&$'$$0LFURVRIW([FHOVSUHDGVKHHWZDVSUHSDUHGWR
structure the findings obtained from the field studies and to provide time-
OLQH GDWD RI WKH (&5 RSHUDWRU¶V LQWHUDFWLRQ ZLWK WKH FRQWURO VHWWLQJ ZKLOH
alarm handling. Moreover, operators were asked to comment on the 
amount of information presented to them and this comment was also 
recorded on the spreadsheet. Table 6-2 shows an example of the 
spreadsheet. This spreadsheet facilitated an understanding of the use of 
various artefacts used while handling an alarm. Furthermore, since the 
checklist was time stamped, it was possible to estimate the amount of time 
each artefact was used, as well as the sequence of use. 
The time stamping divides each alarm handling episode into 15 second 
time frames. In each time frame the use of artefacts was assessed. For 
example, it was noted if, during the first 15 seconds of alarm handling, the 
operators were on the phone as well as talking to a colleague in the control 
room (Face to Face).  
Measurements of the occupancy of operators with each of the artefacts 
provided an understanding of their importance. The total use and overall 
time used for each artefact were recorded on the checklist.  
7KH ILQDO FROXPQ RI WKH REVHUYDWLRQ FKHFNOLVW VSHFLILHG SDUWLFLSDQWV¶
subjective comments about the amount of information presented to them 
in relation to handling the alarms. The amount of information to specify 
one alarm can be more than enough; for example, the operator may get 
alerted to an alarm through a siren as well as a phone call and flashing 
annunciators. This would be UHIHUUHG WR DV µKLJK LQIRUPDWLRQ¶ on the 
checklist. On the other hand, some of the alarms have no indication at all. 
For example, DODUPVNQRZQDVµJKRVWDODUPV¶RFFXUZLWKRXWVSHFLILFUHDVRQ
and neither of the displays shows any indication of what caused it. This 
would be ODEHOOHGDVµORZLQIRUPDWLRQ¶3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHGLUHFWO\TXHVWLRQHG
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to determine whether the alarm they had been attending to was a case of 
µKLJKLQIRUPDWLRQ¶RUµORZLQIRUPDWLRQ¶ 
Completion of this observation checklist allowed a crude estimation to be 
made of the degree to which various displays were used during episodes of 
alarm management. For example, in one episode captured in Table 6-2, 
twelve uses of various information displays and other sources were noted. 
In percentage terms, we can see that   the alarm banner was utilised on 
25% of the occasions of information use (3 out of a total of 12). This 
allowed some crude estimates to be made of information sources accessed 
across all 22 alarm handling episodes. 
TABLE 6-2: OBSERVATIONAL CHECKLIST FILLED FOR ONE ALARM EPISODE 
Finally, a list of generic coping strategies was presented to ECR operators 
prior to the study and they were subsequently asked to comment on their 
strategies during various stages of alarm handling. These strategies are 
taken from Hollnagel and Woods (2005) and are listed in Table 6-3.  
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TABLE 6-3: COPING STRATEGIES FOR INFORMATION INPUT OVERLOAD AND 
INFORMATION INPUT UNDER LOAD (TAKEN FROM HOLLNAGEL & WOODS 2005, PP. 
80-81) 
Strategy  Definition 
Omission Temporary, arbitrary non processing of 
information is lost 
Reduced precision  Trading precision for speed and time, all input is 
considered but only superficially; reasoning is 
shallower 
Queuing  Delaying response during high load on the 
assumption that it will be possible to catch up 
later (stacking input) 
Filtering  Neglecting to process certain categories; non-
processed information is lost  
Cutting categories  Reduce level of discrimination; use fewer grades 
or categories to describe input  
Decentralisation  Distributing processing if possible; calling in 
assistance  
Escape Abandoning the task; giving up completely; 
leaving the field 
Extrapolation ([LVWLQJHYLGHQFHLVµVWUHWFKHG¶WRILWDQHZ
situation; extrapolation is usually linear, and is 
often based on fallacious causal reasoning  
Frequency gambling  The frequency of occurrence of past items/ 
event is used as a basis for recognition/ 
selection  
Similarity matching  The subjective similarity of past to present 
items/event is used as a basis for 
recognition/selection 
Trial-and-error (random 
selection) 
Interpretations and/ or selection do not follow 
any systematic principle 
Laissez-faire An independent strategy is given up in lieu of 
just doing what others do  
6.2.3. Design  
Four sessions, each of 4.5 hours, were scheduled with 6 ECR operators. 
Only one workstation (out of the two active workstations) was analysed at 
each time. As mentioned earlier, there are three desks in Lewisham ECR 
(Figure 6-5). Desk µ&¶LVQRWDFWLYHDQGLVXVHGonly in cases of emergency. 
Of the two active desks (A and B), one is in charge and has a supervisory 
role. In order to avoid any bias, two of the field studies were conducted on 
the supervisory workstation and the other two focused on the other 
workstation. The details of these sessions are summarised in Table 6-4 
below.  
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FIGURE 6-5: LAYOUT OF LEWISHAM ECR  
TABLE 6-4: OUTLINE OF THE FIELD STUDY SESSIONS  
Session No Time/Shift  Workstation studied  
1 Day shift  A 
2 Night shift  B 
3 Day shift  B 
4 Night shift  A 
As artefacts utilised for handling alarms are not centralised and are spread 
out around the control room, it was not possible to fix the location of the 
camera, which was moved around and zoomed in and out, depending on 
the alarm episode.  
6.2.4. Procedure  
Participants were familiarised with the objectives of the research and the 
scope of the study at the beginning of the session. They reviewed the 
observation checklist as well as the list of coping strategies. Furthermore, 
all participants agreed to be video recorded during the study. When an 
alarm was generated, the researcher would start the video recorder and fill 
6XSHUYLVRU¶V GHVN
(A) 
Reserve desk (C) 
Active desk (B) 
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in the checklist. It should be noted that the video enabled revisiting and 
completing of the checklist with detailed time stampings after the study.  
Operators were asked to verbalise their actions regarding the alarm they 
were handling, also recorded through the camcorder. Finally, their 
comments regarding the strategies (based on the strategy sheet provided 
HDUOLHU DQG ZKHWKHU WKH\ ZHUH GHDOLQJ ZLWK D FDVH RI µKLJK LQIRUPDWLRQ¶
DODUPRUµORZLQIRUPDWLRQ¶DODUPZHUHDOVRFDSWXUHG 
6.3. Analysis of field study  
During the 18 hours of field study, 22 cases of alarms were generated. Half 
RIWKHVHZHUHµXQH[SHFWHG¶DQGWKHRWKHUKDOIZHUHµH[SHFWHG¶DODUPV 
The data collected from the observational checklist provided information 
about the sequence of activities and duration of use of each   artefact. A 
rHYLHZ RI RSHUDWRUV¶ FRPPHQWV UHFRUGHG GXULQJ WKH VWXG\ SURYLGHG DQ
understanding of the issues and challenges facing the operators while 
handling alarms. This data were used to develop an understanding of 
sources of difficulty and possible strategies adopted by operators to cope 
with these difficulties. Statistical analysis and link charts were used to show 
the frequency and sequence of activities conducted during an alarm 
handling episode  
6.3.1. Artefacts  
The following artefacts were utilised by operators whilst alarm handling: 
menu, alarm banner, display area, page buttons, overview display, static 
board, paper, phone and face to face communication.  Although face to 
face communication is more of a social activity than physical one, it has 
been cRQVLGHUHG DV D ³VRFLDO DUWHIDFW´ KHUH VLQFH WKLV IRUP RI
communication represents an important source of information for 
operators; neglecting it would lead to gaps in the activity analysis. Likewise 
the telephone (and its use) might be regarded as a mixed physical and 
social artefact. The artefacts are shown in Figure 6-6 below: 
 
Chapter 6: Alarm handling in railway Electrical Control Room   
 
143 
 
 
FIGURE 6-6:  ARTEFACTS OF ALARM HANDLING 
6.3.2. Frequency and sequence of use  
For the 22 alarm cases, the time line observation checklist provides an 
understanding of the frequency and total duration of use of the artefacts. 
An example of a filled-in observational checklist is shown in Figure 6-7 
below. A selection of completed observational checklist are shown in 
Appendix 12.4.  
 
FIGURE 6-7: EXAMPLE OF OBSERVATIONAL CHECKLIST TO CAPTURE THE TIME 
ASSOCIATED WITH DIFFERENT ARTEFACTS DURING ALARM HANDLING  
OVERVIEW 
OVERVIEW 
Page button  
Menu Alarm banner 
Display area  
Paper 
Phone  
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For further analysis, link charts were used to show the interactions 
between various artefacts. Figure 6-8 and Figure 6-9 show the link charts 
of expected and unexpected alarms respectively. The number within each 
circle represents the total duration (seconds) of use for each of these 
artefacts; the links between the circles show the numbers of direct 
transfers from use of one artefact to use of another. The total duration of 
WKH  µXQH[SHFWHG¶ DODUPV REVHUYHG GXULQJ WKLV VWXG\ ZDV  VHFRQGV
and total duration of WKHµH[SHFWHG¶DODUPVREVHUYHGZDVVHFRQds. 
The alarm banner, the display area and the menu on the operational 
display are the three most used artefacts for handling µunexpected¶ alarms. 
On the other hand, the alarm banner and the telephone are the most 
utilised artefacts while operators are handling µexpected¶ alarms. The 
reason for this difference is that, in the case of an expected alarm, 
operators only need to verify and confirm an expected event through either 
a telephone call from a member of the maintenance team or an updated 
alarm banner.  
 
 
FIGURE 6-8/,1.&+$57)25³81(;3(&7('´$/$50+$1'LING 
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FIGURE 6-9/,1.&+$57)25³(;3(&7('´$/$50+$1'/,NG 
The link charts provide an understanding of the frequency and interactions 
of various artefacts, although the order in which the activities are 
performed is not shown.  Information about the sequence of activities will 
help develop an understanding of the context.  This understanding can be 
facilitated through the CWA and the integration of the different forms of 
analysis, as described in section 6.40 of this chapter. 
6.3.3. Statistical analysis  
µ([SHFWHG¶ DQG µXQH[SHFWHG¶ DODUPV, DV ZHOO DV DODUPV ODEHOOHG DV µKLJK
LQIRUPDWLRQ¶DQG µORZLQIRUPDWLRQ¶, were analysed statistically. Hypotheses 
examined in these analyses were: 
H1: There is a significant difference between the use of artefacts in 
expected and unexpected alarms.  
Independent variable: type of alarmÆ expected and unexpected 
Dependent variable: Number of the interactions with artefactsÆ telephone, 
face to face communication, alarm banner, menu, display area, page 
button, overview displays, board and paper. 
H2: There is a significant difference in use of artefacts between high 
information and low information. 
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Independent variable: Amount of informationÆ high information and low 
information  
Dependent variable: Number of the interactions with artefactsÆ telephone, 
face to face communication, alarm banner, menu, display area, page 
button, overview displays), board and paper. 
An independent sample t-test was used for the statistical analysis. The use 
of telephones and the display area were found to be significantly different, 
depending on the type of alarm. There was a significant difference between 
the number of times operators used the telephone in unexpected 
(M=0.131, SD=0.340) and expected conditions (M=0.592, SD=0.050); t 
(86) =-5.044, P<0.01. Also there was a significant difference between the 
number of times operators interacted with the display area in unexpected 
(M=0.524, STD=0.503) and expected (M=0.222, STD=0.423) conditions; t 
(86) = 2.721, p<0.01. 
Figure 6-10 shows the mean percentage of interactions with each of the 
artefacts in the unexpected and expected alarms. Use of face to face 
communication, menu, display, page button, overview and paper was 
higher for expected alarms, whereas the use of the phone and alarm 
banner was greater for the unexpected alarms. 
 
FIGURE 6-10: ARTEFACTS IN EXPECTED AND UNEXPECTED ALARMS 
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In order to investigate the differences in the use of artefacts between high 
information (M=0.38, STD=0.49) and low information (M=0.84, 
STD=0.37), an independent samples t-test was applied.  The results 
revealed that the display area attendance is significantly higher in alarms 
due to high information; t (59) = -3.63, p<0.01. Figure 6-11 shows the 
mean percentage of the application of artefacts in high information and low 
information situations. 
 
FIGURE 6-11: ARTEFACTS IN HIGH INFORMATION AND LOW INFORMATION ALARMS 
6.4. Cognitive work analysis 
CWA was performed to enable structuring of the data collected from the 
field study and to direct these towards contextual understanding of the 
domain. Four stages of the CWA were performed according to Lintern 
(2009). Table 6-5 summarises these stages and the methods of data 
collection that fed each stage.  It should be noted that, for simplicity, both 
analysis and immediate findings of various stages of CWA are reported in 
this section. 
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TABLE 6-5: COGNITIVE WORK ANALYSIS OF RAILWAY ELECTRICAL CONTROL ROOM 
CWA stages (Lintern 
2009)  
Definition  Methods of data 
collection  
Work domain analysis 
 
Activity-independent 
structure of work  
18 hours of field study 
Semi-structured interviews 
Open-ended interviews  
Work organisation 
analysis 
Associates tasks with work 
situations  
Observational checklist  
Video recordings  
Cognitive 
transformation analysis 
 
States and processes 
required for the tasks  
Observational checklist  
Video recordings  
Strategies analysis 
 
Identify strategies for each 
of the states and 
processes  
Video recordings  
Talk aloud 
Coping strategy sheet   
 
6.4.1. Work domain analysis  
Work domain analysis focuses on the functional (activity independent) 
structure of the work and consists of an Abstraction Hierarchy with five 
levels: domain purpose, domain values and priorities, domain functions, 
physical functions and physical objects (Figure 6-12). 
Domain purpose refers to the overall objectives of the system. Values and 
priorities refer to benefits if the task is performed successfully. Domain 
function describes the tasks that have to be achieved. Physical functions 
are the physical outcomes of conducting the tasks and, finally, physical 
objects are the artefacts and tools used in the control room to enable these 
physical functions.  
Interviews conducted in the familiarisation visits provided the researcher 
with knowledge to identify physical objects (e.g. SCADA, maps, logs, etc.) 
and physical functions required to meet the domain functions. The 
observational checklist used throughout this study showed the connection 
between different physical objects and their use for achieving different 
WDVNV ,Q DGGLWLRQ RSHUDWRUV¶ FRPPHQWV KLJKOLJKWHG WKH YDOXHV DQG
purposes of each function.  
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FIGURE 6-12: ABSTRACTION HIERARCHY FOR ALARMS 
Physical objects utilised by operators during alarm handling include SCADA, 
log book, phone, map, regulations and isolation requests. Also, the 
operators might consult with colleagues in the control room or call 
someone on-site to obtain more information; this form of social 
UHODWLRQVKLS LV UHIHUUHG WR KHUH DV µIDFH WR IDFH¶ FRPPXQLFDWLRQ. Use of 
these physical objects enables operators to achieve an understanding of 
system status as well as the optimum plan they ought to develop and 
follow (Physical functions). Alarm handling can be broken down into two 
main functions of alarm recognition and alarm clearance (domain 
functions), with the purpose of ensuring the safety and efficiency of the 
operation and optimising the use of resources within the railway (domain 
values and priorities). This activity is embedded within the overall goal of 
providing a continuous electrical supply to the rail network (domain 
purpose).  
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6.4.2. Work organisation analysis 
Work Organisation Analysis is used to associate tasks required for the 
domain functions, identified in the abstraction hierarchy, with the situations 
in which the work takes place (Figure 6-13). It is usual to associate these 
situations with physical locations. For example, in an air traffic control 
study (Vicente, 1999), work situations refer to three different locations: 
SLORW¶V FRFNSLW DLU WUDIILF FRQWURO URRP DQG WKH RQ JURXQG PDLQWHQDQFH
team.  
For this stage of the analysis, recordings of the alarm handling cases 
provided detailed information regarding the artefacts used for each of the 
tasks. For instance, in order to recognise an alarm, operators have to 
identify the priority of that alarm, locate the fault and assess if the 
information required for handling the alarm is available. They must then 
collect the necessary information and, finally, start diagnosing the cause of 
the alarm. The boxes in Figure 6-13 show the overall spectrum of artefacts 
that can potentially be used for each task. The shaded circles highlight the 
most used artefact for each task and the whiskers show the distribution of 
the artefacts most likely to be used.  
This analysis allows the work functions identified at the abstraction 
hierarchy stage - alarm recognition and alarm clearance - to be tied to 
specific work contexts and artefacts. By using the matrix in this way, we 
are able to provide greater clarity in terms of where each of the constraints 
identified in the AH may be most relevant. For example, the main display is 
used in all work tasks, whereas the phone is used only in two stages 
(identify priority and information collection) as is face to face 
communication (information collection and assess the alarm).  
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FIGURE 6-13: ALARM HANDLING CONTEXTUAL ACTIVITY MATRIX 
6.4.3. Cognitive transformation analysis  
Cognitive transformation analysis aims to identify the cognitive activity 
associated with work tasks identified in the previous stage. Two 
representations are used ± state process diagrams (Figure 6-14) and 
decision ladders (Figure 6-15). The cognitive states and cognitive 
processes of these work tasks are identified and presented using state 
process diagrams (Figure 6-14). Ovals in the figure present cognitive 
states and arrows show cognitive processes that guide the flow between 
cognitive states.  
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FIGURE 6-14: EXAMPLE OF A STATE-PROCESS DIAGRAM FOR THE WORK TASK OF 
INFORMATION REQUIREMENT ASSESSMENT 
The seven tasks noted in the contextual activity matrix (Figure 6-13) were 
used as the basis for this stage. Operators were asked, retrospectively, to 
describe the reasoning behind their decisions during these tasks. This 
provided an understanding of the processes required for the tasks and the 
states of thinking associated with them. For each WDVN RSHUDWRUV¶
comments show a pattern in how would they behave and this led to 
development of diagrams such as that shown in Figure 6-14, other 
examples are shown in appendix 12.5. These state process diagrams were 
then compiled in the form of a decision ladder (Rasmussen et al., 1994), as 
shown in Figure 6-15.  
The value of presenting the cognitive activity of alarm handling in this 
manner is that it allows higher order groupings or stages of processing to 
be presented. In this case, these are notification, acceptance analysis and 
clearance. These stages broadly correspond to the alarm initiated activities 
identified by  Stanton (2006): observe, accept, analyse, correct, monitor, 
investigate and reset .These higher order stages serve as the basis for the 
strategy analysis, conducted next. 
The decision ladder provides a sequential representation of the cognitive 
processing relevant to alarm handling. However, it also supports the 
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representation of different routes through the generic process. The bold 
arrow represents a leap between alarm acceptance and alarm clearance 
and reflects the handling of expected maintenance alarms, where the 
operator has prior knowledge of the likely occurrence of the alarm before 
the actual generation of the alarm. As a result of this existing prior 
knowledge, no evaluation or analysis is required. By extension, none of the 
information sources relevant to evaluation or analysis is therefore required. 
This also demonstrates the additional steps (and information sources) that 
will be required when the alarm is genuine (i.e. the additional steps 
required for alarm acceptance and alarm analysis).  
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FIGURE 6-15: ALARM HANDLING DECISION LADDER 
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6.4.4. Strategies analysis 
Prior to the field studies, participants were introduced to the different types 
of generic coping strategies (Table 6-3). In the initial observations, 
participants were prompted, during alarm cases, to specify which strategy 
they were using at any given point. This made it possible, in the final two 
observation sessions, to infer the sWUDWHJLHV IURP SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ comments 
and video recordings. Certain strategies (filtering, queuing, categorising, 
similarity matching and extrapolation) emerged in the majority of the 
cases. Figure 6-16 shows an example of a spreadsheet, where operators 
were asked to identify the strategies they used at different stages of their 
alarm handling. 
 
FIGURE 6-16: EXAMPLE OF SPREADSHEET THAT WAS USED TO CONSULT ECR 
OPERATORS REGARDING THEIR STRATEGIES  
From this analysis, it was possible to assign specific strategies to the high-
level cognitive processing stages identified on the decision ladder. 
Figure 6-17 shows the alarm initiated activities, together with the 
strategies found to support those activities (marked in bold). It was 
important to recognise the temporal aspect of these strategies. This 
required synthesising the findings from various forms of data collection 
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(e.g. verbal protocol, observational checklist and video recordings) - to be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
FIGURE 6-17: ALARM HANDLING ACTIVITIES AND STRATEGIES 
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Notification: 
Several information sources notify operators of the existence of an alarm. 
These include: the flashing alarm banner, colour codes, acronyms of alarm 
type and location, sirens, phone calls, a flashing circle around the location 
on the overview display, etc. Operators have to categorise and filter these 
sources to achieve a basic understanding of the alarm. In the case of 
multiple alarms, operators queue them, based on their experience. 
Acceptance: 
The situation awareness we assume to be built into the previous stage 
(notification) is the basis on which the operator almost immediately 
accepts the alarm and silences the siren without informing an authorised 
person. In the rare cases of an alarm where immediate on-site action is 
required, operators use their knowledge of the track, the electrical 
equipment, the work that might be taking place out there and the train 
service running, as well as their experience of previous similar cases in 
order to assess the criticality of the alarm. The strategy at this stage is 
mostly similarity matching, ZKLFKLVKLJKO\UHODWHGWRRSHUDWRUV¶H[SHULHQFH
Usually, this stage is tightly coupled with the analysis and assessment of 
the alarm.  
Analysis: 
Information presented to the operator is being used by them for the 
purpose of assessing and evaluating the underlying meaning and causes of 
alarms. Operators generally analyse alarms by stretching the existing 
evidence to match them with similar cases (extrapolation). Unlike similarity 
matching, where all of the evidence is matched with a similar previous 
alarm, here the operator has to use their imagination to fill the gaps until a 
similarity is perceived. 
Clearance:  
The operator identifies possible courses of action, evaluates them and 
executes the optimum action to clear the alarm. The operator remembers 
similar cases and tries to match the stretched evidence to other potential 
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(similarity matching and extrapolation) causes and trials the corrective 
actions of those cases (trial and error). 
6.5. Integration of the findings   
A wide range of methods of data collection and analysis was used to 
facilitate an exploration and investigation of alarm handling activities in 
ECR. This section reports the findings that were integrated from the field 
analysis and the CWA. The first section explains the artefacts used in the 
ECR for handling alarms and the difference in their interaction and 
frequency of use, depending on various types of alarms, i.e., expected vs. 
unexpected; high information vs. low information. The second part 
describes the activities conducted by operators to handle an alarm and 
their strategies to cope with system constraints, i.e., information 
deficiencies.   
6.5.1. Use of artefacts  
The link charts described in section 6.3.2 reported the frequency as well as 
the sequence of interactions with different artefacts when operators were 
handling different types of alarms. The field study suggested that the most 
uWLOLVHG DUWHIDFW GXULQJ KDQGOLQJ WKH µXQH[SHFWHG¶ DODUPV ZDV the display 
area. From a WRWDO RI  VHFRQGV RI WKH µXQH[SHFWHG¶ DODUP KDQGOLQJ
operators were using the display area for 238 seconds, the alarm banner 
for 159 seconds and the menu for 149 seconds.  
Also, in terms of interaction and sequence of attending to different 
artefacts, operators attend to the alarm banner first and then observe the 
display area. Then, depending on the alarm episode, they use the menu to 
handle the alarm or, if the situation is not yet diagnosed, they attend to 
the page buttons to investigate the alarm in more detail.  
6.5.2. Activities and strategies  
This study explored alarm handling in ECR and it became possible to 
XQGHUVWDQG RSHUDWRUV¶ KLJKHU VWDJH RI FRJQLtive processing and the 
artefacts that support these stages. Activities were identified as part of 
alarm handling procedure: notification, acceptance, diagnosis and 
clearance. Furthermore, CWA facilitated the association of these activities 
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with different artefacts. For example, the alarm banner is most used during 
alarm notification; the telephone is the most used artefact when operators 
are clearing the alarms. Figure 6-18 shows the duration of use of various 
artefacts and their use during various alarm handling activities. 
 
FIGURE 6-18: ARTEFACT USE AND ALARM HANDLING STAGES 
In summary, this analysis has identified the strategies adopted by rail ECR 
operators whilst they cope with information presentation inefficiencies of 
too much or too little information when handling alarms. The main 
strategies identified are: categorising, filtering, similarity matching, 
extrapolation. Queuing and trial and error, which emerged in only one of 
the cases were left out due their limited occurrence. Details of these and 
their corresponding activities are described in 6.4.4.  The last three of them 
(similarity matching, extrapolation and trial and error) are related to the 
RSHUDWRU¶V H[SHULHQFH DQG ORFDO NQRZOHGJH as it was found from their 
comments (Appendix 12.6). Alarm systems should be designed to provide 
better support, for instance, by providing historical and statistical 
information relevant to the alarm. The potential risks are also 
demonstrated ± for example, extrapolation may lead operators to apply 
inappropriate prior knowledge.  
Integration of the time-stamped observational checklist, with the strategy 
analysis, led to the development of an understanding of the order of 
activities, as well as the strategies adopted by operators Figure 6-19 and 
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Figure 6-20 VKRZWKHRUGHURIDFWLYLWLHV  IRU  µH[SHFWHG¶DQG µXQH[SHFWHG¶
DODUPV7KH µ<¶D[LVVKRZVHDFKRI WKHHSLVRGHVRIDODUPVDQGWKH µ;¶
axis shows the duration of alarm handling in 15 second pieces.  
The comparison between the two (expected vs. unexpected) reveals that, 
in the latter, only notification and clearance are performed, as the alarm is 
already known and no acceptance or analysis is required.  
 
FIGURE 6-19: ORDER OF ALARM HANDLING ACTIVITIES FOR UNEXPECTED ALARMS  
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FIGURE 6-20: ORDER OF ALARM HANDLING ACTIVITIES FOR EXPECTED ALARMS 
The same approach was used to identify the order of strategies used during 
alarm handling. This is shown in Figure 6-21 and Figure 6-22. 
 
FIGURE 6-21: ORDER OF ALARM HANDLING STRATEGIES FOR UNEXPECTED ALARMS 
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FIGURE 6-22: ORDER OF ALARM HANDLING STRATEGIES FOR EXPECTED ALARMS 
It is evident from these figures that operators do not need to adopt many 
strategies when handling expected alarms. They filter the type of alarm as 
they notice it and occasionally match the alarm with previous similar ones 
or extrapolate the evidence when clearing the alarm.   
6.6. Discussion  
This chapter reports a study that was conducted to guide two of the 
objectives of this PhD study:  
x To establish an understanding of opHUDWRUV¶ VWUDWHJLHV IRU KXPDQ
supervisory control task in alarm handling and fault finding. 
x To produce human factor guidance for the future development and 
implementation of an intelligent infrastructure system in the railway 
to match and complement human capabilities and needs. 
Alarm handling was selected and explored as the representative case of the 
future intelligent infrastructure system. The findings reported in this 
chapter so far have identified activities, artefacts and strategies associated 
with alarm handling. A wide range of data collection and data analysis 
techniques were utilised to ensure that different features of alarm handling 
(e.g. frequency, sequence, strategies, time) were included.  
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In this thesis four stages of CWA have been applied to capture the 
cognitive processing relevant to alarm handling. The value of each 
analytical form and how it can help with the design of alarm systems was 
illustrated in the findings. What emerges from the use of these analyses in 
combination is how these analytical forms work together to build a detailed 
view of the cognitive requirements of a given work domain. The abstraction 
hierarchy showed functions embedded in a physical and organisational 
context. These functions are elaborated in the contextual activity matrix, in 
terms of corresponding tasks and work situations. The cognitive 
transformations underlying these tasks are represented in the decision 
ladder, which highlights higher order stages of processing. These higher 
order stages inform strategy analysis, which can lead to design 
requirements.  
One of the indirect findings of this work is the understanding obtained 
about the process of applying multiple stages of CWA. Certain 
considerations have come to light that may influence the success of 
applying this approach. Different stages of CWA aim to explore various 
aspects of socio-technical environments. It is important to use the right 
stage for the right purpose and it is not always necessary to perform all 
stages of CWA. If the requirement of the case presented here was to only 
explore the domain and provide an initial understanding of ECR alarms, 
then the first few stages would have sufficed and given additional value in 
comparison to applying traditional task analysis methods (Golightly, Ryan 
& Sharples, 2011). If, however, the intention is to generate design 
guidance then we believe it is better to perform a complete CWA. 
CWA is a framework rather than a method; therefore there are few 
guidelines about which methods should be deployed to  apply this 
framework to the understanding of a system. The choice of appropriate 
methods to capture data is therefore crucial and the analysis involved can 
be time-intensive. In the case of the ECR study, a total of 20 hours of 
observation was conducted together with SME interviews to provide an 
appropriate level of understanding. It is also important to choose the 
appropriate methods to elicit data from observations. In this case, 
observational checklists were used to structure the findings. Finally, and 
similar to all research in real world socio-technical environments, the 
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success of the analysis is very much dependent on the experience of the 
researcher, both in the domain she is investigating as well as their 
comprehensive and thorough understanding of the principles of human 
information processing. 
Familiarity with the domain was achieved in this study through the 
UHVHDUFKHU¶V LQYROYHPHQW LQ D QXPEHU RI RWKHU SURMHFWV ZLWKLQ WKH 15
Ergonomics Team, especially with regard to the railway electrical control 
domain. A main contribution was the work of the researcher to develop a 
workload assessment toolkit for electrical control operators (both AC and 
DC). This project included collecting more than 140 hours of data from 7 
ECRs and investigating ECR log books.  
CWA can potentially explore the features of complex control systems. It 
seems, however, unrealistic to conduct all of the stages for every function 
possible. This thesis has tackled only one of the domain functions of ECR 
operation (alarm handling) and it might have been impossible or of limited 
use to apply CWA to elaborate every ECR function. This might explain the 
reasons for the limited number of research studies in the literature which 
involve full implementation of CWA. The risk, however, is that by focussing 
on only one aspect of the system, critical interdependencies between 
people, technology, and functions within the overall system will be lost. For 
example, a fuller understanding of people handling alarms might be gained 
from the joint analysis of their everyday monitoring, planning and 
optimisation activities. Therefore, it may be valuable to conduct a Work 
Domain Analysis of the control system as a whole, in order to determine 
these inter-dependencies and also to prioritise the functions which require 
more analysis.  
The coping strategies investigated in this study were taken from Hollnagel 
and Woods (2005). These are the coping strategies specifically determined 
for information overload and underload. This approach was selected 
because information deficiency was considered to be a challenge to railway 
intelligent infrastructure (Chapter 5) and railway ECR operators confirmed 
this problem to be one of their main concerns.  
One particular finding of the study is the comparison between expected 
and unexpected alarms. Ultimately, it seems that intelligent infrastructure 
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would like to provide sufficient information for operators to notice and clear 
alarms without having to check if they are genuine (acceptance) or analyse 
WKHLU FDXVH DQDO\VLV WKLV LV VLPLODU WR WKH FDVH RI µH[SHFWHG¶ DODUPV
Therefore, the operator should not need to extrapolate the information or 
match the case with similar situations, as these are the two strategies used 
mainly by operators when handling unexpected alarms. In other words, 
local knowledge and situational information, as well as a reliable history of 
previous cases, should be used prior to presenting the alarm to the 
operator.   
Moreover, looking into the differences in the frequency and duration of the 
use of artefacts between expected and unexpected alarms, it is evident 
that the alarm banner, display area and menu are being used significantly 
more in cases of unexpected alarms than expected alarms. Therefore, it is 
SRVVLEOHWRLQWHUSUHWWKDWWKHVHDUWHIDFWVVXSSRUWRSHUDWRUV¶GLDJQRVLVRIWKH
situation. Although these artefacts are associated with the layout of the 
ECR and not necessarily that of the future intelligent infrastructure system, 
it is reasonable and even obvious to assume that these features (alarm 
banner, display area and menu) will be part of the intelligent infrastructure 
alarm management system.  
For example, to improve alarm notification, alarm banners should be 
designed in a way that easily facilities filtering and categorising of the data. 
Local knowledge and historical information should be available to assist 
operators in accepting alarms with confidence. Previous alarm episodes and 
similar situations should be available to enable operators to diagnose and 
clear alarms, as they often extrapolate the available evidence to match 
that of previous situations. Table 6-6 below summarises the design 
guidance that can inform the development and implementation of railway 
intelligent infrastructure system via supporting their alarm systems.  
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TABLE 6-6: DESIGN GUIDANCE FOR SUPPORTING ALARM HANDLING ACTIVITIES   
Activity  Main 
artefacts  
Strategies   Design guidance  
Notification   Alarm 
banner 
 
Filtering  
Categorising  
x The information 
presented on the 
alarm banner should 
be coded so that it is 
easy to filter  
x Codify the types of 
alarms to facilitate 
categorising  
 
Acceptance  Alarm 
banner  
Display area 
Categorising  
Similarity 
matching  
x On the alarm banner, 
mark the alarm to tell 
the operator that 
there are similar 
previous cases.   
x On the display area, 
provide information 
about the similar 
previous cases. This is 
to ensure that 
operators have a clear 
overview of the alarm 
and do not 
automatically accept it 
because of some 
similarities between 
this alarm and some 
previous cases. 
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Analysis  Display area  
Menu 
Overview  
Extrapolation  
Similarity 
matching  
x On the display area 
provide details of 
previous cases and 
also facilitate playing 
back the alarm 
situation  
Clearance  Menu 
Display area  
Overview  
Extrapolation  
Similarity 
matching  
x Provide clearance 
options and ultimately 
potential outcomes of 
these courses of 
action according to 
previous cases (e.g. 
their delay 
contribution, etc.) 
Another important finding of this study relates to the comparison between 
high and low information alarms. When operators are faced with low 
information, they use the display area almost twice as much as in cases of 
high information. However, the overall duration of handling high 
information alarms is twice as long as low information alarms. This could 
suggest that operators are a lot better at finding the missing information 
on the operational display than categorising and filtering the high amount 
of information presented to them. Another way of explaining this is that 
current systems are not very good at categorising and filtering information, 
which should also be a concern for the design of intelligent infrastructure 
displays.  
This study, although among the first to review the ECR domain and develop 
an understanding of alarm handling in railway ECR, has its limitations. 
These arose mainly from the resources available to the study and the 
challenges of real-life research. One particular challenge was the number of 
alarms observed. Despite the 18 hours of field study, only 22 alarms were 
generated, which might seem insufficient. However, video recordings of 
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operators while handling alarms and interviews with them after the 
handling (verbal protocol) facilitated the study of alarms from various 
perspectives and led to findings pertinent to the objectives of this PhD 
study.  
Another limitation seems to result from the simplified definition of strategy 
that was used in this study. 7KHWHUPUHIHUVWRRSHUDWRUV¶DFWLYLWLHVDQGWKH
shortcuts they use when faced with a difficult situation. The reason for this 
simplicity was also central to the objectives of this PhD, where the aim was 
to explore challenges of potential intelligent infrastructure functions. 
Therefore, the first step was to understand what determines a difficult 
situation in alarm handling as a representative intelligent infrastructure 
IXQFWLRQ 7KH RSHUDWRUV¶ FRPPHQWV DQG WKH GXUDWLRQ RI KDQGOLQJ YDULRXV
types of alarms showed that it is worse to be presented with too much 
information than to be presented with too little information. Similarly, 
findings from Sarter (2007) suggested that information overload is one of 
the main contributors to complexity in control rooms.  
Alarm handling has been found to be one of the main functions of future 
intelligent infrastructure systems. Despite the advantages of exploring this 
domain in an under studies domain such as ECR, in guiding the design of 
future intelligent infrastructure it is important to explore other 
functionalities, especially those functions that are distributed differently 
and also should be handled differently. Furthermore, maintenance control 
centres seem to be going to the core domain of the intelligent 
infrastructure system, thus a study was conducted to investigate fault 
finding in the maintenance control centre. This is reported in the next 
chapter.  
6.7. Chapter summary  
This chapter reported a series of studies that was performed to establish an 
understanding of alarm handling in ECR and to apply this understanding to 
guide the design of future intelligent infrastructure systems. A combination 
RITXDOLWDWLYHDQGTXDQWLWDWLYHPHWKRGVZDVDGRSWHGWRLGHQWLI\RSHUDWRUV¶
activities and strategies while handling alarms. This provided a detailed 
insight into alarm handling and facilitated guiding alarm systems in the 
future intelligent infrastructure systems.  
Chapter 7: Fault analysis in maintenance control centres   
 
169 
 
7. Fault analysis in maintenance control centres     
The previous chapter explored and investigated alarm handling as one of 
the core functionalities of a future intelligent infrastructure system. How 
relevant functions will be handled within the intelligent infrastructure of the 
future is not yet known. For example, it is not known whether alarms will 
be handled as soon as they occur (i.e. within a dedicated control room 
responsible only for attending to the intelligent infrastructure) or if alarms 
will be presented in the form of alerts that operators will attend to in their 
own time since they are responsible for other activities and attending to 
the intelligent infrastructure system is not their priority. The former 
condition, in which alarms are handled immediately, has been explored in 
the previous chapter and the latter is explored in the context of fault 
finding within maintenance control and is reported in the present chapter.  
Maintenance control centres are responsible for monitoring and managing 
the maintenance of railway infrastructure through the aid of Remote 
Condition Monitoring (RCM) equipment. They are responsible for a wide 
range of activities and, since their role is not directly operational (unlike 
the role of ECROs or signallers), they do not have to respond to alarms and 
alerts immediately. Moreover, maintenance is the main scope of the 
railway intelligent infrastructure and maintenance technicians are 
potentially the main users of the future intelligent infrastructure systems. 
Therefore, a series of field studies was conducted to facilitate an 
understanding of this work setting. 
The study reported in this chapter aims to guide two of the objectives of 
this PhD study:  
x 7R HVWDEOLVK DQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI RSHUDWRUV¶ VWUDWHJLHV IRU KXPDQ
supervisory control task in alarm handling and fault finding. 
x To produce human factors guidance for the future development and 
implementation of intelligent infrastructure system in the railway to 
match and complement human capabilities and needs. 
To facilitate these objectives, the study reported in the chapter explore   
the research questions associated with an understanding of fault finding 
activities, their potential challenges and opeUDWRUV¶VWUDWHJLHVWRFRSHZLWK
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these challenges. This information, together with the findings from the 
previous chapter, will then lead to a hypothesis regarding the optimal level 
of information for operators conducting problem solving tasks in the future 
intelligent infrastructure.  
The study presents an investigation to predict the effects of using more 
advanced artefacts (e.g. moving from current RCM interfaces to future 
intelligent infrastructure interfaces) in railway problem solving. 
Investigation of three different types of maintenance control centre   
facilitated this. These control rooms are similar in terms of their main 
responsibilities but different in the types of the artefacts available to them. 
Furthermore, the interview study reported in chapter five revealed one  
challenging aspect of the development of an intelligent infrastructure 
system to be the question of its distribution, e.g., local vs. central. The 
maintenance control rooms selected for this study were different in terms 
of their level of distribution.  
Domain familiarisation was conducted first, in order to obtain an 
understanding of the three maintenance control rooms selected for this 
study. Section 7.3 reports the semi-structured interview study conducted in 
the form of a Critical Decision Method (CDM) technique. Section 7.4 reports 
the findings and revisits the research questions of this study in the light of 
the findings.   
7.1. Domain familiarisation  
Three different types of control room were selected on the basis of the 
UHFRPPHQGDWLRQVRID6XEMHFW0DWWHU([SHUWLQ1HWZRUN5DLO¶V(UJRQRPLFV
Team. These control rooms, although similar in terms of their job 
specifications, had different technologies that were distributed differently. 
A summary of these control rooms is shown in Table 7-1, referred to as 
coQWURO URRPV µ$¶ µ%¶ DQG µ&¶ In total, six hours of field visits were 
conducted in these three control rooms (two hours in each control room). 
The main focus of these preliminary visits was to become familiar with 
various forms of RCM equipment and any other artefacts available to the 
maintenance technicians. Moreover, details of the main responsibilities, 
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shift work settings and a brief description of fault analysis processes in 
these control rooms were collected.  
A number of Network Rail (NR) documents relating to the system 
specifications and fault management systems applied in these control 
rooms were reviewed (Table 7-1). Findings of the preliminary visits and 
document review led to the design and development of the study.  
TABLE 7-1: THE THREE MAINTENANCE CONTROL ROOMS OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
Maintenance 
control 
workstation  
A B C  
Type Signalling 
maintenance 
Signalling 
maintenance 
National control centre  
Location  Local ( in a 
different 
room from 
the signaller)  
Local (in the 
same room with 
the signaller) 
 
Central  
(Route control) 
RCM  1. 
Infrastructur
e event log  
1. Asset 
monitoring, 
2.Track 
monitoring,  
3.Point condition 
monitoring 
1.Wheel monitoring, 
2.Track monitoring   
3.Point monitoring, 4.Weather 
monitoring,5.Asset 
monitoring, 6.Train 
monitoring  
7.2. Findings from familiarisation study  
Maintenance control in the railway is responsible for the safe and timely 
maintenance of the rail infrastructure. Maintenance control can be divided 
into two groups: signalling maintenance and national control centres. Two 
of the control rooms studied were signalling maintenance control centres 
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FRQWUROURRPVµ$¶DQGµ%¶DQGWKHWKLUGRQHZDVDQDWLRQDOFRQWUROFHQWUH
FRQWUROURRPµ&¶ 
7.2.1. Maintenance control workstation A 
The first maintenance control workstation is part of the West Midlands 
Signalling Centre (WMSC). The system being used in this signalling centre 
KDV EHHQ GHYHORSHG E\ :HVWLQJKRXVH 5DLO DQG LV FDOOHG :(67&$'
:HVWLQJKRXVH &RQWURO DQG 'LVSOD\  :(67&$' LV DQ LQWHJUDWHG
computer based signalling and maintenance workstation.  
WMSC is in the process of migrating signal boxes along the West Midlands 
into a centralized location, comprising 24 signalling desks. The 
maintenance control centre is located on the top floor of the building. 
Currently, this is a one-man workstation, but upon completion of the 
migration of all of the signal boxes, two technicians would work during 
each shift.  
The maintenance technician is responsible for detecting and dealing with 
operational failures, attending to fault logs, monitoring equipment to 
facilitate predictive maintenance and planning periodic and long term 
maintenance checks. 
,QGLFDWLRQRIDIDXOWRQWKH:(67&$'V\VWHPLVHLWKHUWKURXJKDQDODUP
RQ WKH:(67&$'JHQHUDO LQIRUPDWLRQGLVSOD\RU WKURXJK WKH ODFNRI DQ
expected indication response to a control input, which indicates an 
equipment failure. An example of the general information screen is shown 
in Figure 7-1 below.  
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FIGURE 7-1: EXAMPLE OF A WESTC$'6&5((1 
2QH LPSRUWDQW DVSHFW RI WKH PDLQWHQDQFH WHFKQLFLDQV¶ UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV LQ
WMSC is to monitor the signalling equipment, which is stored in separate 
rooms of the same signalling centre. Therefore, the technicians have to 
monitor the status of these rooms, including their temperature, burglar 
alarm, etc., to ensure that the equipment is safe and in working condition.   
A maintenance technician workstation in WMSC consists of six information 
displays (Figure 7-2 7KHVH LQFOXGH ILYH :(67&$' LQWHJUDWHG
information displays and one display used for web-based applications as 
well as the administrative tasks that the maintenance technician needs to 
fulfil as part of his duties. The information displays on the workstation 
provide information regarding signalling workstations, power supplies, 
monitoring facilities for the office equipment, modems and other 
communication links.  
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FIGURE 7-2: WMSC MAINTENANCE WORKSTATION 
7.2.2. Maintenance control workstation B 
Manchester South signalling control centre (MSSCC) maintenance 
workstation was selected as the second work setting of this study. MSSCC 
FRPSULVHV WZR VLJQDOOLQJ GHVNV ZLWK WKH PDLQWHQDQFH WHFKQLFLDQ¶V GHVN
located behind the two signallers. Figure 7-3 shows a view of the control 
URRPIURPWKHWHFKQLFLDQ¶VGHVN6LPLODUWRZRUNVWDWLRQ µ$¶ WKHRSHUDWRU
does not have to be present in the control room at all times. Depending on 
the situation, the technician might be on-site assessing and diagnosing 
faults.   
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FIGURE 7-3: MANCHESTER SOUTH SIGNALLING CONTROL CENTRE 
7KH WHFKQLFLDQ¶VZRUNVWDWLRQKDV VHYHQ LQIRrmation displays (Figure 7-4). 
Artefacts available to the maintenance technicians include RCM equipment 
linked to various fault management systems (FMS), which was 
coPPLVVLRQHGIRU15([DPSOHVRIWKLV LQFOXGH$VVHW:DWFK&'65DLO
3266 SRLQW FRQGLWLRQ PRQLWRULQJ 7UDFN :DWFK %DOIRXU %HDWW\
$16$/'2HWF6RPHRIWKHVHLQWHUIDFHVDUHZHE-based (e.g. POSS) and 
some comprise stand-alone software, which recalls data from on-track 
sensors and loggers. 
 
FIGURE 7-4: MSSCC WORKSTATION 
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FMS and RCM systems available to the technicians have different interfaces 
that are not always consistent in terms of their basic usability issues. 
Figure 7-5 shows a screen shot of the POSS and Figure 7-6 shows the 
screen shot of Asset Watch. Apart from the use of similar colour coding 
(e.g. red for alarms and green for cleared) the format for information 
presentation differs between these two interfaces. One uses lists and the 
other uses trends and graphs and, although this is not the focus of the 
present study, it confirms the lack of consistency identified by the 
interviewees in the intelligent infrastructure study (Chapter 5).  
In addition to the condition monitoring facilities, signalling displays of the 
area under coverage and Control Centre of the Future (CCF) screens are 
also available to the signalling technicians. Moreover, since the technicians 
are located in the same signal box as the signaller, they can overhear 
relevant information and this, in turn, forms another source of their 
information when it comes to identifying the cause of a failure on the track. 
When a fault is being reported, various types of information are presented 
to the operator: location, equipment type and a brief indication of the fault. 
The logbooks also contain information: the date, the technician who had 
attended to the fault, FMS number, equipment type (e.g. banner repeater, 
point machine, main signal, position light signal) and equipment ID, 
controller unit, field unit, indication of a common fault (e.g. lamp failure, 
lost reverse detection, earth alarm, etc.) and common fix (e.g. filter unit 
replaced, etc.), as well as the current status of that fault (fixed, active, 
unknown or cleared on own). 
This information is usually summarised in fault logs. Rows associated with 
each fault on the log are shown in green if they are fixed, red if they are 
active, yellow if they are unknown and white if they are automatically 
cleared. Finally, a more detailed description of each fault can be found in 
the report that is automatically generated. A sample of a fault log is shown 
in Figure 7-7.  
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FIGURE 7-5: SCREEN SHOT OF POSS 
 
FIGURE 7-6: A SCREEN SHOT ASSETWATCH  
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FIGURE 7-7: EXAMPLE OF A FAULT LOG IN CONTROL ROOM B 
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7.2.3. Maintenance control workstation C 
The third maintenance control workstation used in this study was London 
North East National Control Centre (NCC), located in York. This centre 
controls and maintains the route from London north to Scotland. This 
control room includes a number of operators, such as train operator 
FRPSDQ\¶V UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV UHJXODWRUV DQG PDLQWHQDQFH WHFKQLFLDQV
Figure 7-8 shows an overview of this control room.  
 
FIGURE 7-8: LONDON NORTH EAST NATIONAL CONTROL CENTRE 
Maintenance technicians in this control room are responsible for monitoring 
and dealing with a wide range of faults similar to those in the other two 
control rooms. In addition, they receive information from weather 
monitoring stations (e.g., updated information regarding wind and ice), 
which enables them to make operational decisions and even impose speed 
restrictions to mitigate weather related risks.  
2Q WKH PDLQWHQDQFH WHFKQLFLDQ¶V ZRUN VWDWLRQ LQ WKH /RQGRQ 1RUWK (DVW
National Control Centre there are nine information displays (Figure 7-9). 
These are used for various applications, including weather monitoring, 
point monitoring, train scheduling, wheel monitoring, e-mail, etc.  
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FIGURE 7-9: MAINTENANCE WORKSTATION IN THE NCC 
7.2.4. Summary of the domain familiarisation phase 
The familiarisation visits provided a general understanding of the layout of 
different maintenance cRQWUROZRUNVWDWLRQV WHFKQLFLDQV¶ UROHVDQGYDULRXV
artefacts available on each of the workstations. This understanding 
informed the design of the main fault finding study.  
,QQHLWKHURIWKHPDLQWHQDQFHZRUNVWDWLRQVLVWKHWHFKQLFLDQ¶VUROHD
responsibility. They occasionally leave the workstation and have on-track 
visits to collect the information required to deal with the faults. Therefore, 
it is not possible to record live fault analysis. Technicians are not required 
to attend to a fault when an alarm is generated. It is usually the case that 
the faults get logged and technicians attend to them in their own time.   
Not being able to conduct an on-line fault analysis, unlike the alarms case 
in chapter six, meant that video recording was not used. A series of 
questions, drawn from the CDM, were employed to facilitate the 
investigation.  
7.3. The fault finding study   
The 12 hours of study on the three maintenance control workstations 
comprised a CDM interview study analysing a selection of recent fault 
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analysis episodes. The data were then analysed to address the research 
questions raised earlier.  
7.3.1. Participants  
Two maintenance technicians from each of the selected maintenance 
workstations participated in this study. Participants were all male with an 
average age of 43 years, an average of 22 years of experience in various 
sectors of the railway, and they were all experienced at the task under 
observation.  
Preliminary visits informed the procedure used as part of this study. In 
November 2010 maintenance technicians were approached with the 
proposed study procedures and they agreed to take part. Ethical guidelines 
of the University of Nottingham were followed. Participants were assured 
about data confidentiality and their anonymity. The information sheet for 
this study can be found in appendix 12.7.  
7.3.2. Apparatus  
A decision analysis spreadsheet ZDVGHYHORSHGXVLQJ0LFURVRIW([FHOWR
probe the functions of fault analysis (Figure 7-10), with factors adopted 
from the CDM 2µ+DUHHWDO, and the spreadsheet was customised 
to match the rail domain. Technicians were asked to comment on various 
stages of their fault analysis work. These stages are referred to as 
µJRDOVDFWLYLWLHV¶ (DFK JRDO ZDV WKHQ DQDO\VHG DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH IDFWRUV
identified in the spreadsheet. These factors are: 
x Cue identification: for each of the fault anaO\VLV VWDJHVRSHUDWRUV¶
actions are informed by various cues (e.g., visual cue on the event 
log).   
x Data processing: After identifying the relevant cues, operators will 
process these cues according to their regulations (e.g., categorising 
the colour coded alarms on the log).  
x Information development: operators use their skills and experience 
to evaluate and analyse the categorised data and convert it to 
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meaningful information (e.g., taking into account the weather while 
diagnosing a fault)  
x Knowledge integration: operators consider external factors in order 
to conduct the  optimum action (e.g., remembering similar cases 
which have occurred in that location) 
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FIGURE 7-10: A COMPLETED DECISION ANALYSIS SPREADSHEET 
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7.3.3. Procedure  
Two data collection sessions, each of two hours, were conducted in each of 
the maintenance control rooms. All sessions were conducted with one 
maintenance technician; two maintenance technicians participated from 
each control room.  
Participants were made familiar with the aims of the research, reviewed the 
decision analysis spreadsheet and were briefed about the meaning of 
various factors. Participants were asked to think of the most recent 
challenging fault they had gone through. This also provided an insight into 
WKHWHFKQLFLDQV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIZKDWFRPSULVHVD challenging fault analysis. 
The researcher then asked the following questions regarding each of the 
cases recalled by operators (although the order of questions was not fixed 
and varied from case to case): 
x How did you become aware of the fault? What was the cue in 
identification of the problem? 
x What was the most important piece of information that helped you 
in making your decision? 
x How certain were you regarding the information provided to you? 
x How did you integrate all different sources of information to come to 
a conclusion? 
x What artefacts did you use? 
x In what order did you attend to various pieces of information? 
x How aware were you regarding your surroundings as well as the 
IDXOW¶VFRQWH[W" 
7HFKQLFLDQV¶UHVSRQVHVDQGDQ\RWKHUFRPPHQWVPDGHUHJDUGLQJHDch fault 
situation were recorded and used to complete the decision analysis 
spreadsheet, similar to that in Figure 7-10. Appendix 12.8contains the 
completed spreadsheet for another fault analysis episode.  
 
Chapter 7: Fault analysis in maintenance control centres   
 
185 
 
7.3.4. Analysis 
A total of 25 fault analysis episodes were recorded and analysed,  eight in 
FRQWURO URRP µ$¶ QLQH LQ FRQWURO URRP µ%¶ DQG HLJKW LQ FRQWURO URRP µ&¶
Each session took around two hours and the operator recalled and 
reviewed approximately four fault analysis episodes during each session.  
A decision analysis spreadsheet was completed for each of the faults; 
qualitative analysis of these data enabled the researcher to obtain an 
understanding of fault analysis activities and artefacts. Furthermore, 
decision ladders were used to structure the sequence of activities and the 
cognitive states of the technicians while attending to a fault. 
2SHUDWRUV¶ FRPPHQWV UHJDUGLQJ TXHVWLRQV OLNH µ:KDW ZDV WKH PRVW
LPSRUWDQW SLHFH RI LQIRUPDWLRQ"¶ µ+RZ FHUWDLQ ZHUH \RX UHJDUGLng the 
LQIRUPDWLRQ SURYLGHG WR \RX"¶ DQG µ+RZ GLG \RX LQWHJUDWH DOO VRXUFHV RI
LQIRUPDWLRQ WR FRPH WR D FRQFOXVLRQ"¶ SURYLGHG FXHV DV WR WKH VWUDWHJLHV
they use to overcome information deficiencies.  
It is appreciated that obtaining an in-depth understanding of the strategies 
used for problem solving requires far more detailed and extended data 
collection than merely finding a pattern through a number of questions. 
+RZHYHUWKHVHGDWDDUHXVHIXOLQGHYHORSLQJDJHQHUDOYLHZRIRSHUDWRUV¶
potential approaches to overcome complications while they are attending to 
a fault.  
Comments regarding each of these questions were recorded and analysed. 
These were then mapped to the list of coping strategies adopted from 
Hollnagel and Woods (2005), which was also used in the alarm handling 
study (Chapter 6). A separate one hour long meeting with one of the 
PDLQWHQDQFHWHFKQLFLDQVLQWKH:06&FRQWUROURRPµ$¶ZDVXVHGWRYHULI\
and confirm the strategies identified.  
Differences in terms of activities and strategies in relation to the type of 
artefacts and system distribution available to each control room were 
further analysed. Decision ladders were developed for each of the control 
rooms, providing a means of comparing activities and strategies in a 
control room. Activities and strategies were first compared in terms of the 
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available artefacts in each control room and then compared in terms of the 
distribution of the maintenance workstation within its larger control setting.  
7.4. Findings  
The findings of this study will facilitate the objectives of the PhD by 
addressing research questions to identify the sources of difficulty during 
problem solving; and to identify the sequence of activities and develop an 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIRSHUDWRUV¶ VWUDWHJLHVZKLOHDQDO\VLQJ IDXOWV7KLVVection 
reports the fault finding cases that were selected by the maintenance 
technicians in the three control rooms and explains their activities and 
strategies while analysing faults. As mentioned earlier, these maintenance 
control centres varied in terms of the equipment available to them, as well 
as their degree of distribution; and so the control centres could be 
compared.  
7.4.1. Characteristics of selected faults in the three 
maintenance control centres  
25 fault episodes were reported by six maintenance technicians (operator 1 
to operator 6 on Table 7-2) in three control rooms. These faults and their 
types are shown in Table 7-2 below.  
TABLE 7-2: SUMMARY OF THE FAULTS RECORDED IN THIS STUDY 
Location Operator type 
MSSCC 1 false alarm 
MSSCC 1 point failure 
MSSCC 1 fiber optic failure 
MSSCC 1 power supply failure  
MSSCC 1 wrong system indication 
MSSCC 2 signal failure  
MSSCC 2 false alarm 
MSSCC 2 input fault 
MSSCC 2 point failure 
NCC 3 bridge bash  
NCC 3 flood warning  
NCC 3 speed restriction 
NCC 3 wind alarm 
NCC 4 ice alarm 
NCC 4 false alarm 
NCC 4 bridge bash  
NCC 4 point failure 
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NCC 5 wind alarm 
WMSCC 5 power supply failure  
WMSCC 5 signal failure 
WMSCC 5 signal failure 
WMSCC 5 power supply failure  
WMSCC 6 intruder alarm 
WMSCC 6 loss data link 
WMSCC 6 loss data link 
WMSCC 6 intruder alarm 
The maintenance technicians were asked to identify and then review the 
most recent challenging fault finding situations in their control rooms. From 
the 25 cases of fault finding, 13 types of faults were mentioned by 
maintenance technicians (Figure 7-11). To an extent, these faults were 
perceived by the operators to be the most recurring and challenging cases, 
since as part of the CDM study, maintenance technicians have been asked 
by the researcher to mention their recent challenging fault episodes. False 
alarms, point failures and signal failure were selected more than other 
cases. These faults affect the immediate operation of the railways and 
operators found them more challenging, possibly due to the fact that, 
despite the fact that their job specification  does not require them to attend 
to alarms when they are generated,  operators still feel under time 
pressure as the faults  affect  the operation and  contribute to delays in the 
rail service.     
 
FIGURE 7-11: NUMBER OF THE FAULTS REVIEWED IN THE STUDY  
$ UHYLHZRI RSHUDWRUV¶ FRPPHQWV UHJDUGLQJ WKH UHDVRQV WKDWPDGH WKHVH
cases challenging provided an insight into these problems. It seems that, in 
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some instances, operators did not have a clear view of the fault (e.g. due 
to the lost communication between WKHVHQVRUDQGWKHORJJHULQµORVWGDWD
OLQN¶ DQG LQRWKHU LQVWDQFHV WKH\KDG WRRPXFK LQIRUPDWLRQ WRDQDO\VH
Although there were no time constraints associated with handling the fault 
RSHUDWRUV¶ FRQIXVLRQ GXH WR PXOWLSOH VRXUFHV RI LQIRUPDWLRQ LPSRVHd a 
challenge (power supply failure). Therefore, as in the case of the alarm 
handling study, information deficiency (similar to high and low information 
mentioned in chapter 6) was found to be the source of complexity in the 
maintenance domain.  
7.4.2. Fault analysis activities  
In the decision analysis spreadsheet (Figure 7-10) the first column refers 
to activities and goals. This corresponds to the stages performed by 
technicians during fault analysis. Reviewing these spreadsheets for all 25 
cases (Appendix 12.8), a pattern of activities emerged. In twenty of the 
cases, the activities conducted to analyse the fault started with notification 
of the fault, followed by diagnosis of the fault and then deciding on a 
course of action. In the remaining five cases, where the technician was not 
completely certain whether the fault was authentic or not, a test of 
authenticity was performed and, in two of the cases where there was  a 
false alarm, the technician assessed the causes associated with the 
generation of a false alarm. In these five cases, upon confirming the 
authenticity of the fault episode, the cause was diagnosed and a corrective 
course of action was selected.  
Therefore, fault analysis in rail maintenance has been categorised into four 
main stages:  
1. Receive notification of the fault ÆNotification 
2. Check if it is genuine ÆAcceptance 
3. Diagnose the fault ÆAnalysis 
4. Develop a course of corrective actionÆClearance 
These activities are summarised in Figure 7-12 below.  
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FIGURE 7-12: FAULT INITIATED ACTIVITIES 
When a fault is being reported, the operator is made aware of it. As well as 
getting alerted through another controller and audible and visual channels, 
the operator also has to identify the location from which the fault has 
originated and needs to start analysing the faulty situation on the basis of 
their local knowledge and experience.  
The second stage is to identify whether the fault is genuine or not. This 
assessing the credibility of the data presented. If the fault is not genuine 
and the operator imposes an unnecessary speed restriction or even stops a 
train to send an investigation team to the track, this can lead to delays and 
a waste of time and resources, as well as excess costs in terms of fines.  
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The third stage of fault analysis is to assess the fault, seek potential causes 
of the fault and diagnose it. Finally, the fourth stage refers to the 
development and evaluation of the optimum corrective action.  
7.4.3. Fault analysis strategies  
As with the alarm handling study reported in chapter six, deficiencies in 
information presentation represent one of the main difficulties facing the 
technician endeavouring to deal optimally with faults. There are at least six 
information displays on a tecKQLFLDQ¶V ZRUNVWDWLRQ $OWKRXJK LW LV
appreciated that duplication of information is inevitable, due to critical 
safety issues associated with their roles, technicians also identified 
difficulties with unnecessarily redundant information and misleading data.  
&RPPHQWV ZHUH DVVHVVHG DJDLQVW +ROOQDJHO DQG :RRGV¶  FRSLQJ
strategies. As with the coping strategies found for alarm handling (chapter 
6), the strategies adopted by maintenance technicians to analyse the faults 
include categorising, filtering, queuing, similarity matching and 
extrapolation. However, maintenance technicians also tend to use the 
frequency of occurrence of events in the past as a basis for recognition 
(Frequency gambling) (Table 6-3).  
Table 7-3 VKRZVWHFKQLFLDQV¶UHVSRQVHVWRWKHTXHVWLRQVIRUWKHVHOHFWLRQRI
fault analysis episodes. Boxes within this table refer to their relevant 
strategies (a subsequent hour long meeting with one of the technicians 
who participated in this study confirmed the relevance of these responses 
to the selected strategies).   
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TABLE 7-3 7(&+1,&,$16¶ 5(632NSES TO THE THREE QUESTIONS ABOUT A 
SELECTION OF FAULTS 
Fault  What was the most 
important piece of 
information that 
helped you in 
recognising the 
fault? 
How certain you were 
regarding the 
information provided 
to you? 
How did you 
integrate all sources 
of information and 
come to a 
conclusion? 
1 I know there is 
engineering work in 
Manchester Piccadilly  
 
 
We have heard about 
power shut down in 
Manchester Piccadilly 
earlier.  
 
Used the diagnostic 
tools on fault 
management system to 
confirm my 
assumption. 
2 Signaller located in the 
same control room 
informed me that they 
may have lost 
detection.  
 
I double checked the 
point on responsiveness 
on my system and I trust 
the signaller's call. 
The weather was icy on 
that day and I decided 
that it was weather 
related.  
3 Alarm description on 
the banner  
I know the specific 
location where this alarm 
KDSSHQVLILW¶VWKHVDPH
location it confirms it. 
 
 
I look at the back up 
copy from the system 
and filter the potential 
causes.  
4 The red fault on the 
display of the fault 
Power supply is showing 
unexpected behaviour: 
Filter and categorise 
relevant information on 
Similarity 
matching  
Categorising   
Extrapolation 
Similarity 
matching  
Filtering 
Extrapolation 
Chapter 7: Fault analysis in maintenance control centres   
 
192 
 
management system  
 
other related alarms are 
being generated.  
the fault management 
system.  
 
 
5 Unusual fault on the 
fault management 
system  
Engineering has just 
changed the module 
which is alarming.  
Eliminate all possible 
options to reach a 
conclusion.  
6 Signalling screen shots, 
It went red all the way, 
it was really difficult to 
miss.  
 
Again having the signaller 
in the same room was 
really helpful, also this is 
SPAD alarm, which is 
very critical, you really 
GRQ¶WWKLQNWZLFH.  
I rang other signallers 
in other control rooms 
to get a bigger picture, 
everything was alright 
towards Manchester 
and was not alright 
towards Crew. 
7 This location and this 
specific fault happens 
all the time and I know 
from previous cases. 
that they are all false 
alarms  
 
 
90% of the stuff shown 
on these fault 
management systems is 
false alarms.  
 
I would have to find a 
way to send a fault 
team on track to check 
if the equipment is 
working.  
7.4.4. Comparison of the three maintenance control rooms in 
terms of activities and strategies  
One of the research questions targeted in this study was whether changes 
in the artefacts and equipment available to operators would affect the 
process of fault analysis. Decision ladders of problem solving in each of the 
Filtering    Similarity 
matching  
Frequency 
gambling  
Si ilarity 
matching  
Filtering    
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three maintenance control rooms were developed to facilitate this 
understanding.  
7KHGHFLVLRQ ODGGHUVRI IDXOWDQDO\VLV LQ FRQWURO URRPV µ$¶ µ%¶DQG µ&¶DUH
shown in Figure 7-13, Figure 7-14 and Figure 7-15. The first figure 
(Figure 7-13) also shows the four stages of activities of fault analysis 
associated with various states and processes within the decision ladder.  
The question is how these stages benefit from tKHFRQWUROURRPV¶DUWHIDFWV
and their distribution. Data collected about fault analysis episodes within 
each of the control rooms were analysed separately to study any 
differences and similarities.  
The shaded areas in Figure 7-14 and Figure 7-15 refer to the activities that 
are assisted through the artefacts available in those control rooms. In 
other words, the use of these artefacts and the location of these control 
rooms provided operators with shortcuts.   
The second stage (confirmation) and the third stage (diagnosis) benefit 
IURP 5&0 HTXLSPHQW ,Q ERWK FRQWURO URRPV µ$¶ DQG µ%¶ ZKHQ RSHUDWRUV
want to check if the fault is genuine, they use their knowledge of the faulty 
location and the history of that asset.  &RQWUROURRPµ&¶RSHUDWRUVKDGPRUH
trust in the system, potentially because the RCM equipment had been 
maintained more regularly and alarm thresholds had been updated fairly 
recently. More sophisticated fault management systems and the strategic 
nature of the role of operators in this control room contributed to this 
difference.  
$OWKRXJK FRQWURO URRP µ$¶ KDG QR QRWLFHDEOH VXSSRUW IURP WKH RQO\ 5&0
HTXLSPHQW LQWKHLUURRPFRQWUROURRPV µ%¶DQG µ&¶XVHGYDULRXVSLHFHVRI
RCM equipment to diagnose the fault and assist the investigation process.  
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FIGURE 7-13: DECISION LADDER FOR FAULT ANALYSIS IN CONTROL ROOM 'A' 
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FIGURE 7-14: DECISION LADDER FOR FAULT ANALYSIS IN CONTROL ROOM 'B' 
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FIGURE 7-15: DECISION LADDER FOR FAULT ANALYSIS IN CONTROL ROOM 'C' 
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7.5. Discussion  
Similar to the previous chapter, the study reported here informed two 
objectives of this PhD study: to establish an understanding of the 
strategies and activities associated with this railway problem solving 
scenario and also to use this understanding to develop guidance so that 
these problem solving activities are supported in the future railway 
intelligent infrastructure. Analysis of this work setting was guided by a CDM 
interview technique and was structured within decision ladders. 
CDM was used to enable an in-GHSWKXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIRSHUDWRUV¶DFWLYLWLHV
and decision making in railway maintenance control centres. The reason for 
selecting this method instead of CWA, which was used in the previous 
study (Chapter 6), was rooted in the resources available while conducting 
this study. It was not possible to record live fault analysis and, video 
recording was not an option. The key factors of interest in this study were 
DUWHIDFWVVRXUFHVRIGLIILFXOWLHV LQ WKHFRQWURO URRPDQGRSHUDWRUV¶FRSLQJ
strategies. Decision ladders were used to structure the findings from the 
CDM interviews and to identify the states and processing involved with 
maintenance fault finding.  
&'0ZDVYHU\XVHIXOLQLGHQWLI\LQJRSHUDWRUV¶GHFLVLRQSRLQWVLHGLIIHUHQW
stages of fault finding: notification, acceptance, analysis and clearance). 
The selection of the probes was done with the aim of facilitating an 
understanding of the cues that operators use in order to deal with faults. 
8QGHUVWDQGLQJ WKHVH FXHV KHOSHG WR SURYLGH DQ LQVLJKW LQWR RSHUDWRUV¶
activities and their strategies.  
Selecting and using appropriate probes is a key part in the implementation 
of an effective CDM technique. In this study, these probes were derived 
from the in-depth field studies conducted in both electrical control and 
maintenance control settings.   
Decision ladders have been used in a number of studies in this PhD. They 
were used to facilitate the cognitive transformation analysis of the CWA in 
chapter 6, to explore the sequence of states and processes of fault finding 
in chapter 7 and to predict the performance of participants during the 
laboratory study, which will be reported in chapter 8. Since a decision 
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ladder provides a way of structuring information processing according to its 
sequences, it also guided the development of the experimental prototype 
for the chapter 8 experiment, which was based on the information and data 
utilised at each of the stages identified in the decision ladder. 
It is possible to use the understanding regarding the activities to inform the 
third objective of this PhD (i.e. design guidance). The findings reported 
earlier in this chapter are summarised in Table 7-4 below together with 
their implication for the design.  
TABLE 7-4: DESIGN GUIDANCE FOR SUPPORTING FAULT FAULTING ACTIVITIES  
Activity  Strategies   Design guidance  
Notification   Filtering  
 
x The colour coding should be used for 
presenting the alarms on the banner 
x Central distribution implies less local 
knowledge and therefore the 
RSHUDWRUV¶UHOLDQFHRQWKHV\VWHPLV
important.  
Acceptance  Categorising  
Similarity 
matching  
 
x An updated status log of ongoing 
engineering work in different 
locations should be provided. 
Knowing that there is existing 
engineering work currently is down 
WRRSHUDWRUV¶NQRZOHGJHDQGLWLVQRW
provided within the system.  
x Lack of system reliability(e.g. too 
many false alarms) can be very 
misleading, simply ignoring an alarm 
because there were many previous 
cases of false alarm should be 
avoided by reliable alarm 
management system.  
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Analysis  Extrapolation  
Similarity 
matching  
x Playback option using simulations 
should be available so that operators 
re-build the situation and obtain an 
overview of the problem.  
 
Clearance  Extrapolation  
Similarity 
matching  
x The outcome of operators clearance 
options should be available for 
example in terms of indicating delay 
minutes for every minute of 
persisting the failed asset, this can 
also be extracted from previous 
cases where similar assets have 
been failed in an area with similar 
traffic and around the same time 
during the service.  
One of the key findings for the maintenance control centres is related to a 
comparison between the three control rooms. These control room 
operators had various quantities and types of artefacts available to them. 
&RQWUROURRPµ$¶KDGORJJLQJIDFLOLWLHVRQO\ZKLOHFRQWUROURRPµ%¶Kad some 
5&0DYDLODEOHEXWWKHV\VWHPZDVGLVWULEXWHGORFDOO\&RQWUROURRPµ&¶ZDV
a national control centre, had much RCM equipment and covered a large 
geographical area.  
One of the implementation challenges of the intelligent infrastructure 
system is to decide whether to distribute it locally or  bring it together 
FHQWUDOO\VRWKHFRPSDULVRQEHWZHHQFRQWUROURRP%DQGFRQWUROURRPµ&¶
SURYLGHVVRPHJXLGDQFHLQWKDWUHJDUG&RQWUROURRPµ%¶SURYLGHVRSHUDWRUV
with detailed trends and graphs associated with faults, which assist them in 
GLDJQRVLQJ IDXOWV &RQWURO URRP µ&¶ SURYLGHV GLDJQRVWLF VXSSRUW DQG DOVR
assists operators in a more confident acceptance of the fault. This is due to 
the wide range of RCM equipment available in this control room, which 
provides operators with duplicated and, in some cases, excessive 
information. Despite the differences in their artefacts as well as their 
Chapter 7: Fault analysis in maintenance control centres   
 
200 
 
distribution, decision ladders showed that the process of finding, analysing 
and clearing a fault in these three control rooms is similar. In a way it 
confirms that the processes involved with problem solving in the future 
intelligent infrastructure systems are also going to be similar to those 
found in this thesis.  
Looking at the activities and strategies adopted by operators while 
analysing faults, it seems that there are similarities between the case 
found in the ECR and the situation in maintenance control. This is despite 
the fact that, in the latter, the operators attended the alarms immediately 
after they were generated and, in the former, operators investigated the 
faults in their own time. Moreover, the strategies were almost similar and 
included filtering, categorising, similarity matching and extrapolation. 
However, due to the sheer volume of alerts in maintenance control centres 
and the high false alarm rate meant that operators simply ignored some 
faults (frequency gambling), which should alert designers  developing a 
future intelligent infrastructure system. Also similar to the case in chapter 
6, some of these strategies reveal imperfect practices in control rooms and 
knowing them can assist designers to reduce the risk by recognising them 
early on.  
An underlying recommendation from these studies concerns the 
management of the information presented to operators in order to provide 
them with the optimum level of information relevant and sufficient to their 
tasks.  This involves giving operators enough information to analyse the 
fault and prevent them from having to use risky strategies in order to deal 
with too much information. This is particularly a challenge in an intelligent 
infrastructure system because information is being shared between various 
operators across railway control; different operators would need different 
levels of information presented to them. 
The studies reported in chapter 6 and also the study presented in this 
chapter have identified information relevant to alarm handling and fault 
finding, including the sequence in which operators would need/prefer them.  
Considering these cases as potential functions of the intelligent 
infrastructure system, it is possible to hypothesise about the optimum level 
of information required. This hypothesis is trialled in a simplified laboratory 
study that is reported in chapter 8.   
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7.6. Chapter summary  
This chapter reported a study that was conducted in three maintenance 
control centres with different ranges of RCM equipment. Operators¶ fault 
finding activities and strategies were explored through CDM-like interview 
studies and were structured in form of decision ladders. The findings 
established an understanding of railway maintenance fault finding activities 
and strategies and informed the design of intelligent infrastructure 
systems. 
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8. The impact of presenting different levels of information at 
various stages of railway problem solving: a laboratory 
study  
The study reported in this chapter mainly informs the third objective of this 
PhD: to investigate the optimal level of information required for different 
stages of problem solving and develop guidance for the implementation 
and development of a future intelligent infrastructure system.  
Previous chapters have developed an understanding of the activities and 
strategies adopted by operators while performing problem solving tasks in 
railway control. The sequences in which operators attend to or require 
information has been established. The findings suggest that, not 
VXUSULVLQJO\RSHUDWRUV¶PDLQVRXUFHVRIGLIILFXOty, caused by the challenges 
reported in the chapter two are mainly associated with information 
deficiencies. Hence, it is safe to assume that with the introduction of 
intelligent infrastructure systems, this problem is likely to become at least 
as or more challenging. Therefore, it is important to guide the development 
of the intelligent infrastructure interface in terms of the optimal level of 
information associated with problem solving activities.  
Revisiting the interview study reported in chapter 5, it was clear that 
LQWHOOLJHQW LQIUDVWUXFWXUH RSHUDWRUV¶ UROHV ZLOO YDU\ LQ WHUPV RI IXQFWLRQV
priorities and responsibilities. Therefore, different operators will need 
different levels of information in order to conduct their activities efficiently. 
This is supported by the findings of the data processing framework 
presented in chapter 5, where the hierarchy of information relevant to 
these roles is shown. The two tasks examined in this study (acceptance 
and clearance) relate to the key activities associated with the different 
roles in a future intelligent infrastructure system. From the interview study, 
it appeared that track workers are mainly responsible for accepting the 
faults and control room operators are those who   analyse and clear them.  
The hypotheses regarding the information required for aspects of problem 
solving, linking them with the roles identified for the potential intelligent 
infrastructure system, were formed from the studies reported in chapters 6 
and 7. These hypotheses were then trialled in an isolated laboratory study, 
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reported in the current chapter. The aim here is not to address these 
hypotheses in their complete complex forms, but to explore the question of 
whether different roles will benefit from different levels of information.  
This chapter reports a laboratory study conducted to investigate the effect 
of presenting different levels of information on problem solving activities. 
The first section of this chapter links the findings from previous studies 
(Chapters 5, 6, and 7) to inform the hypotheses generated and scenarios 
adopted for this laboratory study. The development of the experimental 
prototype and its specifications are reported in the second section. The 
methods for conducting the experiment are explained in the third section. 
This is followed by a presentation and discussion of the results of the study 
in the fourth and fifth sections.  
8.1. Information requirement for problem solving: 
integrating the findings from alarm handling and fault finding 
study  
Studies conducted in the Electrical Control Room (ECR) and the 
Maintenance Control Centre (MCC) identified the activities and strategies 
performed by operators to deal with problem solving tasks of relevance to 
a future railway intelligent infrastructure system. This has led to an 
understanding of the types of information used and required by operators. 
The findings from these two studies (Chapters 6 and 7) are summarised in 
this section to guide the development of the hypotheses explored in the 
current chapter.  
Problem solving in the railways alarm handlings consists of four activities: 
notification, acceptance, diagnosis and clearance (Chapters 6). Findings 
from chapter 6 have suggested that, during the handling of alarms in rail 
ECRs, operators have different types of information available to them. 
Table 8-1 shows an example of the information available and required by 
operators when handling alarms, their rationale for using this information 
and the form in which this information is available to them.  
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TABLE 8-1: EXAMPLE OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE WHEN DEALING WITH AN 
ALARM IN ECR 
Information  Rationale  Form of 
information  
Alarm colour 
Location of the alarm  
Number of previous alarms 
 
To develop an 
initial 
understanding 
of the type of 
alarm and its 
severity  
Text 
Colour 
Amount of alarmed 
locations 
Symbols on the 
display  
 
Relationship between various 
alarms  
Previous status of the asset  
To analyse 
potential 
causes of the 
alarm  
Lists on the event 
log 
Local knowledge 
Historical knowledge (similar 
previous cases)  
To develop an 
effective course 
of action 
Conversations 
between operators 
within control and 
from neighboring  
control rooms  
For example, when an alarm is generated, the red colour on the alarm 
EDQQHUDWWUDFWVRSHUDWRUV¶DWWHQWLRQDQGKHOSVWKHPWRQRWLFHWKHSUREOHP
Moreover, the alarm description on the operational display helps the 
operators to recognise the type of fault. Information about other events 
occurring in the vicinity of the faulty asset, e.g., engineering work in the 
location, assists the operators to get a broader picture of the situation. This 
information is currently obtained through face-to-face communication 
between different controllers. Although operators are able to handle the 
alarm with just the data on the alarm banner, the information on event 
logs and alarm lists, as well as details of the location, can assist the 
operator to make a more informed decision.  
Similarly, in the MCCs, operators attend to and seek different types of 
information in order to deal with faults. Table 8-2 shows an example of this 
LQIRUPDWLRQ RSHUDWRUV¶ UDWLRQDOH IRU DWWHQGLQJ WR WKHP DQG WKH IRUPV LQ
which the information is available to the operators.  
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TABLE 8-2: EXAMPLE OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE WHEN DEALING WITH A FAULT 
IN MCC 
Information  Rationale  Form of information  
Colour of the row on the event 
log  
Location of the fault  
Type of faulty asset  
To develop an 
initial 
understanding 
of the type of 
fault and its 
severity  
Conversations with the 
signaler 
Text 
Colour  
 
 
Situational information  
Previous cases of faults in that 
location   
To analyse 
potential 
causes of the 
fault  
Conversations with 
maintenance team   
Event log  
Local knowledge 
Historical knowledge (similar 
previous cases)  
To develop an 
effective 
course of 
action 
Conversations between 
operators within control 
and from neighboring  
control rooms  
When a fault is detected by the maintenance technician, either after 
monitoring the alert list or having been told by a signaller, the operator 
investigates the authenticity of the fault by capturing or remembering the 
situational information (e.g. whether there is engineering work in the faulty 
area or not) and also from previous knowledge. He is then able to assess 
the severity of the fault. This process is followed by the application of local 
knowledge to plan the maintenance and arrange for the maintenance team 
to go on track and investigate or fix the fault.  
Looking at the two examples taken from the ECR and the MCC, it is clear 
that the information available to operators enables them to develop their 
knowledge of the problem gradually and assists them in analysis and 
clearance of the problem. The rationale of the operators for capturing and 
retaining the information fits in three categories. The first category relates 
to developing a basic understanding of the problem, followed by the use of 
information to facilitate the analysis of the fault by investigating the 
evidence and related events (e.g. previous alarms, situational information, 
simultaneous faults, etc.). Finally, operators evaluate various corrective 
options by considering the effect on future operations (e.g. liaising with 
neighbouring control rooms) and then deciding on the course of action. 
These findings suggest that, if, in any way there is a need to separate 
various stages of problem solving, operators would benefit from specific 
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pieces of information. This would ensure that they are presented with 
information sufficient to their task and that they are not overloaded with 
irrelevant information. The next section will expand this notion in the 
context of intelligent infrastructure where, supposedly, different roles 
assume responsibility for different stages of problem solving.  
8.1.1. Problem solving stages for the roles in the future 
intelligent infrastructure system  
Railway intelligent infrastructure systems will collect or generate large 
quantities of data from remote sensors and condition monitoring 
equipment and present this to different operators in different functions. 
Participants of the interview study (Chapter 5) identified three main roles, 
which they believed will be extensively involved with the future railway 
intelligent infrastructure systems.  
x Track workers 
x Control room operators  
x Strategic analysts  
x 7KHWUDFNZRUNHU¶V UROH LV WR UHSDLU IDLOHGDVVHWVDW WKHYHU\HDUO\
VWDJH DOO WKH\ QHHG LV DFFXUDWH LQIRUPDWLRQ DERXW WKH DVVHW¶V
condition (i.e. whether the point machine is working or not). The 
control room operator has to monitor the system to detect failures 
and collect system indications to guide the track worker through the 
repair. The strategic analyst has to develop good practice for a more 
reliable and efficient railway maintenance regime. For example, data 
DERXW DQ DVVHW¶V SHUIRUPDQFH LV UHTXLUHG DORQJ ZLWK WKH GHOD\V
these assets have contributed to, etc. In other words, problem 
solving in railway intelligent infrastructure does not start and finish 
in one control room.  
Different roles associated with railway intelligent infrastructure are 
responsible for a number of these activities. Track workers are responsible 
for noticing faults and informing control room operators. Control room 
operators then assess the authenticity of the fault and conduct the early 
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stages of diagnosis in order to assist the operational railway (clearance). 
This information would then be presented to the strategic analyst, who 
would recommend long term solutions to the fault and ideally to prevent 
them in the future (clearance).  
This information can be categorised into three different levels. A brief 
definition of these levels and examples are listed in Table 8-3 below.  
These levels of information relates to the three levels identified within the 
data processing framework knowledge elicitation study (Table 5-5). 
TABLE 8-3: SUMMARY OF THE LEVELS OF INFORMATION AVAILBLE TO OPERATORS 
WHILE PROBLEM SOLVING IN RAILWAYS  
Level of 
information  
Definition    Example  
Level 1: Data 
& information  
Basic understanding of the system 
that is absolutely necessary to solve 
the problem 
Type of alarm on the 
banner, colour of alarm, 
table of wind thresholds  
Level 2: 
Knowledge  
Information that assists operators to 
explain possible causes of the fault 
as well as the basic information 
required to detect the state of the 
failed equipment 
 A table of all weather 
monitoring stations and 
their active alarm. 
Level 3: 
Intelligence  
Information regarding future state of 
the system 
Where will be the next 
wind alarm 
It is reasonable to assume that future operators of intelligent 
infrastructure, depending on their roles and responsibilities, will require 
various levels of information. This hypothesis is investigated in the study 
reported in the current chapter.  
Due to complexity and the distributed nature of problem solving tasks and 
the lack of an existing intelligent infrastructure system other than the pilot 
mentioned in chapter two, this hypotheses is explored within a simulated 
environment. The idea is to separate the stages of problem solving tasks 
under study (acceptance and clearance) and present operators with 
different levels of information. Details of the scenario that was simulated 
are presented in the next section. 
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8.2. Laboratory study; scenario and participants  
In order to facilitate the simulated laboratory study to investigate the 
hypotheses mentioned earlier, the participants chosen to interact with the 
simulated interface and the problem solving scenario should be carefully 
selected so that the research questions of the study can be addressed 
without FRPSURPLVLQJWKHVWXG\¶VHFRORJLFDOYDOLGLW\ 
(SLVRGHV RI ZHDWKHU UHODWHG DODUPV DQG PRUH VSHFLILFDOO\ µZLQG DODUPV¶
were simulated for the purpose of this study. Wind alarms were one of the 
most common faults identified in the fault finding study (Chapter 7). 
Moreover, decision ladders developed within the fault finding study 
(Chapter 7) led to an understanding of the activities associated with this 
particular type of alarm. These decision ladders were used to hypothesise 
DERXWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SHUIRUPDQFHLQWKLVH[SHULPHQW 
In terms of the participants, it was not sensible to recruit real operators, 
since there was a need to ask participants to perform different stages of 
problem solving tasks (acceptance and clearance as separate tasks). On 
account of their expertise, real operators would not be able, cognitively, to 
separate one stage/task from another. Therefore, trained students were 
used for the purpose of the laboratory study. 
The scenario selected for this study appears very simple in terms of 
imposing cognitive demands on real operators. However, it was thought 
suitable for the student participants. Moreover, this scenario was selected 
so that it was easy to separate different stages of problem solving during 
the experimental study. Had it been complicated, it would have been very 
difficult to draw the boundaries between various stages (acceptance and 
clearance).  
Although a wind alarm is a railway related fault and despite the fact that 
the participants were all university students with no domain specific 
knowledge, they were still able to understand the concept easily and 
quickly.  
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8.2.1. Background 
Wind alarms are generated by the VAISALA railway monitoring system. 
VAISALA provides site-specific monitoring of weather conditions and their 
effect on service disruptions. Wind speed and the presence of ice on rail 
tracks are two features of this monitoring system which have been used in 
this study as examples of an alarm scenario.  
Wind alarms are activated when the wind gust speed sensed from the 
weather station is higher than a set threshold saved in the monitoring 
V\VWHP7KHDODUPLVVKRZQRQWKHZLQGDODUP¶VPDLQZLQGRZFigure 8-1) 
and it is accompanied by an audible siren. There are, typically, two types of 
trains (class 373 and general) used in the UK. Since the weight of these 
two classes of train is different, gust speed affects them differently. 
Therefore, there are two sets of thresholds on the system: 35 mph (miles 
per hour) for class 373 trains and 45 mph for general trains. Moreover, the 
train speeds are known, which is relevant to the type of train as well as the 
type of rail track on their route. If the wind is higher than these thresholds, 
it can potentially lead to train derailments. Maintenance technicians 
monitor weather stations located in their area of coverage and intervene 
when the system generates an alarm. Similarly, when there is ice on the 
track, the maintenance technicians should inform the driver to adjust the 
train speed accordingly. Ice alarms are shown in tables on the alarm 
management systems.   
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FIGURE 8-1: WIND ALARM MAIN WINDOW ON VAISALA $/$50 6<67(0 7$.(1 
)5209$,6$/$ 
Both wind and ice alarms have to be responded to urgently. Ice and frost 
on track can be predicted from the temperature of the track presented in a 
table. Wind gust occurs more unexpectedly but operators can estimate the 
next location that will be affected, since gust speed and direction is 
DYDLODEOHRQWKHZLQGDODUP¶VPDLQZLQGRZFigure 8-1). 
When a wind alarm is generated, the panel shows the average wind speed 
in the last 2 minutes, current wind speed and wind gust speed, the 
direction of the wind and the direction of the track. 
The operators notice the alarm when an audible siren is generated.   
Depending on the type of alarm and type of train under the windy 
conditions, the operators instruct speed restrictions. For class 373 trains, 
the recommended speed is 110 mph and for general trains it is 80 mph. In 
order to clear the alarm, the operator informs the train drivers that they 
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are about to enter the windy area and requests that they reduce their 
speed to the acceptable range.  
8.3. Experimental prototype  
The wind alarm panel used in railway maintenance control centres is E-
prime 2.0  SUHVHQWHG RQ D ´ 6RQ\ 9$,2 laptop. This prototype 
GLVSOD\VVFUHHQVKRWVRIWKHZLQGDODUP¶VPDLQZLQGRZFigure 8-2). Some 
additional information is also displayed on the screen with pre-set time 
intervals E-prime 2.0  is a software that is able to design an experimental 
study using drag and drop interfaces and simple scripting for the run of the 
experiment. Therefore, it is possible to define the sequence of activity live 
ORJJLQJRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHVSRQVHVDQGWKHLUFRPSOHWLRQWLPHV 
To obtain a clear view of the information to be presented to the operators 
while handling these alarms, real wind alarms reviewed in the fault analysis 
study (Chapter 7) were used. 
 
FIGURE 8-2: EXAMPLE OF A SIMULATED WIND ALARM WINDOW 
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8.3.1. Experimental tasks 
Two experimental tasks were selected for this study: 1- alarm acceptance 
and 2- alarm clearance, two of the main activities performed during a 
problem solving scenario reported in chapters 6 and 7. They were selected 
because they incorporate the other two activities that have been identified, 
i.e., noticing the alarm and diagnosing the alarm. One cannot accept an 
alarm without noticing it; similarly, it is impossible to clear an alarm 
without diagnosing it. Also, both of these activities, i.e., accepting and 
clearing the alarm, require the operator to interact with a system to input 
information. In this way it became possible to use this information, which 
could be measured, to assess the impact of the presentation of different 
OHYHOV RI LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ XVHUV¶ SHUIRUPDQFH Moreover, returning to the 
alarm handling AH described in chapter 6 (Figure 6-12), two alarm 
KDQGOLQJGRPDLQIXQFWLRQVZHUHLGHQWLILHGDVµDODUPUHFRJQLWLRQ¶DQGµDODUP
FOHDUDQFH¶ZKLFKUHODWHVWRµDFFHSWDQFH¶DQGµFOHDUDQFH¶ 
 It should be noted that these tasks are simplified forms of the activities 
observed in real wind alarm situations. Charts displayed below are used to 
show the various factors participants had to consider when conducting 
these tasks.  
8.3.1.1. Task 1: accepting wind alarms 
When an alarm is generated, operators have to check to see if it is 
authentic or not. This is referred to as alarm acceptance.  When there is a 
wind alarm, an audible siren will be generated to inform the operator of the 
alarm.  
Participants had tR FKHFN WKH ZLQG JXVW WKDW ZDV VKRZQ RQ WKH DODUP¶V
main window and compare it against the threshold table provided to them. 
If the wind gust speed presented on the main window was higher than the 
threshold, then the alarm was true and participants had to accept it.  In 
RUGHU WRDFFHSWDQDODUPSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUH LQVWUXFWHG WRSUHVV µ¶RQ WKH
NH\ERDUGDQGWRFDQFHOWKHDODUPWKH\KDGWRSUHVVµ¶7KLVLVVKRZQLQ
Figure 8-3 below.  
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3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHGWRFOLFNRQWKHQXPEHUVµ¶DQGµ¶RQWKHNH\ERDUG
LQVWHDGRIW\SLQJµDFFHSW¶DQGµFOHDU¶(-SULPHGLGQRWKDYHWKHIDFLOLW\
to use the mouse click option on the screenshots of the prototype,  so 
QXPEHUHG FRGHV ZHUH XVHG WR UHGXFH WKH ELDV RI SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ VSHHG RI
typing or potential variations caused by clicking on the mouse. Participants 
had reminder sheets available to them so that they would not need to 
memorise the codes. 
 
FIGURE 8-3: SEQUENCE OF ACTIVITIES DURING ALARM ACCEPTANCE 
8.3.1.2. Task 2: clearing wind alarms  
The second task was to correct the fault by imposing a speed restriction on 
the train that was entering the alarmed location. The recommended speed 
restriction varies depending on the type of trains; therefore, the 
participants had to identify the type of train and impose the specific speed 
restriction accordingly. This is shown in Figure 8-4. 
Moreover, if operators were presented with information about ice alarms, 
they were advised to consider this in their clearance task. If there were 
also problems with ice in the alarmed location, a new set of speed 
restrictions had to be recommended. Note that attending to ice alarm 
information was optional for participants. This is shown in Figure 8-5. 
 
FIGURE 8-4: SEQUENCE OF ACTIVITIES OF ALARM CLEARANCE 
Check the gust 
speed at the 
alarmed location 
Check the 
threshold level 
Depending on 
the threshold 
cancel  or accept 
the alarm  
Check the type of 
alarm  
Check the type of 
train  
Adjust the 
recommended 
speed 
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FIGURE 8-5: SEQUENCE OF ACTIVITIES OF ALARM CLEARANCE WHEN ICE ALARM 
INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE 
8.3.2. Levels of information  
Three levels of information were examined in this experiment. These levels 
refer to the information available to participants during the experimental 
trials. The findings reported in chapters 6 and 7 led to an understanding of 
the information required and utilised by operators while conducting their 
tasks. Decision ladders developed from this understanding led to 
predictions of the performance of participants in the present study. In this 
section, an example of the screenshots of the experimental prototype, as 
well as its associated decision ladder, is explained.  
The available information in each of these conditions is summarised in 
Table 8-4 below: 
TABLE 8-4: INFORMATION AVAILABLE IN THE THREE LEVELS OF INFORMATION 
Level  Task  Information  
One  Alarm 
acceptance    
Location of the alarm  
Wind gust speed  
Threshold tables  
One  Alarm 
clearance  
Location of the alarm  
Wind gust speed  
Type of train  
Speed restriction guidelines 
Two  Alarm 
acceptance  
Location of the alarm  
Wind gust speed  
Threshold tables 
Wind alarms in other locations  
Ice alarm information  
Two  Alarm 
clearance  
Location of the alarm  
Wind gust speed  
Type of train  
Speed restriction guidelines 
Ice alarm information  
Check the 
type of alarm  
Check the 
type of train  
Choose to 
attend the ice 
alarm 
information  
Adjust the 
recommended 
speed  
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Three  Alarm 
acceptance  
Wind gust speed  
Threshold tables 
Wind alarms in other locations 
Ice alarm information  
Wind gust speed in the neighboring weather 
station  
Three  Alarm 
clearance  
Location of the alarm  
Wind gust speed  
Type of train  
Speed restriction guidelines 
Ice alarm information  
8.3.2.1. Level one 
Level 1 refers to the basic understanding of the system. In the context of 
the present study, this refers to alarm thresholds and recommended speed 
restrictions for different types of train. Figure 8-6 shows an example of the 
experimental prototype with the first level of information available to the 
participants to conduct an alarm acceptance. 
  
FIGURE 8-6: PROTOTYPE OF LEVEL 1 TO CONDUCT ALARM ACCEPTANCE  
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Figure 8-7 shows the experimental prototype with the first level of 
information when participants are asked to conduct an alarm clearance 
task.  
The first level of information contains no diagnostic indication of the system 
and therefore participants cannot use this information to find the cause of 
the fault. In other words, the information provides only a binary 
understanding of the system (failed/working).  
A decision ladder corresponding to alarm acceptance (task 1) in level 1 is 
shown in Figure 8-8 and the decision ladder corresponding to alarm 
clearance is shown in Figure 8-9. The shaded circles and rectangles show 
those states and processes that are not supported when presented with 
this level of information.  
As shown in both of the decision ladders, this condition enables all of the 
states, apart from the state in which the decision maker can investigate 
and evaluate alternative options. Since the information presented is the 
absolute minimum, it does not allow the user to assess various 
possibilities. 
 
FIGURE 8-7: PROTOTYPE OF LEVEL 1 TO CONDUCT ALARM CLEARANCE 
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FIGURE 8-8: DECISION LADDER OF ALARM ACCEPTANCE WHEN PRESENTED WITH 
THE FIRST LEVEL OF INFORMATION  
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FIGURE 8-9: DECISION LADDER OF ALARM CLEARANCE WHEN PRESENTED WITH 
THE FIRST LEVEL OF INFORMATION  
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8.3.2.2. Level two 
Level two provides participants with information that can be used to 
explain the possible causes of the fault as well as the basic information 
required to detect the state of failure (level 1). In this condition, 
participants were also presented with information regarding an ice alarm in 
that location. The experimental prototypes for the second level of 
information during alarm acceptance and alarm clearance are shown in 
Figure 8-10 and Figure 8-11 respectively. 
Figure 8-12 and Figure 8-13 show the decision ladder of alarm acceptance 
and alarm clearance tasks when participants were presented with the 
second level of information. As shown in both decision ladders, under these 
conditions, participants have some information to enable them to evaluate 
various options. Findings from the alarm handling and fault finding study 
reported in chapters 6 and 7 confirmed that information regarding the 
location of the fault (in this case the presence of an ice alarm at the 
location) enables operators to assess various options and to guess the 
causes of the fault. 
 It should be noted that the second level of information includes first level 
data (basic wind threshold tables) as well. Therefore, more information is 
presented to participants.  
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FIGURE 8-10: PROTOTYPE OF LEVEL 2 TO CONDUCT ALARM ACCEPTANCE    
 
FIGURE 8-11: PROTOTYPE OF LEVEL 2 TO CONDUCT ALARM CLEARANCE 
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FIGURE 8-12: DECISION LADDER OF ALARM ACCEPTANCE WHEN PRESENTED WITH 
THE SECOND LEVEL OF INFORMATION 
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FIGURE 8-13: DECISION LADDER OF ALARM CLEARANCE WHEN PRESENTED WITH 
THE SECOND LEVEL OF INFORMATION 
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8.3.2.3. Level three 
The third level of information provides participants with information that 
enables them to predict future states of the system by applying their 
knowledge to make a more informed decision. In this experiment, 
participants were provided with information that enabled them to predict 
potential future wind alarms.  
Figure 8-14 shows the experimental prototype at level 3, when participants 
had to conduct the alarm acceptance task. A table of wind gusts in the 
neighbouring weather stations was provided. Depending on the type of 
train, locations with a wind gust speed close to 35 mph and 45 mph are 
likely to generate an alarm fairly soon and operators can therefore expect 
alarms in those locations.  
Figure 8-15 shows the experimental prototype for level 3, when 
participants had to conduct alarm clearance. In this case, participants know 
the route the train will be following and also know that the location in 
which the train is heading will be alarming soon. They have to re-set 
(increase or decrease) the speed restriction for the train entering the new 
location as the speed restriction applies only to the current location.     
Decision ladders of both alarm acceptance and alarm clearance tasks in 
condition three are shown in Figure 8-16 and Figure 8-17. The decision 
ladder at this level is similar to the decision ladders of alarm acceptance 
and alarm clearance tasks at level 2; similar states and processes are 
supported. However, more information is available to participants.  
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FIGURE 8-14: PROTOTYPE OF LEVEL 3 TO CONDUCT ALARM ACCEPTANCE     
 
FIGURE 8-15: PROTOTYPE OF LEVEL 3 TO CONDUCT ALARM CLEARANCE 
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FIGURE 8-16: DECISION LADDER OF ALARM ACCEPTANCE WHEN PRESENTED WITH 
THE THIRD LEVEL OF INFORMATION 
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FIGURE 8-17: DECISION LADDER OF ALARM CLEARANCE WHEN PRESENTED WITH 
THE THIRD LEVEL OF INFORMATION 
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8.3.3. Relationship between performance and levels of 
information  
7KHGHFLVLRQODGGHUVUHSRUWHGHDUOLHUHQDEOHGWKHSUHGLFWLRQRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶
performance when presented with various levels of information.  As shown 
in Figure 8-18, the alarm acceptance completion time is expected to 
increase from level 1 to level 3. The first level of information provides the 
participants with only a basic understanding of the problem by giving 
tables of train speeds and train types. The second level of information 
provides the wind alarm status in the neighbouring weather stations to give 
them an overview of the domain and the third level of information provides 
information regarding future potential wind alarms.  
The increase in the completion time can simply relate to the increase in the 
amount of information presented to the participants. Moreover, the 
information at levels 2 and 3 is not necessarily useful for the alarm 
acceptance task. Although the second level of information can provide 
participants with an overview (status of wind alarm in the neighbouring 
ZHDWKHUVWDWLRQRIWKHLUFKRLFHµDFFHSW¶RU µFDQFHO¶LWLVQRWDQHFHVVDU\
piece of information.   
Similarly, errors are also expected to increase from level 1 to level 2, but 
will decrease when participants are presented with the third level of 
information. The errors in the second level increase possibly because 
operators become confused and their task does not really need an 
overview to aid their understanding. However, giving information to 
participants about future alarms means that, when those alarms occur, 
they are expecting them and therefore their errors decrease. 
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FIGURE 8-18: HYPOTHESISED PERFORMANCE OF PARTICIPANTS WHILE 
CONDUCTING TASK 1: ACCEPTING THE ALARM 
,QWHUPVRIWKHLQWHOOLJHQWLQIUDVWUXFWXUHUROHVDVVXPLQJWKDWWUDFNZRUNHUV¶
main tasks are to notice and accept  faults, this hypothesis means that 
track workers do not need/want an overview of the domain if the system is 
reliable enough to provide them with an accurate binary indication of 
DVVHWV¶ VWDWXV 7KLV FRUUHVSRQGV WR WKH ILQGLQJV IURP WKH GDWD SURFHVVLQJ
framework (Figure 8-19).  
 
FIGURE 8-19: HYPOTHETICAL OPTIAMAL LEVEL OF INFORMATION FOR ALARM 
ACCPETANCE  
The decision ladders led to hypotheses about the performance of alarm 
handling tasks at each level of information. Figure 8-20 shows the 
completion time and errors associated with alarm clearance while 
presented with the three levels of information. Task completion time will 
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hypothetically increase. The increase in the task completion time is due to 
an increase in the amount of information presented to the operators.  
The errors would probably decrease when operators are presented with the 
second level of information, as this information will give them a better 
overview of the problem. When presented with the third level of 
information, errors would probably increase due to the fact that the 
LQIRUPDWLRQ LVQRWGLUHFWO\ UHODWHG WRRSHUDWRUV¶ WDVNDWKDQG  ,QVWHDG LW
provides information about future alarms, but does not add much in terms 
of the existing situation; such irrelevant information can confuse operators. 
 
FIGURE 8-20: HYPOTHESISED PERFORMANCE OF PARTICIPANTS WHILE 
CONDUCTING TASK 2: CORRECTING THE ALARM 
Assuming that, within an intelligent infrastructure system, the core function 
of control room operators is to analyse and clear faults, the provision of 
information regarding the future state of assets will only confuse them. 
However, they do benefit from overview information (Figure 8-20).  
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FIGURE 8-21: HYPOTHETICAL OPTIAMAL LEVEL OF INFORMATION FOR ALARM 
CLEARANCE  
The laboratory study presented in the next section investigated these 
hypotheses in a simulated environment.  
8.4. Method  
8.4.1. Design  
Three groups of participants (group A, group B and group C) were 
instructed to conduct both alarm acceptance and alarm clearance tasks. 
The experimental conditions are summarised in Table 8-5 below.  
TABLE 8-5: EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS 
          Participants  
Tasks  
 
Group A Group B  Group C 
Accepting  Level 1 Level2  Level 3 
Clearing  Level 1 Level2 Level 3 
A between subject study was designed: each group of participants was 
presented with only one of the levels of information. Both tasks were 
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H[DPLQHGDQGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHVSRQVHWLPHVDQGWKHQXPEHURIHUURUVWKH\
made while conducting the tasks were recorded.  
Participants were asked to take note of specific faults that were logged on 
paper on the fault management system (Figure 8-22). This secondary task 
was used to keep the participants occupied between the occurrences of the 
alarms.  
The hypothesis and the dependent and independent variables investigated 
in this laboratory study are listed in Table 8-6. 
TABLE 8-6: HYPOTHESIS AND VARIABLES INVESTIGATED IN THE LABORATORY 
STUDY  
Hypothesis  Independent variables  Dependent variables  
There is an effect of 
the information 
provided on the 
performance of alarm 
handling tasks.  
Information availableÆ3 
levels 
Alarm handling tasksÆ 
clearance and acceptance 
Alarm handling 
performance 
Secondary task 
performance  
8.4.2. Participants  
The sample consisted of 31 students (14 male and 17 female, with a mean 
age of 22 years) from the University of Nottingham. They were recruited 
through an advertisement on the University of 1RWWLQJKDP¶VSRUWDO1RQH
of the participants had any prior experience of alarm handling systems. 
Ethical guidelines of the University of Nottingham were followed throughout 
this laboratory study. The information sheet of this study can be found in 
appendix 12.9. 
8.4.3. Apparatus  
$´6RQ\VAIOODSWRSZDVXVHG IRUGLVSOD\LQJ WKHVFUHHQVKRWVRI WKH
ZLQG DODUP SURWRW\SH $ ´ 'HOO ODSWRS ZDV XVHG WR GLVSOD\ WKH
maintenance control fault log (Figure 8-22) to participants when they were 
not handling alarms. A fault log recording form (Figure 8-23) was filled in 
E\SDUWLFLSDQWVZKLOHPRQLWRULQJWKHIDXOWORJ)LQDOO\DQ2O\PSXVDXGLR
UHFRUGHUZDVXVHGWRUHFRUGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶FRPPHQWVDIWHUWKHFRPSOHWLRQRI
the trial.     
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FIGURE 8-22: MAINTENANCE CONTROL FAULT LOG 
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FIGURE 8-23: FAULT LOG RECORDING FORM 
8.4.4. Procedure  
Participants were briefed and asked to review the information sheet before 
agreeing to take part in the study. In all of the experimental trials 
participants had to perform task 1 (alarm acceptance) prior to task 2 
(alarm clearance) and they received training for each of the tasks. 
Participants were guided through a 7 to 10 minute training session for task 
1 and then performed a practice run with the experimental prototype. Next 
they were asked to attend to 24 cases of alarm episodes. After the 
completion of task 1, they were briefed and trained on task 2 for another 7 
to 10 minutes. They then practised with the experimental prototype, after 
which they were asked to attend to 16 cases of alarms.  
There was a 30 second interval between each of the alarm cases, during 
ZKLFKSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHGWRPRQLWRUDQGILQGµSRLQWPDFKLQH¶IDXOWVRQ
the fault log (Figure 8-22) and fill in the fault log recording form 
(Figure 8-23).  
Finally, participants were asked to comment on the alarm episodes and to 
describe their reasons for the decisions made. Their comments about the 
experimental prototype and the tasks were recorded using an audio 
recorder. This led to approximately two hours of audio recording. The 
procedure for this experiment is summarised in Figure 8-24 below.   
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FIGURE 8-24: EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
8.5. Results  
3DUWLFLSDQWV¶ FRPSOHWLRQ WLPHV DQG HUURUV GXULQJ WKH WULDOVZHUH UHFRUGHG
through E-SULPH  $ ; EHWZHHQ VXEMHFWV $129$ ZDV FRQGXFWed. 
7KH UHVXOWV KDYH EHHQ DQDO\VHG VWDWLVWLFDOO\ XVLQJ 6366 9HUVLRQ 
3DUWLFLSDQWV¶FRPPHQWVZHUHUHYLHZHGDQGWKHPDLQWKHPHVPHQWLRQHGE\
participants were identified.  
8.5.1. Completion time 
For both alarm acceptance and clearance, a linear increase in response was 
visible from level 1 to 3. Means of the response times associated with 
alarm acceptance and alarm clearance tasks while presented with three 
levels of information are shown in Figure 8-25. Despite the existence of 
this trend, this increase is not significant for alarm acceptance; F (2, 28) = 
2.94, p>0.05.  
Multiple comparisons between different levels of information show 
significant differences between completion times of alarm acceptance with 
level 1 information, compared with alarm clearance with level 3 information 
(p<0.05).    
Unlike alarm acceptance, when participants were clearing alarms, the 
completion time were significantly different depending on the level of 
information: F (2, 28) =11.73, p<0.001. Multiple comparison shows 
significant difference between all the levels (p<0.001). 
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FIGURE 8-25: MEAN OF COMPLETION TIME FOR TWO TASKS AT THREE DIFFERENT 
LEVELS (MS) 
8.5.2. Error 
The mean of the number of errors while performing both tasks and when 
participants were presented with the three levels of information is shown in 
Figure 8-26. Although the third level generates the least number of errors 
while accepting alarms (task 1), this was not significant: F (2, 28) = 0.73, 
p>0.05. Multiple comparisons of various levels also do not show any 
significant difference among levels.   
On the other hand, when participants were clearing alarms, depending on 
the level of information available to them, their errors were significantly 
different: F (2, 28) = 5.871, p<0.05. Multiple comparison between 
different levels of information shows significant difference between levels 1 
and 2 (p<0.05) and levels 1 and 3 (p<0.01).  
Alarm acceptance Alarm clearance 
Level 1 4076.29 3654.85 
level 1 5881.39 10001.32 
level 3 8365.44 15948.68 
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FIGURE 8-26: ERRORS MADE DURING ALARM ACCEPTANCE AND ALARM ANALYSIS 
IN THREE CONDITIONS 
8.5.3. Secondary task performance  
Secondary task performance refers to the percentage of faults logged 
correctly. The secondary task was designed to keep participants occupied 
when there was no alarm and it did not target any specific research 
questions.  
There was no significant difference between secondary task performance in 
both alarm acceptance and alarm clearance tasks when presented with 
various levels of information. Figure 8-27 shows the mean percentage of 
secondary task performance while presented with the three levels of 
information for both alarm acceptance and alarm clearance tasks. The 
highest percentage, 97%, was associated with the first level when 
participants were accepting the alarm.  The lowest percentage, 93%, was 
associated with levels 2 and 3, when participants were clearing alarms. 
With the increase in the conditions, this percentage shows a decreasing 
trend. Although not significant, the drop in the percentage from level 1 to 2 
and 3 while performing task 1 (from 99% to 96%) was smaller compared 
to the drop in the percentage while performing task 2 (from 97% to 93%). 
Moreover, the percentage of secondary tasks in two of the levels (2 and 3) 
is identical for both tasks.   
Alarm acceptance Alarm clearance 
Level 1 1.3 2 
Level2 1.4 1.85 
Level 3 1.09 2.31 
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FIGURE 8-27: PERCENTAGE OF SECONDARY TASK PERFORMANCE WHILE 
CONDUCTING TASKS 1 AND 2 IN THREE CONDITIONS 
8.5.4. 3DUWLFLSDQWV¶FRPPHQWV 
When participants were presented with the first level of information, they 
found alarm clearance easier than alarm acceptance. One participant 
PHQWLRQHGWKDW³task 2 (alarm clearance) was easier because I only had to 
look at one thing´,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHSHUFHLYHGGLIILFXOW\ZDVDVVRFLDWHG
with the amount of information available, which explains the higher 
response time for alarm acceptance tasks in comparison with alarm 
clearance. Out of the 10 participants presented with the first level of 
information, only one participant said that alarm acceptance was easier 
than alarm clearance and the reason mentioned was´ WKH ORFDWLRQ RI
LQIRUPDWLRQZDVPRUH RUJDQLVHG RQ WKH VFUHHQ WKDQ LQ WDVN ´. Although 
the presentation of information on the screen was not the focus of this 
VWXG\WKLVSDUWLFLSDQW¶VFRPPHQWsuggests that presenting the information 
RQDGLVSOD\DIIHFWVWKHXVHU¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWDVNGLIILFXOW\ 
When presented with the second level of information, participants had the 
option of reviewing location information and using this data for decision 
making, if they wanted to. Although this was an optional piece of 
information, all 10 participants in this condition considered it. One of the 
participants mentioned´ZHOOWKHUHLVDQRSWLRQWKHUHDQG\RXMXVWZDQWWR
Alarm acceptance Alarm clearance 
Level 1 0.99 0.97 
Level2 0.96 0.93 
Level 3 0.96 0.93 
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XVH LW´.  Unlike the first group (first level of information), 7 of the 10 
participants in the second group found alarm clearance more difficult. This 
was due to the increase in the amount of information that they felt obliged 
to review and analyse. This difficulty is reflected in the quantitative data as 
well: errors and response times are higher for the alarm clearance task 
than for alarm acceptance. The 3 participants who found task 2 easier 
under the second condition gave different reasons. One participant said 
that the second task was easier because they were familiar with the 
system after performing alarm acceptance. Another participant made a 
mistake when accepting alarms due to distractions caused by monitoring 
the fault log and therefore found the task more difficult. 
All 11 participants performing the tasks under the third condition attended 
to location information for the alarm clearance task but mostly ignored it 
when accepting alarms. One of the participants said that, during alarm 
DFFHSWDQFH³I got quite stressed and I could not attend to any additional 
information regarding the location, I just wanted to deal with the absolute 
minimum´+RZHYHU ILYHSDUWLFLSDQWVXVHG WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ UHJDUGLQJ WKH
gust speed in the neighbouring location as a clue to predict future alarms. 
This explains the reason for the lower number of errors when performing 
the alarm acceptance in the third group (information level 3) in comparison 
with the other two groups. Participants mainly used these extra pieces of 
information to investigate a false alarm; if the alarm was true, participants 
were unlikely to consult any of these sources of information. Other 
participants chose not to refer to the wind speed in the neighbouring 
station as they wanted to handle alarms as quickly as possible and 
therefore did not want to attend to information believed to be beneficial in 
WKHIXWXUH2QHRIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWVPHQWLRQHGWKDW³I was not sure when 
these alarms would happen, so I thought by the time they are generated I 
might have forgotten them already´ 
In the third group, only one participant used the route information to 
predict future alarms when clearing alarms; the rest chose not to use that 
LQIRUPDWLRQ 2QH SDUWLFLSDQWV PHQWLRQHG WKDW ³ , IHOW LW ZDV WRR PXFK´
another  said that ³EHFDXVHWKHUHZHUHWRRPDQ\SLeces of information I 
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knew I would not remember that route anyway, so it was better to deal 
ZLWKWKHPZKHQWKH\ZHUHJHQHUDWHG´ 
In the third group, 7 out of 11 participants found the alarm acceptance 
task easier than the alarm clearance task. One participant thought that 
alarm acceptance was more difficult because, in alarm clearance, the user 
felt more engaged and felt that they had control over the situation. The 
participant said: ´Task 1 (alarm acceptance) is too boring for the operator 
and should be doQHE\DPDFKLQHQRWDKXPDQ´. A number of participants 
reported confusion when they had to deal with various pieces of 
information when clearing alarms and admitted that they might have made 
some mistakes.  
8.6. Discussion  
The main goal of intelligent infrastructure system is to: ³SURYLGHWKHULJKW
information at the right time to the right person´ 15 ,QWHOOLJHQW
Infrastructure project manager). Currently, with the aid of advanced 
technologies, sophisticated pieces of information are being collected. 
However, the question remains as to whether the provision of all of these 
pieces of information to users with different responsibilities would enhance 
performance or not. 
The study presented in this chapter has attempted to address this question 
in a simplified simulated environment. Different activities (alarm 
acceptance and clearance tasks), thought to be relevant to the roles of a 
future intelligent infrastructure system (track worker, control room 
operator and strategic analyst), were assessed when participants were 
presented with different levels of information.  
There were two reasons for using the simulated environment in this study. 
Firstly, it was not possible to use real-life settings due to the safety 
criticality of the PDLQWHQDQFH WHFKQLFLDQV¶ UROH 6HFRQGO\ D VLPXODWHG
environment enabled the experimental tasks to be isolated from each other 
and addressed the objectives of this study more effectively.  
Novice participants (trained students in this case) were selected in this 
study. This was to avoid bias imposed on the experiment by experts. 
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Expert operators would automatically accept and clear the alarms and the 
presentation of different levels of information would not have much effect 
on their performance. This is because the type of the fault prototyped in 
this study was a simple and straightforward scenario.   
Power analysis was conducted after performing the study with 4 
participants within each of the groups. This was to get an idea of the effect 
size of various conditions, as well as the optimum sample size. The 
recommended sample size was found to be 45 (15 in each group). 
However, this study did not aim to identify significant differences between 
various conditions; it was mainly to explore the trend that was 
hypothesised (Figure 8-18). 
The data processing framework presented in chapter 5 of this thesis 
identified three categories of data processing: data & information, 
knowledge, and intelligence. These corresponded to the three levels of 
information investigated in the present study. The findings of the 
laboratory study in admittedly limited conditions confirmed the impact of 
presenting various levels of information to operators at different stages of 
problem solving. As mentioned in chapter 5, it is reasonable to assume 
that each of the roles of the future intelligent infrastructure system will 
benefit from one of these categories. Track workers would require only 
basic understanding of the system (level 1), control room operators need 
to be able to interpret the system (level 2) and strategic analysts need to 
be able to predict the future state of the system (level 3). 
According to the data processing framework, FRQWURO URRP RSHUDWRUV¶ 
performance is best when they are presented with the second level of 
information (knowledge). Findings of the study confirmed that alarm 
clearance errors were fewest when operators were presented with level 2 
information. However, while accepting alarms, the least number of the 
errors  related to the third level of information This is potentially due to the 
fact that, during alarm acceptance, operators had enough time to attend to 
extra pieces of information to predict future alarms and consequently to 
expect  when they would be  generated. 
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The performance of the participants with different levels of information was 
predicted through the decision ladders that had been drawn during the 
fault finding study (Chapter 7). These predictions were mostly confirmed. 
This highlights the benefit and necessity of using field studies to 
understand cognitive activities and, in particular, the use of decision 
ladders to obtain a clear understanding of the system behaviour. 
8.7. Chapter summary  
This chapter reports a laboratory study conducted to explore the 
hypotheses derived from different studies in the PhD about the optimal 
level of information for problem solving. A simplified scenario was 
simulated within E-SULPH   DQG WUDLQHG VWXGHQWV ZHUH DVNHG WR
conduct separate stages of problem solving (alarm acceptance and alarm 
FOHDUDQFH3DUWLFLSDQWV¶FRPSOHWLRQWLPHVDQGHUURUVZHUHPHDVXUHG7KH
results confirmed the trend that was hypothesised. For each of the tasks, 
the best performance was associated with the level of information that had 
been hypothesised within previous studies. 
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9. Discussion  
The overall aim of this thesis has been to investigate and to understand the 
relevant human factors for a future intelligent infrastructure on the GB 
railway. This has involved studies of behaviour, cognitive performance and 
knowledge requirements for current relevant work functions and, in 
prospect, for the future intelligent infrastructure.  
The nature, use, and future requirements of information management in a 
railway intelligent infrastructure were studied through a variety of 
paradigms and methodological approaches. The implementation of 
intelligent infrastructure systems in the rail industry is still in its infancy, 
and despite optimistic voices at the outset of the research in 2008 it was 
not until 2011 that Network Rail (NR), where the research study has been 
based, made considerable strides towards intelligent infrastructure 
implementation. Therefore a considerable amount of the empirical work in 
WKLV WKHVLV ZDV IRFXVVHG RQ VLPLODU W\SHV RI V\VWHPV LQ WRGD\¶V UDLOZD\
especially alarm handling and fault finding systems. This has had the 
beneficial effect of allowing in-depth study of railway alarm handling and 
fault finding ± both somewhat under-studies until this work ± as well as 
allowing the first in-depth prospective study of intelligent infrastructure 
human factors. 
This discussion chapter is built around the original thesis objectives, and 
opens with a re-statement of them. A particular aspect of the discussion 
not covered in-depth elsewhere comprises the provision of guidance on 
design for and implementation of intelligent infrastructure, produced to 
meet objective three. Finally, a review of the application and extent of use 
of several paradigms and methodological approaches as well as limitations 
of the work are identified and their potential consequences for the findings 
of this work are addressed.  
9.1. Overall contribution    
This PhD examines the needs for and delivery of information and 
knowledge management for railway intelligent infrastructure systems from 
a human factors viewpoint. In doing this, and certainly at the time when 
work from this PhD has been more widely published (Dadashi et al, 2011), 
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it is believed that the research makes the first substantial human factors 
contribution to the application field. In addition, the key findings of the 
work have facilitated a deeper understanding of the roles and needs of 
operators in electrical control alarm handling and fault finding, considered 
to be key functions of the future railway intelligent infrastructure.  
The objectives of this PhD thesis are to:  
I. Develop a data processing framework that guide and support 
effective implementation of railway intelligent infrastructure from a 
human factors perspective  
II. (VWDEOLVK DQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI RSHUDWRUV¶ VWUDWHJLHV IRU KXPDQ
supervisory control tasks in alarm handling and fault finding.  
III. Produce human factors guidance for the future development and 
implementation of intelligent infrastructure systems in the railway to 
match and complement human capabilities and needs. 
As a result of this work, a number of major contributions have been 
delivered, and are briefly described here. Further on in this chapter the 
value of these contributions are further discussed in the context of the 
objectives of this PhD. 
x The first contribution is the establishment of a data processing 
framework that identified the scope of and activities within the 
railway intelligent infrastructure 
A data processing framework was developed which structured activities 
related to information within a potential intelligent infrastructure system. 
This framework is a combination of processes that are performed by 
technical equipment (e.g. sensors, data bases) and it moves up to 
processes performed by the human operator to handle and clear the 
problem. In other words, the data processing framework shows the 
structure within which data are manipulated (either by the human operator 
or technology). This provides the starting point, in an abstract view, for 
guidance of developers and implementers. A joint technological and human 
operator view of the work matches a cognitive system engineering 
approach whereby system performance is the result of joint collaboration 
amongst various agents (human and machine).  
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x The second major contribution is the identification of human factors 
issues of most importance to a successful implementation of railway 
intelligent infrastructure. 
Although it is arguable that the study as a whole explores and investigates 
intelligent infrastructure from a human factors perspective, this deliverable 
is specifically reported to highlight the most relevant human factors issues 
that might challenge the effective implementation of intelligent 
infrastructure systems.  The human factors issues identified through the 
interview studies from rail experts involved with the project were later 
confirmed and reviewed within the field studies and provided a list of most 
important issues that designers and developers should be aware of. It 
should be pointed out that, in order to carry out a rational programme of 
empirical work, the work function central to producing this advice was 
control room work, rather than, say, track workers or systems analysts. 
x The third contribution was an understanding of the activities carried 
out, artefacts used and coping strategies prevalent during railway 
alarm-handling and fault-finding 
Field studies conducted in electrical control and maintenance control led to 
a detailed understanding of the activities involved in problem solving as 
well as the artefacts used by operators. Moreover, studying these work 
domains in their real setting enabled the researcher to understand what 
comprises a challenging situation (i.e. information deficiency) and has 
guided the identification of the strategies that operators use to cope with 
information shortcomings.  
x The fourth contribution has been guidance for the effective 
implementation of railway intelligent infrastructure 
All the studies reported in this PhD have led to an understanding of how 
designers and developers can effectively implement intelligent 
infrastructure systems. Chapter 5 identified the human factors issues, 
chapter 6 and 7 developed an understanding of alarm handling and fault 
finding which are potential functions of the future intelligent infrastructure 
systems and chapter 8 investigated the hypothesis regarding the optimal 
levels of information for different roles within the intelligent infrastructure 
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system. The outcomes from this work should not be mistaken for detailed 
design guidelines; the strategies identified should be studied further for 
developing detailed guidelines. This PhD does however provide high level 
guidance as to what strategies should be investigated and how knowing 
about them prior to the design process starting can aid developers in 
building more effective and less confusing systems. The guidance which is 
collated from the studies conducted in the PhD is contained at the end of 
this chapter. 
x A fifth contribution has been the demonstration of the value of 
applying a combination of human factors and cognitive engineering 
study methods in investigating cognitive processes within socio-
technical systems. 
A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods was adopted to 
address the objectives of this study. Selecting and applying these methods 
faced the investigator with different challenges, including the fact that 
there were no existing intelligent infrastructure systems in Network Rail, 
and collecting data from real-life control rooms while these are in operation 
which can impose extra challenges in data collection. The paradigms and 
approaches in this PhD study were used so as to best handle these 
limitations and can be used in studying similar complex socio-technical 
environments, discussed in the following section.  
9.2. Objective one: Identify the human factors of most 
relevance to railway intelligent infrastructure and, in so 
doing, develop a framework that focuses on data processing 
requirements to support informed decision making.  
Indentifying and investigating human factors issues in large and complex 
control settings is not new, but as noted by Noy (1997), they have often 
been studied in isolation; a few of the many examples from rail include 
workload studies (Pickup, Wilson, & Clarke, 2003), situation awareness 
(Golightly et al., 2010), and automation (Balfe, 2010). Moreover, Wilson 
and Norris (2005) emphasise  the need to consider human factor issues in 
the railway since this domain is, and will be, facing tremendous technical 
and organisational changes. For the foreseeable future it will consist of 
various legacy systems as well as advanced technologies. Furthermore, in 
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DGGLWLRQ WRRSHUDWRUV¶ UROHVDQGWKHLU LQWHUDFWLRQVZLWK WKHV\VWHPs, there 
are always concerns about passenger safety and comfort, both of which   
need to be taken into account. Therefore, a thorough understanding of 
human factor issues for future intelligent infrastructure was considered 
necessary. 
The human factor issues identified in the interview study (Chapter 5) are 
summarised in Table 9-1 below. 
TABLE 9-1 : HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES IDENTIFIED FROM THE INTERVIEW STUDY 
Human factor issues  %  Relevance to the intelligent 
infrastructure   
Planning  15 To plan the  optimal course of action 
to keep the balance between safety 
and operation of the service 
Safety and human 
reliability  
14 To understand potential sources of 
error and to mitigate the risks 
associated with them. 
Organisational 
culture  
13 To involve various roles and different 
attitudes towards technical 
advancements, role changes, 
business change, etc. with the 
project. 
Decision making  11 To understand the process involved 
with current and future railway 
decision making, ultimately to inform 
optimal decision aids. 
Situation awareness  10 To determine knowledge in the head 
and knowledge in the world that is or 
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will be required by the railway 
operators. 
Workload 9 To determine the effect of the 
introduction of the new technology on 
the current workload. 
User engagement  8 To engage end users with the project 
and facilitate a participatory design. 
Monitoring  7 To identify issues affecting the 
performance of monitoring and how 
this will be changed. 
Automation  5 To determine an appropriate level of 
automation that is practical to the 
nature of the roles. 
System reliability  5 To design and develop reliable 
systems and issues associated with 
XVHUV¶ UHOLDQFH RQ DQG WUXVW LQ WKH
systems. 
Human-Machine 
interaction  
3 To identify and address usability 
issues in order to design effective 
systems. 
From the twenty interviewees, only two were ergonomists and therefore 
intimately aware of the potential human factor issues. However, other 
participants referred, both directly and indirectly, to various issues 
FRQQHFWHGZLWKSHRSOHDQGVRFLDOV\VWHPV7KHUHVHDUFKHU¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQV
of any indirect references to human factors were confirmed through 
informal discussions with the ergonomists.  
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As  mentioned in chapter 5, the interview transcriptions were coded three 
times: first to address general issues and produce a definition of the 
concept of intelligent infrastructure, second to identify the data processing 
associated with various activities within the intelligent infrastructure 
systems, and finally, to identify the human relevant factors. Merging of 
these coding groups led to a categorisation of the human factors within the 
data processing framework and linking them to intelligent infrastructure 
activities. The human factors are presented in the frequency order in which 
interviewees mentioned them within the different levels of the data 
processing framework.  This understanding was also incorporated in the 
guidance (Objective three).Therefore, a designer or a developer would 
know which of these issues should be considered and which phases of the 
project would benefit from an assessment of them. For example, issues 
associated with system reliability should be considered in the early stages 
of the design of intelligent infrastructure systems.  
The strategies applied by operators in coping with information deficiencies 
during problem solving (filtering, categorising, similarity matching and 
extrapolation) can also inform the most relevant human factors that should 
be considered. Filtering and categorising, while   a fault is being noticed 
and accepted, refer mainly to the issues associated with the presentation of 
information in a reliable and perceptual form. Therefore, they are directly 
related to system reliability and monitoring. Furthermore, when operators 
use similarity matching to analyse and clear, it implies that historical 
information and obtaining a wider picture of the problem should be 
provided. This is directly rHODWHG WR RSHUDWRUV¶ H[SHUWLVH Finally, when 
operators extrapolate the existing information to facilitate analysis and 
clearance of faults, they use their expertise.  In order to extrapolate the 
correct information they should have a clear understanding of the 
organisation of the work.  
Table 9-1 above presents the human factor issues relevant to intelligent 
infrastructure identified from the interview studies (Chapter 5). Moreover, 
the field studies conducted in this PhD have led to the identification of the 
issues of most relevance by exploring potential intelligent infrastructure 
functions (alarm handling and fault finding). Table 9-2 below lists these 
human factors and reports their relevance to the intelligent infrastructure.    
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TABLE 9-2: HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES OF MOST RELEVANCE TO INTELLIGENT 
INFRASTRUCTURE  
Human factors Relevance to the intelligent 
infrastructure    
System 
reliability  
To provide reliable and consistent 
information to the operators.  
Expertise  µZKDWLVPLVVLQJIURPWKHDOJRULWKPVLV
understanding how operators deal with 
existing problems, (NR intelligent 
infrastructure project manager)  
Monitoring  There are many information displays on any 
of the control rooms workstations studied in 
this PhD. It is important to support 
operators in monitoring these screens so 
WKDWWKH\GRQ¶WPLVVLPSRUWDQWIHDWXUHV 
Planning  To plan the optimum course of action by 
allocating a knowledgeable maintenance 
team and sending them on track at the 
time that will cause least delay.  
Work 
organsiation 
Various organisations are involved with 
intelligent infrastructure; either they use it 
(e.g. TOC), provide it (e.g. Westinghouse), 
monitor it (e.g. ANSALDO) or apply it (e.g. 
NR). It is important to understand the 
relationship between these organisations 
and how they can or should inform each 
other.  
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Identification of human factors of Intelligent infrastructure systems have 
been fed by understanding the scope and concept of railway intelligent 
infrastructure and to model the data processing associated with various 
activities within intelligent infrastructure. Intelligent infrastructure systems 
have been used and explained in conceptual terms, but scientists or 
practitioners have mainly modelled the relationships between various 
technical elements. For example the elements in the intelligent information 
infrastructure modelled by Lau et al., (2002) consist of a common internet 
interface and other layers of a computer network. Although Lau et al., 
(2002) noted the details of the technical layout required for recording and 
transferring information within the database, they have not discussed what 
information should be collected and presented to achieve this expert 
system.  
Another example is shown in Figure 9-1 below. This is a framework of 
intelligent infrastructure for a sustainable potable water system developed 
by Adriaens et al., (2003). It includes various information sources such as 
remote sensing or coastal urban centres as well as various forms of data 
coding. There are two boxes allocated to modelling water quality and to 
VWUDWHJLFGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ,WVHHPVDVLIWKHVHDUH³PDJLFER[HV´DQGLWLV
supposed that they would automatically generate intelligent information 
that can be fed into various components of the system.  
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FIGURE 9-1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR AN INTERACTIVE DECISION SUPPORT 
SYSTEM TAKEN FROM ADRIAENS ET AL., 2003, PP. 122 
1HWZRUN5DLO¶VKLJKOHYHOPRGHORIUHPRWHFRQGLWLRQPRQLWRULQJLVVKRZQLQ
Figure 9-2 below (a modified version of this model was developed in NR in 
2010). Like the two previous examples, this is also a very simple high level 
work flow; it shows the data sources, transformation links, a strategic 
intelligent infrastructure solution (i.e., the magic box!), and end user 
interfaces.  
A standard that is used to direct phases of developing remote condition 
monitoring systems is ISO 13374 (Network Rail, 2010). This model is 
shown on the right hand side of Figure 9-3. ISO 13374 consists of six 
stages but it does not provide information on how to conduct those stages. 
The data processing framework can inform the activities required to 
achieve the various stages of ISO 13374.   
 
 
FIGURE 9-2: HIGH LEVEL MODEL OF THE RCM INTERNAL NETWORK RAIL 
COMMUNICATION  
The question explored within the data processing framework of this PhD 
DWWHPSWVWRLQIRUPWKHVHµPDJLFER[HV¶Exploring the functions of potential 
intelligent systems currently conducted by operators and studying their 
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strategies for a safe and efficient decision in their complex systems will 
DOORZLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIWKHIHDWXUHVWKHVH³PDJLFER[HV´VKRXOGKDYH 
In this PhD, a data processing framework was developed to move beyond a 
purely technical description of intelligent infrastructure to one that 
addressed the role of cognition (automated or human), and to describe 
how data generated by the system will be turned into intelligence to meet 
overall system objectives.  
Therefore, the data processing framework looks at the transition of data 
during a problem solving activity that is going to feature in the future 
intelligent infrastructure. By looking at the manipulation of data the 
different roles involved with the tasks can be clarified and the data relevant 
to these roles can be identified. These aspects are further investigated in 
this PhD.  
The data processing framework is the product of a series of studies. It was 
first drafted in a workshop held by NR and then explored in detail through 
the interview study with 20 key organisation decision makers reported in 
chapter 5. The sequences of  data processing and the content of the 
framework, as well the relevant human factor issues, were then reviewed 
and refined through the two field studies reported in chapters 6 and 7.  
In addition to the various studies to identify the content and sequence of 
the data processing framework, a controlled knowledge elicitation exercise 
was performed in the ECR to support some verification of the framework.  
ECR operators were asked to carry out an alarm handling episode and to 
write the information they wanted to be made available to them on a card. 
They were then asked to sort the cards in order of priority and to group the 
cards according to the various stages of the data processing framework.  In 
this way, various forms of information within different levels of the data 
processing framework were structured. Figure 9-3 below shows the final 
iteration of the data processing framework, as well the related and relevant 
human factors. 
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FIGURE 9-3: DATA PROCESSING FRAMEWORK OF RAILWAY INTELLIGENT INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEM 
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An intelligent infrastructure system can be thought of as, in effect, a 
knowledge sharing centre in which information is collected in great 
quantities, processed and presented to operators to support their decision 
PDNLQJ,WLVQRWLQWHQGHGWRUHSODFHFXUUHQWV\VWHPVDQGWKHUHIRUHXVHUV¶
current responsibilities and priorities will remain the same. A critical 
question remains as to what level of knowledge and information is required 
for operators to meet their responsibilities in the  best way possible and 
what range of information level is advisory (i.e., not too much or too little). 
The field studies conducted in the ECR and MCCs led to an understanding 
of the activities performed by operators when handling alarms and 
analysing faults as: receiving notifications, acceptance, diagnosis, and 
clHDUDQFH 5HYLVLWLQJ WKH LQWHUYLHZHHV¶ FRPPHQWV VKRZHG VLPLODULWLHV
between the activities of various roles in the future intelligent infrastructure 
and the activities identified within the ECR and MCCs. For example, track 
workers and control room operators notice the failure; the control room 
RSHUDWRU LQYHVWLJDWHV WKH IDXOW¶V DXWKHQWLFLW\ DQG DFFHSWV WKH IDXOW LI LW LV
true, diagnoses potential causes for the fault and clears it. The strategic 
analyst then collates the historical information regarding that particular 
fault and derives future recommendations to avoid the fault.  Therefore, it 
was made possible to hypothesise that different roles would benefit from 
different types and amounts of information (i.e., levels of information) as 
they are responsible for different activities (Section 8.3.3). These 
hypotheses were investigated in the experimental study reported in 
chapter 8.  
The data processing framework developed and explored in this PhD 
DWWHPSWVWRLQIRUPWKH³PDJLFER[HV´RIWKHRWKHUIUDPHZRUNV,WLVLQGHHG
a starting point for human factors identification to manage the information 
development and presentation required for successful implementation of 
such intertwined knowledge sharing centres.  
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9.3. 2EMHFWLYHWZR(VWDEOLVKDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIRSHUDWRUV¶
strategies for human supervisory control tasks in alarm 
handling and fault finding.  
The aim of the second objective of this PhD was to gain an understanding 
RI RSHUDWRUV¶ VWUDWHJLHV ZKLOH FRQGXFWLQJ SUREOHP VROYLQJ WDVNV RI
relevance to the future intelligent infrastructure.   
Note that the strategies explored in this PhD study refer to the tactics 
adopted by operators while dealing with information deficiencies (i.e. 
multiple sources of information) that amount to insufficient or irrelevant 
information. Rasmussen and Lind (1982) specified that the route to in-
depth understanding of control settings is through investigation of 
RSHUDWRUV¶ DFWLYLWLHV UDWKHU WKDQ WKH V\VWHP UHTXLUHPHQWV 7KHUHIRUH LQ
WKLV3K'ILHOGVWXGLHVZHUHFRQGXFWHGWRH[SORUHRSHUDWRUV¶DFWLYLWLHVLQWKH
control rooms.   
In order to identify the constraints when handling alarms and analysing 
faults, real operators commented on the challenges that they face while 
attending to an alarm or a fault (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7).  
A wide range of data collection techniques was used to ensure that an 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI RSHUDWRUV¶ DFWLYLWLHV DQG WKH DVVRFLDWHG FRJQLWLYH
processing was reached. These field studies are similar in approach to 
process tracing, which aims to identify how participants use the cues 
available  to handle a situation within a dynamic and evolving situation 
(Woods, 1992). Methods typically used to facilitate such understanding 
include behavioural records, verbal reports, eye movements, observation, 
concurrent or retrospective probes, interviews, etc. (Patrick, James, & 
Ahmed, 2006). A similar range of methods of data collection was used in 
the present PhD study.  
Within the ECR, video recordings of alarm handling episodes enabled 
timing of the activities, collecting information about the duration and 
sequence of interactions with different artefacts.  Furthermore, a time 
stamped observational checklist was designed to structure the data in 
terms of the use of the artefacts and whether operators considered these 
DODUPV WR EH RI µKLJK LQIRUPDWLRQ¶ RU µORZ LQIRUPDWLRQ¶ )LQDOO\ RSHUDWRUV¶
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verbal protocols provided the basis for an understanding of their thinking 
processes and an explanation of their actions. These extensive data 
collection were led to Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA). 
CWA explores the work setting by understanding the domain, its functions 
and available artefacts (Abstraction Hierarchy). The activities that are 
required to facilitate domain functions (Contextual Activity Matrix) and 
their sequence are elaborated (Cognitive transformation analysis) and it 
leads to understanding the strategies adopted by operator to deal with the 
problems raised within their context (Strategy analysis).  
It was not possible to conduct a video recording in the MCCs as the 
technicians did not agree to be recorded. Moreover, maintenance 
technicians do not respond to faults as soon as they are generated. The 
faults are recorded in a fault log and the technicians attend to them in their 
own time. Therefore, a semi-structured interview was designed to capture 
RSHUDWRUV¶ DFWLYLWLHV FXHV DQG VWUDWHJLHV ZKHQ DQDO\VLng a fault. The 
probes used in this interview were similar to the probes used within a CDM. 
The CDM interview technique facilitated an understanding of activities and 
their sequence. The cues used by operators and the reasons for seeking 
out those cues were discussed. The reasoning behind the selection of cues 
guided the strategies adopted in the control rooms. The cues used by 
operators are rooted in the characteristics of their context and the 
information available to them. 
 
Findings on the alarm and fault initiated activities show some 
correspondence with the stages of alarm initiated activities identified by 
Stanton (2006): observe, accept, analyse, investigate, correct, monitor, 
DQG UHVHW 7KH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ WKH ZRUN KHUH DQG 6WDQWRQ¶V LV WKDW
although his findings develop an understanding of the activities associated 
with alarm handling, his model is mainly focused on physical actions 
performed on one system (SCADA). The four activities identified in the 
present study - notification, acceptance, diagnosis, and clearance - refer 
mainly to domain functions and do not depend on specific artefacts (Note 
that the artefacts within ECR and MCC as well as the three MCCs varied). 
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Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the activities associated with 
problem solving identified in this PhD can correspond to those in railway 
intelligent infrastructure, in which the artefacts are yet to be specified.    
Operators in both domains, ECR and MCC, confirmed that information 
deficiencies, i.e., being presented with redundant information or not having 
enough information, comprise the most important challenges to their 
duties. Railway control workstations consist of various forms and types of 
information displays, there are cases where two or more displays refer to a 
particular alarm, with the result that there may be too many channels of 
information. In this study the teUPVµKLJKLQIRUPDWLRQ¶DQGµORZLQIRUPDWLRQ¶
are used. 
7KURXJKRXWWKHILHOGVWXG\LQWKH(&5DODUPVZLWKµKLJKLQIRUPDWLRQ¶WRRN
WZLFHDVORQJWRKDQGOHLQFRPSDULVRQWRDODUPVZLWKµORZLQIRUPDWLRQ¶7KLV
FRQILUPVSDUWLFLSDQWV¶FRQFHUQDQG suggests a major source of difficulty as 
information deficiencies and highlights the risks of presenting too much 
information in future intelligent infrastructure systems, just because the 
sensor systems can generate it. This finding concurs with that of  Omodei 
et al., (2005), where alarm handling performance worsened as the 
operators felt obligated to attend to every single piece of information 
simply because it was available.  
In addition to the lessons learned for human factors of future intelligent 
infrastructure systems, the two domains addressed in this study- electrical 
control rooms and maintenance control centres- have not previously been 
the focus of much rail human factors study, compared to say signalling or 
rail traffic control. Therefore, the findings from this thesis can inform the 
industry with regard to these two domains. Indeed, the findings from this 
study so far have fed into the flagship GB railway Thameslink project as 
well as the future railway Operation Strategy. 
The Thameslink project used the ECR alarm handling findings to inform the 
design of the ECR system of the future with the ultimate goal of combining 
AC and DC control rooms. Similarly, the detailed understanding gained 
from the ECR alarm handling was used to facilitate the standardisation of 
Electrical Control Operators in different control rooms, as part of the 
railway Operation Strategy for future network control.  
Chapter9: Discussion 
 
258 
 
9.4. Objective three: Produce Human Factors guidance for 
the future development and implementation of intelligent 
infrastructure systems in the railway to match and 
complement human capabilities and needs. 
The third objective of this PhD was to collate the findings from all of the 
studies and inform the industry about effective implementation and 
development of railway intelligent infrastructure from a human factors 
perspective. The studies reported in the previous chapters led to specific 
guidance regarding the roles, activities, strategies and human factor issues 
associated with a potential future intelligent infrastructure system 
(Table 6-6 and Table 7-4).  The guidance for an effective approach to the 
design of intelligent infrastructure to best meet human and social needs is, 
not surprisingly, compatible with traditional ergonomics design guidance 
(Network Rail, 2004) and is summarised in Table 9-3 below. Note that the 
intelligent infrastructure system in this table refers the overall system 
rather than the interface to be used, for example, by the control room 
operator. 
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TABLE 9-3: HIGH LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS IN DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING 
INTELLIGENT INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS  
Guidance  Relevance to rail Intelligent Infrastructure  
Clearly specify the 
scope, priorities and 
stakeholders of the 
project.  
Having a clear view of the values of the project 
will lead to an accurate understanding of the 
requirements and priorities of the system. 
Currently the main value residing in the 
intelligent infrastructure project is to reduce the 
delays and improve safety. Furthermore, 
identifying the stakeholders of the project 
(people who are involved or affected in any form 
by the project) can determine various phases of 
work that needs to be considered.  
Identify the stages 
that are necessary to 
facilitate successful 
implementation of 
each of the phases of 
the project  
Currently, NR is using ISO 13374 to guide the 
development phases of intelligent infrastructure 
project. It seems feasible to use the data 
processing framework developed and described 
in this thesis to guide successful implementation 
of each of these phases. This can be achieved by 
including human factor considerations presented 
in the data processing framework. 
Identify the roles of 
potential users early 
on in the project  
Since 2006, when the intelligent infrastructure 
project was launched, there has apparently been 
no clear view of the potential users and their 
roles within the project. The interview study, as 
well as the case studies, conducted in this PhD 
confirmed that an understanding of the various 
future user roles (track worker, control room 
operator and strategic analyst) is essential in 
terms of what information and functions should 
be embedded within the interface. Therefore it is 
essential to develop this understanding early on 
in the project. 
Engage the users 
early on the project  
Engage users, not just to achieve a participatory 
design but to encourage a sense of ownership. 
Whilst this is important for all human factors 
contributions to systems design, it is particularly 
important when the new system will change 
ways of working for whole networks of operators, 
including changes in the balance of 
responsibilities between them. 
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Reduce the numbers 
of alarms and faults 
alerted within the 
control centres  
In the MCC study, a huge number of alarms 
were logged, many of which were false and 
nuisance alarms. Occasionally they were 
misleading and caused the operator to miss the 
real alarm. Since the events  to be logged in 
future intelligent infrastructure  systems are 
likely to be very numerous, some considerable 
effort in intelligent screening and sorting will be 
required (although the history of alarm 
mismanagement from human factors literature 
shows that this is easier said than done). This 
will mean that the priorities and stregies of user 
groups must be thoroughly understood. 
Avoid presenting too 
much information to 
the operators. 
In the alarm handling study in the ECR, alarms 
FDWHJRULVHGDVµKLJKLQIRUPDWLRQ¶WRRNWZLFHDV
long to be handled compared to those 
categoULVHGDVµORZLQIRUPDWLRQ¶,WLVLPSRUWDQW
to identify and design for a necessary and 
sufficient level of information to the operators. 
Moreover, transferring a huge amount of data 
from sensors and loggers to information displays 
in control rooms can be very costly, and any 
reduction in this will help project cost 
effectiveness.  
Provide a reminder 
facility on the 
interface. 
In both case studies (ECR alarm handling and 
MCC fault finding) operators used paper based 
reminders to make sure they will attend to the 
important faults. It is important to assess the 
optimal format of the reminder facility (i.e., on 
paper or on the interface), and given systems 
change generally in this (eg the change from 
paper strips to computer interfaces in air traffic 
control), it is likely that insightful work analysis 
and interface design will be needed to develop 
computer based reminders.  
Ensure that support 
facilities are 
available. 
One of the issues identified by the maintenance 
technicians in the MCCs was that the legacy 
systems in control rooms are not sufficiently 
maintained and when things go wrong there is 
not enough support available.  
From the studies performed throughout this PhD, specific design guidance 
for HMI within intelligent infrastructure was made available, which is 
summarised in Table 9-4 below.  This guidance assumes that alarm 
handling and fault finding are two core functions of intelligent infrastructure 
(Chapter 5) and therefore refer to the field studies (Chapter 6 and chapter 
7) as well as the experimental study (Chapter 8).  
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TABLE 9-4: DESIGN GUIDANCE FOR SUPPORTING THE THREE ROLES WITHIN 
INTELLIGENT INFRASTRUCTURE (HMI RECOMMENDATIONS) 
Findings  Enablers/barriers  Design guidance   
Three roles involved with 
future intelligent 
infrastructure are track 
worker, control room 
operator and strategic 
analyst.  
Unlike strategic analyst, 
track worker and control 
room operator are 
existing roles and have a 
number of responsibilities 
within their job 
specification which should 
be considered when 
assigning them to 
intelligent infrastructure 
related activities.  
Clear job specification for 
the roles is required.  
Different roles would 
benefit from various levels 
of understanding, 
depending on their values 
and priorities.  
7UDFNZRUNHUV¶SULRULW\LV
to access the track in 
order to conduct its 
maintenance, whereas 
contrROURRPRSHUDWRUV¶
priority is to access the 
track for running the 
train.  
In designing job 
specification ensure that 
one role does not have 
conflicting values and 
priorities.  
Guidance for the track worker 
The sources of information 
should be reliable  
Track workers have no or 
limited access to 
interfaces on site (e.g. 
handheld devices) and 
therefore they cannot 
investigate the accuracy 
of the information 
System reliability should 
be ensured 
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available to them.  
Track workers need   
binary indication of the 
state of the asset   
In order to notice and 
accept the fault on track, 
a track worker is only 
interested to know 
whether the asset is in 
working condition or has 
IDLOHGVLQFHWKH\GRQ¶W
have the authority to 
plan the maintenance 
and have to feedback the 
information to the control 
room operator.  
Provide information 
regarding the state of the 
asset   
The information can be 
accompanied with local 
knowledge (e.g. recent 
engineering work in the 
location) 
Although knowing 
detailed information 
about the type of fault or 
historical information for 
a particular fault is not 
useful, situational 
information can help 
track workers to assess 
the authenticity of fault 
with more confidence  
Update track workers with 
the situational information  
Track workers do not need 
information associated 
with potential future faults  
Track workers are sent 
out on track to deal with 
operational failure at 
hand; some information 
is associated with what is 
going to happen next.  
Provide information only 
related to comprehending 
the task at hand.  
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Guidance for the Control Room Operator Role  
The information required 
for noticing and accepting 
alarms: 1-type of alarm 2-
general temporal and 
spatial information 3- the 
geographical 
characteristics   
Type of alarm and temporal 
aspect is usually available 
but knowing the 
characteristics of the location 
is very much dependent on 
WKHRSHUDWRUV¶H[SHUWLVH
However, ignoring a true 
alarm only based on the fact 
that the location has high 
false alarm rate is 
dangerous.  
Provide geographical 
characteristics (e.g. 
existing engineering 
work, number of the 
failed assets in the last 
month, etc.).  
Telephone is the most 
used artefact  while 
DWWHQGLQJµH[SHFWHG¶
alarms  
In cases of emergency, use of 
the telephone can be 
distracting. Furthermore 
other operators in the vicinity 
cannot share the information 
as they are not privy to the 
other end of the phone call.  
The other operators 
might find it useful to 
share phone 
conversations through 
a party line or open 
call. 
Paper is the most used 
artefact while attending 
µXQH[SHFWHG¶DODUPV 
Possibly due to the limitations 
of the computer display which 
cannot provide alarm 
indications on one page. 
Hence operators are required 
to write indication codes 
from, for example, an event 
log and switch back to the 
display area to complete the 
alarm assessment on other 
display pages. 
Key information (e.g. 
codes, history, etc) to 
be presented on the 
display on request 
(maybe with a mouse 
rollover) 
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If the information about 
the alarm is presented 
through more than two 
sources (phone, display, 
etc) it takes nearly twice 
as long to handle 
compared to the alarms 
where information is 
presented through no 
more than two sources.  
Redundancy in information 
load can cause confusion. 
Operators need to consider 
these features, if they are 
being informed through 
different types of media.  
Minimise information 
redundancy. An 
integrated information 
display might assist 
reduction of 
information 
redundancy.  
Operators do attend to 
multiple sources of 
information for the fear of 
missing some important 
information 
Almost all of the participants 
in the experimental study 
attended to the optional piece 
of information. This is very 
important; usually one of the 
design strategies is to allow 
the operators to customise 
the information   they want. 
This finding suggests that 
operators are not very good 
at ignoring irrelevant 
information for the fear of 
losing something important.  
The interface should 
manage the 
information that is 
being presented to the 
operator.  
Operators conduct similar 
core activities 
(notification, acceptance, 
analysis and clearance) 
disregarding the artefacts 
available to them- the only 
difference is that some 
processes are only 
supported.  
The comparison between the 
three MCCs showed that the 
activities conducted while 
dealing with faults remain the 
same. However, with more 
advanced RCM equipment, 
analysis and clearance are 
supported.  
Identify the level of 
support that is to be 
provided by the 
intelligent 
infrastructure interface 
in different control 
rooms.  
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Guidance for the strategic analyst role 
Strategic analysts are 
not interested in knowing 
about the operational 
state of the asset or the 
cues that will facilitate 
diagnosis of faults.  They 
only want trends in the 
history of the behavior of 
the assets so that they 
can evaluate its 
performance  
The findings in the 
interview study suggested 
that, since the strategic 
DQDO\VWV¶UROHLVQRWRI
immediate relevance to 
the operational task, they 
should not be alarmed by 
asset failures.  
Statistical analysis of the 
historical trends shown in 
graphs can be used to give 
operators an overview of 
WKHDVVHW¶VEHKDYLRURYHU
time.  
Strategic analyst need to 
have a clear 
understanding of the 
organisation  of work in 
order to be able to 
advise on efficient 
maintenance regimes 
and plan future 
recommendations.  
Different organisations are 
involved in the 
maintenance of an asset. 
This includes the company 
who developed the asset 
(e.g. Westinghouse), the 
TOC whose train is running 
on the asset and the 
railway safety board who 
advise on the safety 
requirements and 
standards.  
Clarify the benefits and the 
extent of involvement for 
different organisations 
involved with the project 
(if any) and hence define 
the extent of advice 
generation by the strategic 
analyst (so that it is 
feasible).  
9.5. Paradigms in analysing system control work: a review  
In this study, several paradigms and methodological approaches have been 
used, and the reasons for selecting these paradigms and their relevance to 
the research questions of this PhD were described in Section 3.4. The 
paradigms include a) the information processing paradigm, used to develop 
an understanding of the sequence of activities and of information 
processing during alarm handling and fault finding, b) the supervisory 
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control paradigm to identify the resource and function allocations 
associated with the different roles within the potential intelligent 
infrastructure system and c) the cognitive systems engineering paradigm 
to understand the nature of the intelligent infrastructure control context at 
a systems level, and to use this to understand relevant factors such as 
coping strategies when operators are dealing with potential challenges 
(such as information deficiencies). This section reviews these paradigms in 
light of the outputs of this PhD study and comments on their use. 
The empirical work in the current research project started with a holistic 
view of intelligent infrastructure, facilitated by an interview study (Chapter 
5), and  followed by an exploration of  specific problem solving tasks (i.e. 
alarm handling and fault finding ± chapters 6 and 7) and identification of  
the sequence of activities within particular work contexts. It was found that 
particular cognitive demands existed in the context of these control 
settings and that these resulted from situations of information deficiency. 
This has led to some hypotheses about the level of information provided 
which were investigated further through a laboratory study.  
The underlying approach of this PhD study was to understand cognition in 
context, hence the variations in cognitive methods and detailed field 
studies adopted in this study. At first it had been assumed that CSE would 
be an appropriate paradigm for the whole of the research work. The core 
requirement of the CSE paradigm is to investigate and explore the 
collaborations between various users and technologies in their actual 
dynamic forms (Woods et al., 1996). In the context of this PhD study, this 
would KDYHPHDQWH[SORULQJERWKWKHKXPDQRSHUDWRUV¶DQGWHFKQRORJLFDO
LQWHUIDFH¶V DFWLRQV DQG UHDFWLRQV DQG LQYHVWLJDWLQJ WKHLU FRXSOLQJ
throughout the complex situation. This was not possible, however, due to 
limitations in the resources available in this PhD.  
In other words, in order to facilitate a full use of the CSE paradigm, 
support for problem solving, the cognitive processing of the human 
operator, cognition of the machine (e.g. decision support systems) and 
their co-agency should all be explored. The main problem for developing 
such understanding in this PhD was the fact that there was no existing 
intelligent infrastructure system and therefore speculations about its 
functionalities could only be made through interviews with potential users. 
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This was the same approach adopted by Bisantz et al., (2003) in guiding 
the development of new US navy decision support systems.  
Upon identifying potential functions of the future intelligent infrastructure, 
exploring and investigating the human cognition and operatRUV¶EHKDYLRXU
during problem solving were facilitated and structured through cognitive 
methods such as CWA and CDM. However, within these studies, an 
information processing paradigm was followed to develop an understanding 
of the sequence of activities and processing modes during problem solving. 
6WXG\LQJ LQ WKH ILHOG RU ³LQ WKHZLOG´DQG observing operators in action, 
gave an indication of the challenges (cognitive demands) as well as the 
strategies they adopt to cope with these challenges. Work with key 
decision makers within Network Rail identified that problem solving within 
the future intelligent infrastructure will be distributed amongst various 
roles and across different control rooms. Hence, the supervisory control 
paradigm was used to facilitate considering these roles and their relevant 
cognitive processing. Beyond that, supervisory control guided the 
identification of the themes (i.e. resource and function allocation, 
strategies) that have to be addressed with future intelligent infrastructure. 
A simulation of a railway problem solving task was set up in order to 
examine problem solving performance based on the knowledge required by 
the operator (according to their roles) and the knowledge provided by the 
system. The findings suggest variance in the performance depending on 
the level of information provided and the tasks undertaken. In a way the 
final experimental study, although very simple, seeks to explore cognitive 
coupling in railway problem solving. This is similar to the experimental 
study conducted by Dalal and Kasper (1994). 
In summary while it was necessary to draw on different aspects of the 
three different paradigms (information processing, supervisory control and 
CSE), in order to address the questions identified at the outset of this 
thesis. Some of these paradigms do have acknowledged research 
limitations, which are discussed in the next section.  
9.6. Limitations of the research  
Intelligent infrastructure comprises a very large, somewhat ill-defined and 
complex system or even system of systems. In the planning within NR, the 
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salient project is massive, both in terms of the quantity and variety of data 
that have to be collected as well as the wide range of roles and functions 
that will potentially be affected by it. Likewise the variety of human and 
social issues potentially involved is very large and inter-connected. 
Furthermore, since this is an on-going project within the company, it 
changed constantly throughout the life of this research, in terms of the 
strategies and priorities of the project as well as the people involved with 
it. For example, the project manager interviewed as part of the first study 
(Chapter 5) was no longer responsible for the project at the conclusion of 
the research. This is not only a limitation for this PhD, but it confirms a 
challenge to the development of large scale projects, such as intelligent 
infrastructure, in organisations such as Network Rail. 
During the field study in the ECR, only 22 alarm episodes were generated 
during the course of 18 hours of the study. This number appears to be low 
in order to achieve the objectives of this study. It is worth taking into 
consideration the fact that the researcher was involved in a number of 
other projects related to ECR; through her additional knowledge of the 
domain gained from these other duties, this number of alarms and the 
quality of data collected (via video recording, interviews, etc.) has provided 
sufficient information to achieve the objectives of this study and to make 
the interpretations reported. Also notable is the fact that the findings from 
the ECR were confirmed in the study conducted in the maintenance control 
centres.  
The number of participants (31 students) recruited for the experimental 
study (Chapter 8) is relatively small from a statistical point of view. The 
power analysis conducted prior to the study recommended the inclusion of 
around 45 participants to avoid any risk of missing a significant effect. In 
fact, this study was not established to seek a significant effect but aimed to 
confirm the trend in the performance of the tasks trialled as hypothesised. 
Therefore, the sample size is regarded as adequate for purpose. 
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10. Conclusion and recommendations for future research  
10.1 Conclusions 
The research undertaken and described in this thesis has developed a 
human factors understanding of likely human behaviour and cognition, as 
well as the knowledge and information requirements, for future users of a 
potential railway intelligent infrastructure system. Several paradigms and 
methodological approaches were used throughout this PhD, suitable for 
different research questions and in light of the resources available to the 
researcher,  
The researcher was fortunate to be welcomed into a wide range of railway 
FRQWUROVHWWLQJVWRH[SORUHRSHUDWRUV¶FRJQLWLYHSURFHVVLQJLQDFWLRQDODUP
handling and fault finding). Moreover, the researcher was a member of the 
Network Rail (NR) Ergonomics Team for three years and hence had 
developed a good overall understanding of the organisational culture, 
which enabled her to place the scientific and theoretical knowledge 
acquired in a realistic context. In this sense she became a participative 
observer of the company, the development of human factors solutions 
generally and the progress of the intelligent infrastructure systems 
development (a very slow process!). 
This project was the first in NR to study the human factors of future 
intelligent infrastructure and one of the few in all domains that aims to 
understand and facilitate use of the requirements for an intelligent 
infrastructure system which does not yet exist. This provided opportunities 
to contribute to a novel idea and, at the same time, offer design guidance 
at both basic and more advanced levels, in comparison to the guidance 
developed for existing systems.  The PhD took a systematic approach 
towards understanding the future likely work systems and workplaces so 
that the researcher could predict the knowledge and information 
requirements of a system not yet in existence.   
Intelligent infrastructure has been defined in this PhD study as: an 
integration of existing remote condition monitoring technologies that are 
distributed locally and centrally and used by different operators in 
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identifying and handling faults in the infrastructure assets in order to 
improve safety and efficiency of the rail service.  
This definition highlights features of the work that will influence the 
successful implementation of intelligent infrastructure. These features are: 
identification of an effective method of integrating various (possibly 
incompatible) sources of data, retention of accuracy and reliability 
throughout any data cleaning and reduction techniques, identification of 
potential user groups, exploration of the information and knowledge 
requirements for each group of users and identification of the values and 
priorities of the overall system. The first two features relate to the technical 
challenges of the intelligent infrastructure system and those remaining are 
practical human factor issues that designers and developers need to 
address for successful implementation.  
The methodological framework used in this study was continually assessed 
and evolved throughout the research. Different cognitive methods were 
used to facilitate the study: CWA and knowledge elicitation in the alarm 
handling study (chapter 6), and CDM and Decision Ladders in the fault 
finding study (chapter 7). Using a combination of methods to capture and 
structure the field-based qualitative data provided the means to 
understand the practicalities and limitations of the use of these methods 
and could be adopted as a good practice guide for future research. For 
instance, the outcome of understanding the practicalities and limitations 
associated with CWA were published in a journal of rail and rapid transit 
systems to inform railway practitioners (Dadashi et al, 2012 in press).  
,Q WRGD\¶VHQHUJ\-aware world, the railway is appreciated more than any 
other mode of transportation and there is an urgent and critical need to 
improve the quality of the services provided by the rail industry. Thus, in 
the years to come, we will be witnessing more advanced technologies to 
address these needs. The methodological approach adopted for the 
purpose of this research can be used to inform the design and scoping of 
these future technologies. 
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10.1 Recommendations for future research  
This research has been among the first attempts to study railway control 
settings from a cognitive systems engineering point of view. In order to 
implement and develop a successful intelligent infrastructure system, many 
aspects need to be addressed beyond those feasible within the scope of 
this research. Some of the proposed future research areas are listed here:  
1- Investigate and critically examine the data processing framework in 
rail (via further verification) and in other intelligent infrastructure 
domains. This PhD study was focused on the exploration of various 
aspects of intelligent infrastructure in the rail industry, yet it is 
believed that the data processing framework has the potential to be 
generalised to other intelligent infrastructures and knowledge 
sharing centres. At the time of writing this thesis, system 
developers providing services to the water industry encountered 
during presentation of the research at international conferences 
have shown an interest in applying the data processing framework.   
2- The interview study has revealed a number of cognitive functions as 
part of the activities of the potential intelligent infrastructure 
system, such as decision making, planning, regulating, problem 
solving, etc. The focus of the current study was problem solving. 
One possible future work direction is to apply a similar work analysis 
approach to discover and explore other cognitive functions as well.  
3- The data processing framework recommends an order in which 
various human factors issues should be investigated at different 
phases of the project.  Although this order is derived from an in-
depth and comprehensive interview study, not all of the informants 
were human factors specialists. Complementary pieces of work with 
human factors experts could investigate these issues, particularly 
their order, in more detail. Ultimately the goal would be to develop 
a human factors practical standard that guides the development and 
implementation of intelligent infrastructure and knowledge sharing 
centres.  
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12. Appendices  
12.1.  Information sheet for the railway intelligent 
infrastructure interview study   
Network Rail is making the further development of an intelligent 
infrastructure a key part of its future plans. Within that, remote condition 
monitoring is likely to play an important role. Intelligent Infrastructure will 
be introduced to move rail work processes from a µILQGDQGIL[¶PHQWDOLW\WR
one of µSUHGLFW DQG SUHYHQW¶ DQG SRWHQWLDOO\ WR µGHVLJQ DQG SUHYHQW¶
(Network Rail Intelligent Infrastructure Good Practice Guide).  The 
objective of the Intelligent Infrastructure is essentially to integrate data 
obtained from different types of assets (e.g. software, hardware, points, 
tracks, trains, etc) and convert them to useful information and especially 
knowledge that can be used as a decision aid.  
It is clear that there are a number of critical human factors implications of 
intelligent infrastructure and remote condition monitoring. What will the 
new functions and roles be, how will the new knowledge and decision 
making routines effect distributed teamwork and communications? What 
knowledge will people need to do their jobs? How should the data collected 
from the infrastructure be managed into knowledge and how should this be 
displayed for different functional groups on information devices and 
interfaces (including mobile computing)? Intelligent Infrastructure presents 
integrated information on a display to assist operator and hence it is 
essential to understand not only the information and functional 
requirements of an Intelligent Infrastructure information display, but also 
how this information should be presented to the operators.  
The latest in a series of PhD projects managed by the Network Rail 
Ergonomics Team and University of Nottingham is examining the human 
factors of remote condition monitoring and of Intelligent Infrastructure 
generally. The very first stage in this research is to conduct an exploratory 
study of Intelligent Infrastructure and RCM in rail through a series of semi-
structured interviews with rail staff who are potential users or those who 
know of Intelligent Infrastructure information displays. Below is a list of 
possible questions to feed into these interviews: 
1. What do you understand to be the future of Intelligent 
Infrastructure for Network Rail? 
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2. What do you think is the purpose of Intelligent Infrastructure?  
3. Do you consider RCM as a type of intelligent infrastructure? 
4. :KDWGRHVµUHPRWH¶LQ5&0PHDQ" 
5. :KDWGRHVµLQWHOOLJHQW¶LQLQWHOOLJHQWLQIUDVWUXFWXUHPHDQ" 
6. How will the information required for an intelligent infrastructure be 
captured? 
7. What do you think are the main functions of an intelligent 
infrastructure information display? 
8. Which control rooms need to be in direct contact with intelligent 
infrastructure systems?  
9. What are the challenges for designing an effective intelligent 
infrastructure system? 
10. What are the main roles and responsibilities of operators working 
with intelligent infrastructure systems? 
For more information about this study, please contact Nastaran Dadashi or 
John Wilson: 
Email: Nastaran.Dadashi@networkrail.co.uk  
Email: John.Wilson@nottingham.ac.uk 
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12.2. An example of the interview study and the one of the 
coding schemes  
Code Colour  
Definition and purpose   
Benefit   
Current RCM situation   
Future plans   
Functions   
Cognitive functions   
Challenge   
Roles and responsibilities   
System distribution   
Human factors issues   
Interview number 1:  
Intelligent infrastructure is an ill defined project although it goes back to 
few years ago. My role is to lead Intelligent Infrastructure, I am part of the 
transformation team, and this team has been set up from early 2009 and 
to help NR achieve significant budget shortfalls due to recent economical 
changes. So effectively it is to inform a 4 billion gap caused by recent 
alterations.  
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The intelligence at this stage is not perceived to consider Human Machine 
Interface [HMI] related issues, we had not considered human interaction 
issues yet.  
Now what do we mean by intelligent infrastructure? 
The definition and the understanding of intelligent infrastructure are not 
consistent around the company. What I have found is:  
Intelligent infrastructure is an infrastructure which in some way uses 
technology to provide data pertinent to its condition.  
At the moment the how we look after infrastructure is completely passive, 
something breaks on the track, you as a technician get alerted and fix it. 
We are using ISO 133743 model to present intelligent infrastructure. ISO 
133743 is a framework which is a standardised approach and it has six 
stages:  
1- Data acquisition: 
This is being done to some extent at the moment. For example we do 
measure point heating and this data is being collected every second, and 
the time interval setup on it is chosen due to purely arbitrary perspective.  
The problem of this rather arbitrary data acquisition is generating 
inappropriate amount of data, so we need to specify exactly what data we 
need. For example on a point machine you can measure various things:  
the time it takes to switch, force, temperature on the rail, hydraulic 
pressure, etc, but  do we really need all of these information, part of the 
project is to collect the right amount of data at the right interval and also 
on the right asset.  
2- Data Manipulation  
If you acquire data you need to be able to manipulate it or that data is 
pointless.  
3- State detection  
This is to identify what state the asset is and it gives binary measures, is it 
working normally or is it working abnormally, currently this is the stage 
where network rail is. We have remote condition measurement systems 
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places on various assets and we can determine whether the asset is 
operating in its normal condition or an abnormal condition.  
4- Health assessment  
This is a diagnostic position where we can diagnose from the data we have 
and say what is wrong with it. Somewhere in here between these two steps 
you need to inform people somehow. Today in most cases we just have an 
alarm and alert approach. Local operators set the limits for the assets in 
their area and when an abnormality occurs it will generate an alarm which 
is a window on their normal operating screen and they can click on it to 
find out what is wrong and they can look back and see plots over time. For 
example if you look at a point machine in Essex the guy at the control 
centre based in Liverpool Street is monitoring the resistance of the 650 
volts of power supplies to a signalling power supply and normally for some 
reason the resistance value shows abnormality and there is a huge drop in 
the resistance which is beyond the alarm limit. So the operator had to send 
a fault team on track and they have found a rat which decided to feed on 
main power supply and ended up having a 650 volts lunch which fried him 
so they removed the rat and that is basically how alarms get responded to. 
The risk in handling them more intelligently is that we are going to end up 
with huge amount of data alarms and alerts being raised on different asset 
categories with different level of urgency and the problem is how we are 
going to present that data to operators in order that we get the right 
reaction.   
In order to focus the project a number of strategic assets have been 
selected. The selection was conducted by two criteria: historical and 
criticality. Historical is due to information regarding previous delay records 
and what assets are the major contributors. Essentially network rail signs a 
contract with network operators and guarantee certain network availability 
to them and if this is not fulfilled then NR is subject to a fine. Critical assets 
are those if failed which cause major problems (if they do fail that would be 
a nightmare). Most of them are quite well known and what you normally 
find is that they get special attention and maintenance operators know that 
these set of points are really important so these have a higher routine 
maintenance schedule. $ SURMHFW LQ 1HWZRUN 5DLO HQWLWOHG ³1HWZRUN
&ULWLFDOLW\´ LV UHVSRQVLEOH IRU WKLV DVVLJQPHQW DQG WKH\ KDYH GHYHORSHG D
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map of critical assets which is assists intelligent infrastructure project team 
with identification of critical assets.  
Also we do have a number of legacy systems which collect and analyse 
asset data, one of the requirements of the intelligent infrastructure projects 
is to align these various legacy systems. Today there are around 3000 RCM 
systems and some of our most problematic maintenance points have many 
RCM systems so the question would be if it worth it or not. For example in 
there is loads of point condition monitoring fitted on points in the Anglia 
region and the an off the shelf system provided for the company called 
CDS together with other off the shelf systems and we could just say that 
OHW¶VUHSOLFDWHWKRVHRII WKHVKHOIV\VWHPVEXWZHGRQ¶W WKLQNWKDW LV LGHDO 
So one of the big pieces of work is to look at the legacy systems and 
provide recommendations for it. for example we do have a pilot which is an 
alignment of various off the shelf systems and essentially what you get in 
different places are different with different users.  
Intelligence is when we are able to use data to prevent equipment failures. 
So going back to the ISO standard in these six steps the level of 
intelligence is increasing. The infrastructure has no level of intelligence in 
it, the first level of intelligence is how much information is required to 
reach a good decision and then on the sixth stage which is the advisory 
generation. 
At the moment only alarms has a level of intelligence in them. So instead 
of having data versus time, you have data versus time versus control 
limits.  
There are huge amount of expertise involved with the decision making and 
fault finding, a lot of people are being surprised by knowing what exactly is 
that happens to an asset. For example I was surprised to see that there 
are cases where fluctuations to resistance are normal, there are many 
contributing factors and this is where human become useful. To be honest 
we really want to know how an expert does this job, because that can be 
what it is that contributing to reduction in service.  
We have drawn a conceptual benefit model with two axes benefit and time. 
Time has an important factor in the context of intelligent infrastructure 
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project. A period of understanding is required for each of these steps and 
we try to link this to the six stages in the ISO and actually in terms of 
benefit you get x, y and z on each of the three steps and z< x>y and these 
three stages are diagnostics, prognostics and advisory generation.  
I do agree with your model but the time piece is also important.  
The way we are looking at our system is that we have a number of loggers 
that acquire data and it is then connected to an aerial via GPRS which is 
managed by O2 and transmitted to our central server. Up to this level it 
might be called as intelligent infrastructure but it is not, it is just an IM. 
Currently we are planning to present solutions suggested based on the 
aligned information by Invensys (So what is shown on the screen here is 
not in the scope of our project, it is mainly Invensys) and that is then 
connect to our internal network so we can display the output on a terminal 
anywhere. Part of our work is to describe this business process because at 
the moment we believe that we provide the wrong information to the 
wrong people at the wrong time. Actually I think what we do is that we 
over kill, we give information to everybody.  
We have put some thoughts into the amount of data that we are putting on 
the screens so for example rather than measuring everything and then 
filter it later we want to be more specific and record the vital signs and 
then we got less to deal with later. The least we want to assign a person to 
look at data all day, for me the project can actually fail on the same criteria 
that it can succeed. So it is important how much information is beneficial to 
collect.  
Distribution of the system is not finale yet, it can be a national RCM centre 
which you have one screen and one source of data but it is unlikely to have 
that. Probably the most realistic distribution of the system is the regional 
one. The distribution of the system relates to the type of work that needs 
to be done. Two types of actions need to be considered: interim corrective 
action and permanent corrective action. Interim corrective action refers to 
when the operator has to fix the problem quickly, for example if an error 
occurs and it is going to cause delay the maintenance team might decide to 
fix the error straight away, two options are available: 
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1- The maintenance supervisor will use his operational capability to avoid 
asset failure, for example if it is a point failure re-routing trains might 
be an option in order to eliminate or decrease delays. I think Network 
Rail is very good in this but the problem is that just after they have 
dealt with one occurrence they forget about it until it happens again. 
Partially this is due to the nature of work, we FDQ¶WDIIRUGGHOD\V and if 
we want to make up with a permanent solution then it is going to need 
three months of analysis and lab work and a new deployment schedule. 
Well that is not possible, we need a quick way but we also need 
another loop which for me is called permanent corrective action.  
2- Permanent corrective action: this might involve contacting suppliers 
with an enhanced set of information to be provided to a more strategic 
group. The control centres which support this feature should be more 
central, so for example if we have 40 local RCM control centre to deal 
with TCA one would be responsible for PCA. So the local centres would 
see the information and respond to them fairly quickly and, the central 
centres would receive the same information but should not be 
immediately responsive they can monitor and analyse the information 
and provide permanent corrective actions. For example the central 
guys say well you fixed them good but I am monitoring it and I can see 
that you have done 100 of times in the last year and of those 100 
times 80% seems to be the same thing so what I am going to do is to 
focus on that 80% and I am going to try to come up with a permanent 
action to basically to start eliminating these faults. But it should be the 
same source of information probably more depth available in the 
central level. 
7KHUHDVRQIRUVHSDUDWLQJWKHVHWZRUROHVLVWKDWZHGRQ¶WZDQWWREXUGHQ
the local guys with unmanageable amount of work. For example we know 
that just with current measurements we can detect the state of the point, 
this might not be enough for diagnosing why the point has failed but good 
enough at the operational level.  
What we in intelligent infrastructure team refer to is flight controller model 
and the analogy would be that on a plane a captain might get a red light 
about a fuel system and he say that I know what it is but I am busy flying 
the plane, the flight engineer would have pressure gauges, thermal 
couples and other information, so he looks into it and find the reason for 
the problem. So basically the pilot is the operator on the front line and the 
flight engineer is the central room controller.  
Another note is that we do not want to measure parameters if we are not 
going to use those parameters. For example in the pilot in Scotland we 
only measure current whereas at Liverpool Street we measure current, 
swing time, force and temperature. They measure four parameters and at 
the end they only use current to do the state detection.  +RZHYHUZHGRQ¶W
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know for the next stage on the ISO which is diagnosis do we have to step 
back and apply more parameters or not.  
Main functions of the system are alerting at the operational level and a 
parametric description of asset condition in this bigger loop. On our pilot in 
Scotland in the control centre in Glasgow the operator has a minimised 
window on his control screen which flashed red when an asset condition 
became abnormal, he then log a fault in FMS (Fault Management System) 
and contact the signal box to inform them of the fault and inform the local 
fault team to diagnose if it is a genuine faults and if yes what has caused 
it. What we are aiming for in intelligent infrastructure is to give them the 
right information to do the right action and also tell the front line that the 
failure is going to happen in an specific duration and the advise would be 
to either fix it now and avoid the peak time or leave it for tonight also 
some information to the maintenance track worker regarding the causes of 
failure so that they can go on track prepared. So the idea is to get the 
right information to the right group of people and stop bothering others. 
For example some of the trains have some sort of RCM on them , for 
instance if there is a fault on the door it will contact to the server depots 
and order future maintenance works . These systems apparently work 
really well and train operating companies no longer do routine 
PDLQWHQDQFHFKHFNVPRUHRYHUWKH\GRQ¶WHYHQLQIRUPWKHGULYHUDERXWDOO
this as long as it is not affecting the operational procedure. One of the 
challenges for us is to identify which information for hat task and when.  
Challenges facing the project are:  
1. Selecting the right assets 
2. Identifying the correct parameters to measure  
7RRPDQ\DQG\RXRYHUNLOOLWDQGWRRIHZDQG\RXGRQ¶WJHWWKHFDSDELOLW\
out of the information. 
3. Identify the correct operating process 
This is to do with the people. When we ask operators who do you like RCM 
they say it is very good but in reality they ended up doing more work.  
Roles and responsibilities of the operators are going to be defined by the 
business process team. By December we will have a strategic plan which 
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gives us a view on the operative model. After that we can decide on the 
major roles and responsibilities.  
Moreover we are talking to other departments in Network Rail and ask 
them their requirements and view on the project. :KDW,GRQ¶t want to do 
LVWKDWSHRSOHLQWKHV\VWHPGRQ¶WJLYHDQ\LQSXWDQGVD\LWLVQRWKLQJWRGR
with me that would be destined to failure. For example we ask customer 
service and ask them do you have assets that can be benefited from RCM 
and assist you in delivering CP4 business target. One example is 
information about ticket barriers, large information displays and passenger 
related information. We were actually going to put a questionnaire e-mail 
at everybody but we realised that will end up into an unmanageable 
responses, that is why we are targeting at key stake holders.  
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12.3. Information sheet and consent for the knowledge 
elicitation exercise  
Thank you for your participation in this study. I am a PhD student in 
Human Factors Research Group, University of Nottingham and I am funded 
by Network Rail. The goal of this study is to investigate the information 
requirement while alarm handling in railway electrical control rooms.  
This study will take around 30 minutes. You will be presented with an 
exemplar of an alarm situation. You will be asked to diagnose the fault and 
suggest corrective actions. More information regarding the fault would be 
available to you upon request.  
Information will be gathered in the form of your responses and the 
information that was requested during the study. The results from the 
study will be retained securely by University of Nottingham in accordance 
with data protection policies, and will be use solely for the purpose of this 
research, including academic publication. Data will only be accessible by 
people directly involved in the research. Images will not be used without 
your permission. 
No personal information (e.g. name, contact details) will be associated with 
your responses; it will not be possible to identify you from response data. 
You will be allocated an ID number upon arrival and this will be used on 
your responses. 
Participation in this experiment is strictly voluntary and you may 
withdraw at any point.  Your participation in this experiment is 
anonymous and the records of your participation will be kept 
strictly confidential. 
Thank you very much for your help. Please do not hesitate to ask any 
questions. 
Nastaran Dadashi  
PhD student, Human Factors Research Group, University of Nottingham 
Tel: +44 (0) 115 9514033 
Email: epxnd2@nottingham.ac.uk 
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12.4. Alarm handling observational checklist  
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12.5. Alarm handling state and process diagrams 
Identify priority:  
 
Locating alarmÆ what is the alarm about? What does the code mean? 
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Information requirement analysis  
 
Collect the required information  
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Assess the alarm  
 
Make the appropriate changes  
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Finalising the alarm  
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12.6. ECRO comments after handling alarms- 2 examples  
Alarm 1: unexpected alarm  
Note: It took 3 seconds for the operator to look at the alarm and grab the 
mouse and acknowledge it by clicking on the operational display. And 
another 4 second to load the new page where caused the alarm. But before 
the page is loaded or while it is loading O1 started to explain what he 
thinks this alarm is about. 
Operator1: see once when get here, there could be anything at Lewisham.  
There is no way we can tell what the problem is. But in this case it is a trip 
charge. It just dropped a lot of threshold and its gone back to normal now. 
And now that I am on this page I see that the other one (Bloomsbury) is 
low as well and that is going to guide alarm so you just  increase that as 
well. 
Note: He made the changes on the screen and continues talking about the 
procedure and the reasons  
Operator: but you do know on your mind sort of why is that, because you 
can see that there is no DC breakers trip or AC breakers trip. What I am 
saying is that you looking and you already looked into it and you sort of 
NQRZZKDW¶VGRZQEHIRUH\RXKDYHWKHSDJHXSORDGHG%HFDXVH\RXORRN
at the other two screens, because if anything of AC has tripped you see it 
on there and DC tripped you see it on the other and by the time the alarm 
related page loads up you know you have to rule out those two options. All 
I am saying is that you automatically do that and you already looked at 
both screens and you know that nothing is actually tripped, so you are 
already half way there.  
Note: Now he is going back to the screens to show me what it is that he is 
scanning: 
Operator: So without even looking at it you have already checked that it is 
not the other two so it is very likely to be the other one. Whereas if it is a 
AC trip you see the thing open on the screen and then you know that this 
is what that need taking care of and you rule out the other options.  
ResearcherVRWKLVLVKRZ\RXUHDOLVHZKDW¶VZURQJ 
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O2: yes, obviously, all we get is the alarm banner. This is the operator we 
call this up to do operations about accepting the alarm, we look at the 
RYHUYLHZWRJUDEWKHLQIRUPDWLRQDQGGHFLGHZKDW¶VZURQJLW¶VOLNHVHFRQG
nature, you think you are not thinking. When you look at the colour you 
think what category alarm it is and you already are half way there, because 
you can say what category alarm it is and you know what is the priority of 
each category and what are the things associated with the potential causes 
of the alarms based on the categories.  
Note: then he generates the alarm to show me how different categories 
work, he does it to test an outstation but it was going to generate an 
alarm. 
Alarm2: expected 
Operator: there are multiple alarms in that because I just set them like 
that, as part of the testing. But the system will display only the high 
SULRULW\ 7KH KLJKHVW SULRULW\ LV FDWHJRU\ WZR DQG WKDW¶V WKH RQH , DP
seeing, but when you go on a site, you see that we got category 2, 
category 3 and category 4 alarms, so it will only show you the individuals. 
Now what I am going to accept just the category 2 alarm and you see the 
banner is going to change to the pink. 
Researcher: so the system do the prioritising for you in colour coding, but 
in this case you have 5 category 2 alarms in red, how do you know which 
one to chose first. 
Operator: it would depend on what it is, because we have so many 
different category 2 alarms. 
Researcher: so you do a double filtering in some sense. 
Operator: yes, exactly. For example if we lost an HV supply, we get lots of 
FDWHJRU\  DODUPV SOXV HYHU\WKLQJ HOVH 6R \RX JR WR WKH VLWH DQG \RX¶OO
see. Let me show in an example: 
Note: so he changes the page and goes to another one to show me what 
happened if a HV is lost and what he has to do in response to that: 
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Operator: we would have to rectify trip, that indicate opened that would 
remain open.  We would have to battery charge of 1, 2 and 3 (Category 4 
alarm) , NV1, NV2(category 3), SS1 (category 2) ... and all these would 
alarmed. We also get a rectifier trip as well which will be category 2. And if 
its is due to a fault on that feeder then that DCP would be open and we will 
get 61,62 (?) which will be category 2. And that would be just one of the 
sites. For example if we lose the feeder of 1074, everything in orange on 
here we would get those alarms from.  
Researcher: So the branch colours are another way for you to know which 
branch to look. 
OperatorH[DFWO\WKHRQO\SUREOHPLVWKDWLW¶VDELWPLVOHDGLQJEHFDXVHZH
GRQ¶WJHWLQGLFDWLRQRIDQ\RIWKRVHJURXSSRLQWV6RLILWLVWULSSHGDWJULG
VXSSO\ ZH ZRXOGQ¶W JHW LQGLFDWLRQ RI WKDW EHFDXVH WKH\ QHYHU JLYH XV
LQGLFDWLRQEHFDXVH WKH\KDYHQ¶WJRWFables in. However we would now by 
losing our voltages so if we go to the tab changing page , you can still work 
it out  because that 1704 , the Lewisham one, those voltage would be 0. 
So we know that it tripped the entire supply grid. After we have confirmed 
it we get in touch with the grid and first of you asked them has it tripped, if 
LW¶V1RWKHQZKDWKDSSHQHGWKH\FRXOGKDYHWKHLUHTXLSPHQWWULSSHGDQG
DOVRZH FDQ¶WSXW LW ULJKWEDFNRQEHFDXVH WKHQ LWZLOOEHD VKRFN WR WKLV
system, so we have to go slowly.  And you can see by the size of it if this 
happens what huge work it is and when you are recharging them back you 
get all of the alarms back as well and you have to accept them before you 
can carry on.  
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12.7. Information sheet and consent for the fault finding 
study  
Thank you for your participation in this study. I am a PhD student in 
Human Factors Research Group, University of Nottingham and I am funded 
by Network Rail. The current study is to provide a conceptual 
understanding of fault finding within maintenance boxes. The aim of this 
project is to explore the activities associated with fault finding and tactics 
and strategies adopted by operators. 
In this experiment which will take about an hour you will be asked to think 
of examples of recent faults they have attended with any of the following: 
1- Example of fault detection which refers to the promptness of 
detection 
2- Incipient faults: small faults that if not attended can adds up 
3- False alarm rate: example of a case where the detection was 
difficult due to high false alarm rate. 
4- Example of an incident where the fault detection get missed? 
5- Example of an incident where incorrect fault identification occurs: 
system correctly register that there is a fault but incorrectly 
identifies the component which has failed. 
The researcher will ask following questions for each of the cases 
recalled by operators, note must be taken that these questions re not 
fixed and might vary from case to case: 
1- How you became aware of the fault? What was the cue in 
identification of the problem? 
2- What was the most important piece of information that helped you 
in making that decision? 
3- How did you integrate all sources of information and came to a 
conclusion? 
4- What artefacts you used? 
5- What was your level of situation awareness? 
Participation in this experiment is strictly voluntary and you may 
withdraw at any point.  Your participation in this experiment is 
anonymous and the records of your participation will be kept 
strictly confidential.  
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If you felt any inconvenience at any stage of the experiment please make 
sure that you inform me. 
For any questions regarding the experiment please do not hesitate to 
contact me. 
Nastaran Dadashi  
PhD student, Human Factors Research Group, University of Nottingham 
Tel: +44 (0) 115 9514033 
Email: epxnd2@nottingham.ac.uk 
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12.8. CDM-like spreadsheet completed during the fault 
finding study 
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12.9. Information sheet and consent for the laboratory study  
Thank you for your participation in this study. I am a PhD student in 
Human Factors Research Group, University of Nottingham and I am funded 
by Network Rail. The goal of this study is to assess the effect of information 
presentation on the performance of alarm handling.  
This study will take up to an hour and you will be paid £12 for your time. A 
tutorial of the experimental procedures will be available and the required 
level of competency will be assessed through a test. Upon successful 
completion of the competency test you will be asked to assess 30 alarms 
presented on the experimental prototype and respond accordingly. In order 
to take part in this study you must successfully complete the test which will 
take around 15 minutes. 
The study will take place in a usability laboratory, where you will be asked 
to perform a simple alarm handling task. The experimenter will explain the 
equipment being used and there will be a practice run of the system to give 
you the opportunity to familiarise yourself with the experimental 
procedures.  
Information will be gathered in the form of response times, interaction with 
the experimental prototype and a record of eye movement while 
conducting the experiment. The results from the study will be retained 
securely by University of Nottingham in accordance with data protection 
policies, and will be use solely for the purpose of this research, including 
academic publication. Data will only be accessible by people directly 
involved in the research. Images will not be used without your permission. 
No personal information (e.g. name, contact details) will be associated with 
your responses; it will not be possible to identify you from response data. 
You will be allocated an ID number upon arrival and this will be used on 
your responses. 
Participation in this experiment is strictly voluntary and you may 
withdraw at any point.  Your participation in this experiment is 
anonymous and the records of your participation will be kept 
strictly confidential. 
Thank you very much for your help. Please do not hesitate to ask any 
questions. 
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Nastaran Dadashi  
Tel: +44 (0) 115 9514033 
Email: epxnd2@nottingham.ac.uk 
 
